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This essay examines the role language and images play in the 
construction of subjectivity. Apart from many theories of subjectivity 
{especially psychoanalytic) which base the development of the subject 
almost solely in language, i argue that there are other media (i.e., images) 
which contribute to the formation of the subject. Using Kierkegaard’s 
concept of the aesthetic as narrative thread, i weave together the thought 
of several recent theorists (Kristeva, Lacan, Baudrillard, and Derrida) and 
several paintings (by Rembrandt, Kandinsky, Dali, and Magritte) to 
illuminate the role images may play in understanding the pre-linguistic self. By paralleling Kierkegaard, critical theory, and the visual arts, 
visuality is shown to be a key function of the self, This conception gives 
not only a chronological, or developmental, view of the subject, but also 
provides a topographical mapping where vision stands aside speech as 
diverse constitutive elements of the fully-functioning subject.
By shifting critical emphasis away from ’language’ to the broader 
notion of ’media of communication,’ images are separated from the domain 
of language. In this scheme, language and images are considered as 
distinct media which supplement ("add to and replace") one another. The 
’media of communication’ view of the subject is analogous to Kierkegaard’s 
three stages, or "modes," of existence (the aesthetic, ethical, and religious). 
Just as each medium of communication supplements another, the aesthetic 
and ethical (and religious) modes of existence similarly supplement and 
overlap each other. The human subject, then, is constructed by words and  
images, and exists in aesthetic and  ethical modes, among others.
In the end, these various media and modes play off of each other, 
giving way to a ’subject in process.’ Subjectivity becomes a movement 
with no fixed or final place for ultimate meaning, no teleological 
progression toward a final salvation. This movement of the subject is what 
i am labelling, following Kierkegaard’s religious category, ’faith.’ Such a 
non-traditional notion sees faith not as an attainable object, but relates it 
to the psychoanalytic concept of d es ire  and the poststructural view of 
writing {écritu re). Faith is the movement of the subject which resists 
structures, singular media, or modes, and takes risks.
As a conclusion to the examination of the aesthetic stage, i make a 
brief foray into Kierkegaard’s ethical stage and take the literary trope of 
irony into consideration, especially as it relates to the discrepancy between 
the form  of communication and the meaning. Here there is a move to 
examine the function of language in subjectivity. A question arises: in 
terms of this essay, if the aesthetic is "pre-lingual" (and image separate 
from the word) how can one theorize the images of the aesthetic using 
language? Irony comes into play and in this play a different view of 
language surfaces. Furthermore, the subject is seen as an ironic subject 
split between form and content. Finally, repetition is the doubly-reflective 
movement out of these stages, propelling the subject to more movement.
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Scholarly discourse is no longer distinguishable from that prolix and 
fundamental narrativity that is our everyday historiography. Scholarship 
is an integral part of tiie system that organizes by means of 'histories' all 
social communication and everything that makes the present habitable.
-Michel de Certeau*
The "essay"—wliich should be understood as the assay or test by which, in 
the game of truth, one undergoes changes, and not as the simplistic 
appropriation of others for the purpose of communication—is the living 
substance of philosophy, at least if  we assume that philosophy is still what 
it was in times past, i.e., an "ascesis," askësis, an exercise of oneself in the 
activity of thought.
-Michel Foucault^
 ^Heterologies, 20?. Full bibliograpic references are given in the Bibliography 
unless it is a book not directly consulted in which case full bibliographic infoimation will 
be provided in tlie footnotes.
 ^ The Use of Pleasure^ 9.
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Prescripf
Tlie scholarly essay must have a signature, a name which gives it a place. How 
then assay a self from the position of a self? If  Üie subject of writing is the subject, who 
then writes the subject? In the beginning was the word, but who wrote the word? Co­
existent and co-creating, the writing and the subject tangle with images and bodies from 
the beginning. The beginning comes without an origin.
Grunewald’s sixteenth-centuiy Isenheim Altarpiece brings John the Baptist back 
from the dead and into literacy by displaying him with an open book and pointed finger, 
the book reading, "He must increase, but I must decrease." How can the one who is 
already dead decrease more? The decrease of the book then? "The end of tlie book and 
the beginning of writing"?'* The writings which survive show no indication of Jesus or 
John the Baptist writing anything, yet here they are imag(in)ed witii a book: one dead but 
alive, one dead awaiting resurrection.
The grotesquely long finger, of course, points to tlie mangled body of a crucified 
Christ. Originally located at an Antonite monastery devoted to healing tlie sick, patients 
were paraded in front of the painting in hopes of an instant cure, the illness expelled from 
the body and offered to Chiist. The illnesses affected a range of bodily disintegiation, 
with the body of Christ sufficiently gruesome to mirror the patient's bodies. The artist as 
pharmacist moves the viewer from fragmentation to redemption 
and wholeness, moving through the crucifixion to resurrection of the body. "The body
 ^The word, "Prescript," is used for several reasons. First, obviously, it is "before 
file writing," a title or heading, which is a writing itself. The word "script" conjures up 
a play, a theatrical performance, full of actors. Similar to a "text" with various threads, 
the analogy to script shows the various tlireads to be tlie performances of actors playing 
roles, of which tlie current script entails only one. The theatrical theme will continue in 
the body of the script. Also, "prescript" is related to "prescription," which designates, "the 
means of acquiring or of freeing oneself, through a certain passage of time, and under the 
conditions determined by the law" (Lyotard, "Prescription," 176). Finally, script(ure) is 
a possible translation of the French écriture. While this term usually gets translated 
simply as 'writing,' the Unkage with scripture suggests itself as a religious category which 
has echoes through this essay.
 ^ See Derrida, O f Grammatology^ 6-26.
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of Christ is a continuous appropriation of the body; it is composed of the bodies that 
dissipate in front of it."*
At the beginning: a book, a gesture, a body, an image, a subject. Created and 
recreated along the way of such various media, the subject must inscribe itself in the 
process, a process of death and sur-vival.
The essay which follows is, broadly speaking, situated at an intersection of 
theology, the visual arts, and critical theoiy. To weave tliese typically separated 
disciplines together, i bring out a relationship between them tlirough what i see as three 
interrelated strands of current theoretical discourse. Not meant in any way to be 
exhaustive of the disciplines or theoretical problems mentioned, this essay cuts across 
grains of disciplines and lines of thinking in order to come to its own way of thinking; 
a thinking which bears on the issue of subjectivity B The strands of theory which are here 
brought forward are: 1) the influence of images on communication and culture, 2) 
questions about language and the limits of language, and 3) the materiality of tlie body.
the image
Witliin the first strand of theory i am interested in tlie implications of a western 
culture increasingly influenced by and dependent on images. Images—whether those of 
television, film, advertisements, pictures in magazines, fashion, et al.-constitute a mode 
of communication other than that of the printed word or speech, i.e., language. At the
 ^Nick Millet, "The Fugitive Body," 42-43.
® For the purposes of this study, i am using the term "subject" rather than "self 
to link it to objectivity and ways of reading and speaking. Barbara Johnson begins her 
Introduction to the Oxford Amnesty Lectures of 1992 by explaining differing views of 
self and subject. The French tradition—from Descartes on—sees a "subject," contrasted with 
an "object," centered on reason and thought, and resembling a grammatical function. The 
Anglo-American tradition sees a "self," which is bound up witli ideas of property and 
inseparable from "rights" {Freedom and Interpretation, 3).
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same time, images are often bound up witli verbal language (filmic dialogue, captions), 
with music (as in dance), or the economic market (as in advertisements), and the ability 
to ferret out a particular medium (e.g., gesture, or music) from the others seems to be 
impossible; tliey must be analyzed as they work together in a particular context. "[T]he 
society in which we live is a society of generalized communication. It is the society of 
the mass media. Within a mass media society knowledge and communication structures 
are, to say the least, complicated.
What is vital it would seem is a continual analysis of tiie way communication 
patterns, the shaping of culture and, finally, the construction of knowledge are constituted 
and reconstituted by new media. Eric Havelock, Marshall McLuhan, and Walter Qng are 
a few of the scholars who have brought attention to the way communication media alter 
consciousness and culture through their studies of orality and literacy.® It has come time 
to extend these projects into the postmodern world of the mass media.
Hegemonic control which would limit modes of information making culture an 
easily definable, easy-to-live-in place, is no longer possible (and, most would say, 
certainly not desirable). This essay is part of an attempt to think about new ways of 
reading (and therefore also writing, and therefore also living) by bringing signs from 
various media and various disciplines together. This essay then is part of an attempt at 
rethinking the existing structures and media of knowledge.
Elsewhere i have used the title Tmagology'^ to encompass these ideas. The project
 ^Gianni Vattimo, The Transparent Society, 1.
 ^ Sec bibliography under tlicse names for references.
® I must point out that i have been using this term in currently unpublished papers 
long before Mark C. Taylor and Esa Saarinen's Imagologies was published. It is 
somewhat ironic though, considering the influence Taylor's previous work (and 
Imagologies is a radical break from his other work) has had on my own thinking.
The neologism comes from Milan Kundera who, in his book Immortality, gives 
a first view of what is entailed,
Imagology! . . . this word finally lets us put under one roof someüiing tliat goes 
by so many names; advertising agencies; political campaign managers; designers 
who devise the shape of everything from cars to gym equipment; fashion stylists;
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of imagology, as i conceive it, is taken up in a critical way in the work of theorists such
as Gregory Ulmer, Mieke Bal, J. Hillis Miller, WJ.T. Mitchell and Kaja Silverman.*®
Jonathan Culler gives a nod to tlie shift toward images and provides a strong indictment
for the hard work that must now take place in education:
[W]hen one thinks about the future of our multilingual, multiracial society, one 
finds it hard seriously to imagine the establishment of a common culture based on 
the Greeks or other classics. Such common culture as we have will inevitably be 
based on the mass media—especially films and television. Schools will not counter 
this cultiue effectively by requiring the study of particular historical artifacts, 
seeking to impose a canon. The struggle against the debilitating effects of mass 
cultuie must take place on a different front: by teaching critical thinking, perhaps 
by analyzing the ideological stakes and structures of mass-media productions and 
exposing the interests at work in their functioning. Arguments about what literary 
works and what historical knowledge to require will only distract attention from 
the pressing problem of how to insure that schools encourage intellectual activity 
by teaching critical thinking, close reading, and tlie analysis of narrative structures 
and semiotic mechanisms.**
Tlie shifting of media requires a shift in the critical tlrinking structures we have inlierited.
barbers; show-business stars dictating the norms of physical beauty that all 
branches of imagology obey (114).
But Kundera goes on and the consequences become a bit more sinister,
[I]n the last few decades, imagology has gained a historic victory over ideology. 
All ideologies have been defeated: in the end their dogmas were unmasked as 
illusions and people stopped taking them seriously. . . . Reality was stronger than 
ideology. And it is in this sense that imagology surpassed it: imagology is 
stronger than reality. . . . [IJdeology belonged to history, while the reign of 
imagology begins where history ends (114, 116).
Here we are reminded of the great champion of postmodern cynicism, Jean Baudrillard, 
who claims, "there is no longer such a tiling as ideology; tliere ar e only simulacra." There 
are strong arguments against "end of ideology" thinking (especially in the work of 
Christopher Norris), but it is not too much here to realize the sheer power of imagology 
as Kundera describes it above, Baudrillard will be returned to in the following study.
Within literary and critical theory several recent books have appeared which 
examine, in varying ways, the relationship of word and image. See Ulmer, Teletheory ; 
Miller, Illustration; Bal, Reading 'Rembrandt"; Mitchell, Picture Theory; Silverman, The 
Subject o f Semiotics. (Full references given in Bibliography.)
"Tlie Future of Criticism," 31-32.
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No simple re-application of literary tools on to images will do.
This project o f imagology needs a place from which to critique. But part of the 
entry into the postmodern world entails the end of oppositional critiques and the end of 
'utopia' as a place from which to criticize. So, rather than a "strategy" of critique it may 
be of more importance to look for "tactics." Tactic is a term borrowed from Michel de 
Certeau who contrasts it with that of strategy. A strategy is a judgement from a point of 
power and control, "every 'strategic' rationalization seeks first of all to distinguish its 'own' 
place, that is, the place of its own power and will, from an 'environment.'"*^ In this way, 
a strategy is inherently "modem," if  the modem is to be understood in its Cartesian and 
scientific objectivity (this will be developed further). By contrast, "The space of a tactic 
is tlie space of the other. . . .  It does not have tlie means to keep to itself, at a distance, 
in a position of withdrawal, foresight, and self-collection. . . .  It operates in isolated 
actions, blow by blow. . . .  In short, a tactic is an art of the weak."*^ This project may 
then be thought of as a pocket full of tactics, a few places among many of countering and, 
perhaps a better temr for the purposes here, subverting existing configurations of 
knowledge, but moving within them at the same time. As an essay using tactics, it also 
becomes impossible to claim a 'discipline' out of which to criticize, be it theology, literaiy 
theoiy or psychoanalysis. A tactic necessarily remains apart from the grounding provided 
by any particular discipline.
Appropriate here may be the use of the word 'theory,' and indeed it is this word 
which i will use tliroughout this essay for a few reasons. The first reason is its 
etymological roots (thêôros, spectator; thëôrëô, look at; related to theatie) which relate it 
to sight and 'speculation.' (Granted, 'speculation' is a loaded word with many 
ideologically-motivated variants, some of wliich will be worked with in the writings which 
follow). As this essay is about images, a linking with sight may be somewhat tactical. 
But much more than this, i take the use of the term 'theoiy' from two other theorists. I 
use it in the sense that Culler argues for it:
The Practice o f Everydcy Life, 36. 
Ibid., 37.
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[WJhat distinguishes members o f tliis genre [i.e., theoiy] is their ability to function 
not as demonstrations witliin the parameters of a discipline but as redescriptions 
that challenge disciplinary boundaries. The works we allude to as 'theoiy' are 
those that have had the power to make strange the familiar and to make readers 
conceive of their own thinking, behavior, and institutions in new ways.*'*
Similarly, Maik Poster sees the socio-political implications of ttieoiy's movement across 
modes of knowledge. He argues that poststructural theoiy is a necessary social force, 
picking up where the modernism of the Frankfurt School left off;
The labor of theoiy . . .  is to relate conceptual advances to their context not to 
reduce them to it but, quite the opposite, to demonstrate that the Hnk between 
discourse and society gives discourse its generalizing force while providing what 
Fredric Jameson has called a 'cognitive mapping' of society.* *
'Theoiy' then, as i am using it, is decidedly inter- and trans-disciplinary, but not as an end 
in itself. Rather, theoiy is the restructuring of boundaries (not a striving for a place 
"outside the boundaries") that has political implications in today's context. This essay 
is about re-theorizing, or, "seeing again" from a new perspective. This has long been one 
of tlie aims of the visual arts.*®
In the following essay i move beyond a semiological analysis of image culture to 
the point where my interests meld with Üieological interests. Here the implications of the 
proliferation of the image are much more severe, and here is found a link between the 
first and second strands of theoiy i am examining; for theology (specifically, Cliristian
On Deconstruction. 9.
Critical Theory and PoststructuraUsm, 7.
The use of 'theory' by the likes of Poster and Culler has interesting resonances 
with modernist theories of the visual arts. One might consider, for example, Bertolt 
Brecht's use of the Russian formalist's theory of 'estrangement' in order to see m a new 
way through "making strange." There are many other examples throughout modern art— 
from the Cubists to Soviet montage (Eisenstein, Vertov) and all mamiers of the avant- 
garde—of de-familiarizing so as to see from a new perspective.
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theology) has been centered around a concept of the logos through most of its histoiy.*^ 
Such a conception has not always been explicitly stated using the term, logos, and while 
the logos has meant different things in different places, the last few hundred years 
(especially within protestantism since the reformation and die invention of the printing
The logos within Christianity grows out of the prologue to tlie gospel of John 
and, stemming from this, the logos-christology of early apologists such as Justin Martyr 
and Origen. In these early and Platonic views Christians and non-christians alike have 
access to the logos, but only Christians have full access because of its manifestation in 
Christ, Tied to this is the interesting concept of logos spermatikos ("seed-bearing Logos") 
a sowing of seeds throughout human history.
There may be seen two main significations of the logos through Christian history: 
knowledge and salvation. Lc?go.s-as-knowledge is seen in statements such as, "The Logos 
. . .  is to be thought of as the ultimate source of all human knowledge" (Alister McGrath, 
Christian Theology, 282); or, "Christian logos-theology was influenced by developments 
in later Judaism which tended to conceive God as remote and transcendent, 
communicating witli the world by agencies such as liis Word {membra) or his Wisdom. 
. . .  In particular Philo of Alexandria, interpreting the Greek OT [sic] in terms of Greek 
philosophy, depicted the Logos as the intelligible element in God’s mysterious being; the 
means of God’s self-disclosure to the world; the source of its rational order, understood 
as Plato’s ’Forms,’ and its controlling principle" (Christopher Stead, "Logos," 339). Here 
is the notion of the "presence of God" existing in the medium of 'knowledge' between 
transcendent God and fallen humanity. Tied to Zc?gw-as-knowledge is many interpreters 
arguments relating logos to the Hebrew Bible notion of wisdom (Heb. chokmah, Gk. 
Sophia). Bultmaim, for example, points this out in particular relating John 1 to passages 
such as Proverbs 8.22 ("The History of Religions Background").
Not dissociated from logos as knowledge is logos as salvation. Here tlie mediating 
form of the logos, for groups such as the Alexandrian School, takes human nature upon 
itself (incarnation) in the world in order to redeem the world. The Alexandrian's concerns 
are soteriological (McGratli, Christian Theology, 287-8). Paul Lamarche also sees the link 
between the logos of John 1 with the wisdom of tlie Hebrew Bible, but focuses on the 
salvific element of the logos: "the title of the Logos designates not only the Word, as we 
now call him, but Christ the Saviour" ("The Prologue of John," 41). The precise meaning 
of Logos in Jolm 1, according to Lamarche, is "the divine plan of salvation for all, 
conceived by God before the foundation of the world' in other words the Word that is 
Christ, the Second Person of the Trinity, destined to take flesh and to save mankind" (41).
Most importantly, both of these views work with the notion of a 'mediating 
presence,' an ultimate security of salvation, whether the Word is that of Christ or the 
rational knowledge bound to language. Such a "filling" will have important implications 
as the development of subjectivity is pursued in the following essay.
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press*®) has seen the logos congeal into an emphasis on the medium of the verbal word. 
Quoting Werner Kelber, Stephen D. Moore sees a two-part structure in the fourth gospel 
where Jesus is elevated to "the primordial position of a transcendental signified" and "the 
incarnation is not fleslily only; the Logos is doubly incarnated 'tluough the materiality of 
written communication.'"* ^  It is the co-incidence of /ogo^-as-transcendent-presence (giving 
salvation) and /c»gc?jf-as-word (giving knowledge) that i wish to pursue.
Recently, diverse movements such as feminism, poststructural theory, liberation 
critiques from tlie two-thiids world, as well as the rise of television and film in western 
culture, have created a multi-faceted affront on the structures of the logos?^ For my study 
here, i am bringing together the force of these "non-logocentric" movements tlu ough two 
inseparable stiains witliin tlieology (and implications are felt in otlier fields as well).^* 
Just as i have stressed the logos to be two-part, the movement against the logos is also 
two-sided. The image functions as a de-powering of tlie verbal word; it is a challenge to 
the medium of the logos. But also, non-logocentiic thinking has questioned discourses 
that make a privileged claim backed up by transcendence which exist througliout theology; 
this questioning is a challenge to the metaphysical claims of presence. Tliis leads directly 
into the second and related strand of tiieory touched upon in this essay: the limits of the
For effects of the printing press on society see Elizabetli Eisenstein's two- 
volume, The Printing Press as Agent o f Change.
Moore, Literary Criticism and the Gospels, 152. Inner quote from an (at the 
time) unpublished essay of Kelber, "In the Beginning Were the Words."
This listing is not intended to equate or reduce each of these movements to the 
same; they aie related in tliis context in their working against hegemonic and logo-centric 
thinking.
"Critiques" (if we can call them that) of logocentricity often neglect one or the 
other of tliese elements of the logos. What seems to me to be of paiticulai interest within 
theology and much of the humanities is the way the medium itself has become intimately 
bound to privileged transcendent discourse. At the same time, these two elements may 
be temporarily separated to show the reliance of one on the other. Denida clearly deals 
with each of the two—medium and metaphysics—in Dissemination and O f Grammatology. 
It is this line of tliinking i will be following.
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logocentric language of presence and direct communication.
the word
Wlien Jacques Derrida and Hélène Cixous, among otiiers, began reworking
concepts of western metaphysics in the 1960's and 70’s, avenues began to open up for new
modes of communication. Interdisciplinary studies began to rise up, and 'theory,' as
outlined above, became a geme of its own. But it is precisely tliis theoiy which
constrains theology to reconsider its structure such as it is. The hierarchy of knowledge
is being dismantled, boundaries refigured, and language can no longer be considered a
totalizing, all-encompassing explanatory force. Certainly not all traditions and currents
of thought have considered language thus, but here /?c?5’t-structuralism must be seen in
relation to what may have been tlie last great movement of modernity: structuralism. As
Robert Detweiler has stated, "Structmalism's search for universal laws of language to
replace those of liistoiy . . . attest to the weight of the role assigned to language in the
mid-late centuiy's quest for a signifier of s u r v i v a l . L a n g u a g e ,  according to
poststructural theory, has limits, it is not a perfectly present mediator.
I take 'language' to mean the verbal, spoken and printed word. The image, as i am
viewing it, is not part of language. When image analysts (or, 'iconologists') approach the
image, there is a continual temptation to equate the image with language. In the
introduction to the collection of essays, The Language of Images, W.J.T. Mitchell aligns
the contributors through the relationship of language and image:
By the "language of images," then, we mean tliree soils of things: (1) language 
about images . . .  the interpretive discourse a culture regards as appropriate to its 
image systems; (2) images regarded as a language; the semantic, syntactic, 
communicative power of images to encode messages, tell stories, express ideas and 
emotions, raise questions, and "speak" to us; (3) verbal language as a system 
informed by images.
"Overliving," 241.
"Introduction," The Language c f  Images, 3.
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Mitchell goes on to state his awareness of making a categorical mistake, putting two 
tilings together wliich do not belong together, but wants to look instead at what separates 
"different symbolic modes." As he elsewhere states, "The point, then, is not to heal the 
split between words and images, but to see what interests and powers it serves."^ While 
in many respects i agree with this interrelation of word and image—especially option 3— 
there is a tendency (as evidenced throughout The Language of Images) to analyze images 
from a fundamental re-presentational and linguistic basis. Tlie images i wiU be 
considering aie such that representation itself becomes problematic and the ability for 
language to comment on tiie image breaks down. Here is where i see the use of 
poststructural theoiy as an adequate response in a questioning of the image, for they each 
are dealing with the thresholds of language. Or, in Foucault’s pre-poststiuctural terms, 
"if it is true that the image still has the function of speaking, of transmitting something 
consubstantial with language, we must recognize that it already no longer says the same 
thing; and that by its own plastic values painting engages in an experiment that will take 
it farther and fartlier from language, whatever the supeificial identity of the theme. 
There is a relationsliip between words and images wliich i suggest is best brought out 
when they are understood as distinct media.
In contrast to language,' i want to propose the tentative plnase, media of 
communication as an encompassing notion within which to approach word and image. 
It takes no time to realize the shortcomings of such a phrase if one is to take 
poststructural theory into account with its questioning of botli 'communication' and 
'media.' Perhaps, in Heideggerian terms, it would better be stated: media of  
communication, whereby a trace of the 'communication' remains. Tliese media- of 
conummication would be in agreement with Demda's notion of grammatology in its 
listing of such linguistic and non-linguistic media: "we say 'writing' for all that gives rise 
to an inscription in general, whether it is literal or not and even if  what it distributes in 
space is alien to the order of the voice: cinematography, choreography, of coui'se, but also
24 »»wqiat is an Image?" 530.
Madness and Civilization, 18.
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pictorial, musical, sculptural 'writing.’"^ Definitions for language' and media of 
conummication must be kept separate, but it is their interaction which will be of interest 
throughout this essay.
Taking seriously the "critiques" levelled against logocentrism, this project begins 
from the question, "What can be done (i.e., thought, felt, lived) theologically in a post- 
logocentric world?" Connected with the move to an "image culture," a preliminary 
answer is to argue for a new theological dimension of "materialist aesthetics," with special 
attention given to recent theories of visuality. Acknowledging the impact of images on 
the western culture, the following is a look at these images and their disruption of 
logocentric language (on two inseparable levels: as printed or spoken word and as 
transcendent guarantor of Truth and presence), but it is also a new look at images for 
further theological thinking.
Let it be said up front that such theological tliinking is no return to an aestiietics 
of beauty,' but a "dangerous and necessary" (Derrida) wandering into Üie dark night of 
the soul. I usually try to keep the apocalyptic overtones to a minimum, but part of 
finding myself within western culture in the 1990's is finding myself continually verging 
on apocalyptic thought—perhaps especially as one who has hved in America with its 
handguns and fundamentalist televangelists. This is written in a fin-de~millenium epoch, 
a time of waiting and ambiguity, of upheaval and rapid change. While providing comfort 
and security may be one important element of religion, tliis project is more aggressive, 
its answers remaining unsettled.
the body
The unsettling factors involved bring up the theme of wandering. This is not only 
to be taken metaphorically, but also to allude to a place for space, a place for the material 
human body to move and matter. Tliis is the third strand which i hope to weave into this 
essay. Though this strand will not be as prominent as the first two, it will be important
O f Grammatology, 9.
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nonetheless. As mentioned above, part of the space opened up in the critique of 
logocentrism is a space for the material, and it is within aesthetics that i attempt to bring 
out the import of materiality. One of the major moves in theoretical circles seems to be 
a move from word to image, but another important move seems to be the sliift from 
language to bodies, from the semantic to the somatic. In Juditli Butler's words, 
"Theorizing from the ruins of the Logos invites the following question: 'What about tlie 
materiality of the body?'"^^ These two shifts (word to image, language to body) i believe 
are related and will require more attention tliroughout this essay. Just as language came 
to the fore in twentieth-centuiy theorizing and witli it the rise of hterary studies, tlie end 
of the twentieth-centuiy seems to mark, among other things, a move toward materialist 
communication and the rise of body theories. Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, Donna 
Haraway and the ZONE series from MIT Press are just a few examples of die locations 
of this new strand of tlieoretical discourse. Here too it is poststructural and poststmctural- 
influenced theoiy that show tlie limits of language, allowing holes at the thresholds, 
thereby giving way to new media of communication.
the subject (of the essay)
These tliree strands (which may be seen as leitmotifs throughout this study) are 
threaded together here in the construction o f subjectivity. Tliis essay will be working with 
the constitution and (dis)solution (Solution: "Dissolving or being dissolved; separating, 
breaking." Dissolution: "Disintegration; undoing of bond; coming or being brought to an 
end, disappearance."^) of the subject; the possibility and impossibility tliat a human 
subject can be constructed and deconstructed in part by media of communication.
Wliile images and words have an impact on cultural communication, they also 
have an impact on the subject. Social constructs are tied to subjective constructs and the
Bodies That Matter, ix.
Concise Oxford Dictionary.
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two cannot be separated. As Julia Kristeva states, "The text is a practice that could be 
compared to political revolution; the one brings about in the subject what the other 
introduces into society. The histoiy and political experience of the twentieth century have 
demonstrated that one cannot be transformed without the o t h e r . T h e  transformation and 
"trials" of the subject (and, therefore, also o f society) within this essay depend on the 
importance of the body and vision, a "materialist aesthetics." The "texts of 
transformation" are visual images as well as printed texts. Implicit in such a rethinking 
of subjectivity is a move from language and linguistic analysis to media-oriented analysis.
M eke Bal's Reading "Rembrandt" has as its subtitle, "Beyond tlie Word-Image 
Opposition," and sets out to consider images and words in relationship with each other 
and how this interrelation may provide new ways of "reading": a reading of both verbal 
texts and visual images. Similarly, i will be arguing for the importance of images in 
constmctioiLs of subjectivity not so as to replace verbal language, but to supplement it. 
In Derrida's O f Grammatology, the interaction of speech and writing are considered to be 
in supplementaiy relationship; a relationship in which there is no simple replacement of 
the preceding by the latter—speech by writing—rather the relationship is more complex. 
Supplement, in the French, has two significations. First, it means "addition": "the 
supplement adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching anotlier plentitude, the fullest 
measure of presence."^® But second, it means "substitute": "if it fills, it is as if  one fills 
a void. If  it represents and makes an image, it is by the anterior default of a presence."^* 
As writing is a supplement to speech, it is dangerous and necessary, for "that what opens 
meaning and language is writing as the disappearance of natural presence. As the word 
fades away in the cuirent culture, the image becomes a supplement: "opening meaning."
To establish a supplementary relationsliip between word and image within the
Revolution in Poetic Language, 17. 
O f Grammatology, 144.
Ibid., 145.
32 Ibid., 159.
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subject i will be working with the "stages" of Soren Kierkegaard. While there can be 
found three separate and interrelated stages within Kierkegaard’s writing (the aesthetic, 
ethical and religious), i will be concentrating on the aesthetic stage with a brief move into 
the ethical by way of conclusion. Kierkegaard's aesthetic and ethical stages—as found 
most especially in provide the narrative thread of tliis essay. Woven into the
narrative of Kierkegaard’s stages are the paintings and writings of several diverse theorists 
and artists as they help to move tlie Kierkegaardian-conceived stages in new directions.^^ 
The relationship of the stages to each other may be thought o f in terms of Demda's notion 
of 'supplementarity,' and in this way i am relating them also to the relationship between 
word and image: the aesthetic tentatively corresponding to the image, the ethical to tlie 
word.
Working from the thesis that various media are responsible for tlie construction of 
subjectivity, i am especially interested in the role images—and correlatively, visuality—play 
in psychoanalytic, philosophic and aesthetic theories. Through the use of several theorists 
(most especially the psychoanalytic theories of Lacan and Kristeva, poststructural theorists 
like Jean Baudrillard, Derrida and Jean-François Lyotard, and feminist-poststiuctural 
theorists Butler and Hélène Cixous) i will reread Kierkegaard's aesthetic stage and open 
up possibilities to consider images (specifically for this essay, paintings by Rembrandt, 
Magritte, Kandinsky and Dali) as functioning at this stage. I have chosen the traditional 
categoiy of painting and am considering 'canonical' paintei’s to help prove the point that
Kierkegaard’s view of stages should not be thought of as independent steps 
which one leaves wholly as one moves to the next step, radier, they should be thought of 
as 'spheres' or 'existence-spheres,' as he calls them in Stages on Life's Way, His translators 
suggest, "'Sphere' and 'existence-sphere' more readily denote qualitative possibilities 
involving the discontinuity of a leap, reflection, and an act in freedom. Furthermore, the 
spheres are not discrete logical categories, and therefore the lower qualitative sphere is not 
annihilated but is caught up and transformed" {Stages on Life's Way, "Historical 
Introduction," x). Yet, there are important reasons for the maintaining of the term, 'stage,' 
as will become clear especially in relation to Jacques Lacan's theories of subjectivity.
For Kierkegaard, as with Derrideaii supplementarity, each sphere/stage, is "that 
what opens meaning and language." The stages are a palimpsest where the writings 
underneath aie erased but not totally, the traces show through. There is no tabula rasa 
on which subjectivity rests, inscriptions are always already placed on the subject/body.
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disruptions to logo-centric thinking have always already been part of ’western culture.' 
Reading recent theorists and paintings alongside Kierkegaard, i am aiguing that images 
may function as an early and "pre-lingual" constructor of subjectivity. This is not only 
to give a chronological view, but a topographical view as well whereby an image will 
"bring one back" to pivotal spaces in the construction of subjectivity and suggest 
themselves as aporias and points of deconstruction.
While many of these ideas stem from the above-mentioned theorists themselves, 
this essay moves visuality—and by extension the visual arts—into a position on par with 
the "coming into language" (Oedipal and odier) that marks many theories of subjectivity. 
It is in no way as simple as suggesting that images come before words (as some sort of 
"Ur-medium"), and the (un)concluding final chapter will be a return of verbal language, 
through which, of course, this entire essay is communicated. Uie method is discursive, 
and i have hoped to present a conversation between various modes of tliought and 
communication. There is no systematic and comprehensive account of any one of tlie 
tliinkers or paintings involved, nor—considering the a-systematicity of each of the writers 
invoked—could there be. I have chosen to trace a particular thread through various texts 
for the purposes of this essay.
At the beginning of each of the two following sections (the main body and 
conclusion), i will give a different reading of Rembrandt’s painting. The Slaughtered Ox, 
in order to preface and foreshadow many of the issues at stake in the aesthetic and ethical 
stages. This multivalent painting has continued to prove its excessive meaning throughout 
my essay and the reading and re-reading of it seives to bring out more than one rhetorical 
point. For one, the two readings make use of a Kierkegaard!an method of reading, 
brought out in the four readings of Abraham and Isaac found at tlie beginning of Fear 
and Trembling. Each reading of the ride to Mount Moriah and subsequent attempt at tlie 
"sacrifice" of the child suggests something vastly different than the previous reading. It 
is not exegesis but rather, "tlie beautifiil tapestry of imagination."^'* Kierkegaard is reader
Fear and Trembling, 9. Kierkegaard ironically, and indirectly, notes in the 
"Exordium" that these readings are not those of an exegetical scholar for "if he had known
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first, but then again, "all reading is writing."^*
The notion that "reading is writing" and the use of re-reading brings up another 
tactic, that there may be found in Kierkegaard many already existing parallels to 
poststructuralism. This case is made most strongly by Mark C. Taylor in works such as 
Altarity, Di^iguring, Nots, and Erring. Indeed, his Di^guring is a central text for the 
essay under consideration here as i intend to bring out similar links and show how 
poststructural theoiy may be enhanced by Kierkegaard and how Kierkegaard may be 
reread through poststructural eyes. My work overlaps witli Taylor’s in a few different 
ways. For one, in Disfiguring Taylor loosely uses the three Kierkegaardian stages as ways 
of rethinking tliree "epochs" in 20tii centuiy art: modernism, "modernist" postmodernism, 
and postmodernism sensu strictissimo.^^ Also, Taylor, like myself, is concerned with the 
refiguring of tlie relationship between theology and the visual arts. Along these lines 
tiiere is a conviction that theory (especially of the poststructural variety) opens a new 
space for the theological imagination, leading the way to an "a/theoesthetics," as Taylor 
calls it taking after Georges Bataille's La Somme athéoîogique.
But there are differences in Taylor’s and my approach to Kierkegaard, 
poststructural theoiy and the visual arts, three of which i mention here. First, my essay 
is a study of the constiuction of subjectivity; it brings various disciplines together, but 
specifically as they bear on the subject. Taylor touches on subjectivity at various points 
(especially in Altarity), but his studies have had other foci. Also, in Disfiguring Taylor 
moves chronologically, fi-om the 18th century to tlie present, looking at general 
"movements" in art and criticism, while my essay bounces around to various periods, 
creating a "chionology" (but also a "topography") of the subject. Finally, Taylor has
Hebrew, he perhaps would easily have understood the stoiy and Abraham" (9).
Timothy K. Beal, "Ideology and Intertextuality," 27.
See ch.l, "Program." The differences between these three epochs, in Taylor's 
mind, generally revolve around questions of presence/absence and 
transcendence/immanence with figures like Kierkegaard, Denida, the painter Anselm 
Kiefer, and the architect Peter Eisenman being the subverters of modernist notions of 
presence.
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considered Kierkegaard's stages in light of three ait movements (mentioned above),
keeping the "epochs" separate from each other. For me, modernism and postmodernism
work together and against each other and each will, therefore, make appearances
throughout this essay.
While i would be hesitant to label this essay "postmodern"—as if  something can
simply be postmodern—it surely situates itself within such a climate. I agree with Michèle
Barrett when she states, "post-modernism is not something that you can be for or against:
the reiteration of old knowledges will not make it vanish. For it is a cultural climate as
well as an intellectual position, a political reality as well as an academic fashion. Tliat
said, i am initially concerned with two elements of the postmodern in which i may situate
myself. The first has been mentioned above and is that of an opening to interdisciplinaiy
studies; this essay touches on feminist theory, film studies, psychoanalysis, theology,
philosophy, cultural studies, et al. The second element of tlte postmodern winch i include
here is an initial definition of the postmodern as given by Lyotard in his essay,
"Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?":
A work can become modem only if  it is first postmodern. Postmodernism thus 
understood is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this state is 
constant. . . . The postmodern would be that which, in tiie modem, puts forward 
the unpresentable in presentation itself.^ ®
This cursory definition is given because it points out the necessary relation of the modern 
and post-modern, reason enough for me not wanting to claim titis to be an "either/or" 
study. It also suggests, as i will point out below, the impossibility of presenting the 
"unpresentable"; the unpresentable here being the aesthetic stage. That is, if the aesthetic 
is truly pre-linguistic, how can i write about it? And yet, it is "put forward" in the 
following.
The interaction of diverse structures and disciplines in tins essay are brought 
together in order to highlight connections that have not been previously highlighted and
Women's Oppression Today: The Marxist Feminist Encounter. (London: Verso, 
1988) xxxvi. Quoted in Landry and MacLean, Materialist Feminisms, 6-7.
"Answering the Question," 79, 81.
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to attempt a restructuring of existing categories of academic knowledge as they come to
bear on the issue of subjectivity. The writing i am engaging in here recalls the notion of
the tactic and further tries to follow the lead of Michel de Certeau:
de Certeau's approach seeks neither to affirm some evanescent unity nor to play 
the role of tlie protector of the integrity of the present configuration of knowledge.
. . . [H]e seeks to exacerbate the fragmentation by deliberately uncovering the 
ways in which the various disciplinary enterprises rely upon models and paradigms 
borrowed from each other, and never less so than when they proclaim their 
independence, so that the mutual relation of the disciplines is never one of 
autonomy or of heteronomy, but some sort of complicated set of textual relations 
that needs to be unraveled in each instance.^*'
Again, an interdisciplinaiy approach teases out implications of particular ways of thinking 
which could not be seen without this particular juxtaposition. More than comparing 
thinkers, i am also attempting to compare the media of their thought, the reliance of 
words on images and vice versa. And again, it is within subjectivity that i propose to 
"contain" these relationships; though tlie container, tliis academic exercise, is leaky and, 
as with Francis Bacon's 1972 Triptych, things keep spilling out of the body.
Another tactic i should point out here entails the reading of Kierkegaard alongside 
psychoanalytic theoiy. While much of psychoanalysis cannot help but establish a 
chronology of subjectivity, and tlierefore continually runs the risk of 'prescription' for 
human development, Kierkegaard's stages function as more of a topography of 
subjectivity, establishing 'modes o f existence,' and therefore are not limited to 
development. As i have suggested above, the stages are in a supplementaiy relationship 
and, following Maurice Blanchot's reading of Kierkegaard, Kevin Newmai k suggests that 
"we begin to suspect tliat the ordinary conception of the three stages as an existential 
movement or history . . .  is already a kind of rhetorical device or figure in the narrative 
form of an allegory."'*^ NaiTativized renderings of the stages stem fi’om existential 
readings of Kierkegaard in the pursuit of a final "authentic self." But, Newmark
X.
"Foreword: The Further Possibility of Knowledge," in de Certeau, Heterologies,
"Taking Kierkegaard Apart," 9.
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continues, within
a nonnarrative structure, the form of communication (which is partly, though not 
entirely, a question of aesthetics since it is concerned with the outward form or 
sensuous appearance of the communication) and the meaning of the 
communication (which would at some point become religious truth as inwardness) 
are maintained indissolubly in a relationship of nonadequation as the result of a 
philosophical theory of indirect communication or, better, as the result o f a purely 
linguistic predicament (that the communication of truth is by necessity indirect)/^
Newmark describes, in this dense sentence, the interrelations of the aesthetic, ethical and 
religious stages, with the ethical (the linguistic) being a necessary middle (media) element; 
language stands at the crux of the aesthetic and religious. Weaving concepts of 
Kierkegaard’s stages throughout this essay brings together issues already mentioned 
regarding the two-fold nature o f the logos (liere mentioned as form and meaning), the 
failings of communication and a topographical construction of subjectivity.
What must here be emphasized is the non-necessity o f reading the stages as a 
forward progressing movement. If  the stages are read synchronically rather than as a
linearly developing narrative of the self, there is an opening to a "modes of existence"
view in considerations of subjectivity. A modes of existence view is linked to media of 
communication: and sees many possibilités for a subject to exist and communicate. The 
modes, as supplements, "add to" and "replace" other modes.
An adult reading (or writing) this essay, or Kierkegaard's aestlietic stage, caimot 
understand their own subjectivity as being beyond the scope of aesthetics, for there are 
writings and images—and this is a key point i hope to show—which bring the
viewer/reader "back" to such an 'infantile' state (in-fans: "without speech," i.e.,
"speechless"). That is, in a strictly chronological view of the stages, one could read and 
view the stage as that from which she or he came and be interested in tlie aesthetic as 
purely an interesting part of history. In a modes of existence, or topographical, view one 
is confronted wiüi the continual disruption between modes and media. At the same time, 
chronology and topography will continue to play against each other and my writing will
Ibid., 9.
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at times slip into one or the other mode.
theo-logos
This essay is a rethinking of subjectivity and, correlatively in a theological setting, 
faith. The idea of faith as some arbitraiy set of beliefs consmicted in such and such a 
way may be another study, but here i want to rethink the typical concept of faith itself. 
Faith, as generally conceived in theology, is intimately tied to reason, the emotions, and/or 
the will; all three of which depend on a singular agent to possess faith. Faith becomes an 
object, attainable, possessable. The faith i hope to point toward is Kierkegaard’s faith of 
trials and ordeals reread most especially through Kristeva’s subject in process/on trial 
{subjet en procès), Lacan's desire, and the imaginative aspects of the visual arts. Faith, 
i hope to show, is related to the psychoanalytic notion of desire, it is a catalyst for the 
separations occurring along the creation of tlie subject; and it is related, again i hope to 
show, to the poststiuctural view of 'writing' (écriture). Faith is full of risks, not the least 
of which is the risking of the death of God and the deatli of the Self; in other words, the 
end of a guarantee of redemption.
What much of current theology has yet to come to terms with is the dissolution 
of the stable, "certain" and unitary subject conceived in the modem industrial western 
society. Theology has killed its God, its church, its "religiosity," but it has not allowed 
for the death of the subject. This is in some respects a very curious notion. It would 
seem [Is there any way to give quantifiable reference for this?] that among the more 
radical approaches to theology—i would consider here those influenced by hemieneutics 
(stemming from Ricoeur) and the turn toward literary analysis and textuality—there is 
always a reading-subject claiming the undecidability of a text, the "conflict of 
interpretations," or the death of God."*^  It may be said that the logos has come to rest in
Theologians and biblical critics influenced by poststructuralism (E.g., Mark C. 
Taylor and Stephen D. Moore) must be considered "more radical" than hemieneuticists 
like David Tracy, but on the whole it would seem that poststmctural tiiinking has yet to 
have a major impact on academic theology. For eveiy one Moore there are twenty-five
Prescript 23
the subject-reader, a transcendental ego (Husserl's and other's) providing the final
promised land of certainty and stable ground. Tliis essay tiien, approaches a deconstruction
of the subject-who-has-faith.
The deconstruction of the subject (which, as Derrida has continually reiterated, is
not a "destruction" or end of the subject) is a shaking of certainty, and then a wilderness.
Who is in the wilderness? A subject in process', a subject (dis)illusioned through image
and word, through an aesthetic which strikes the subject in process causing reordering of
boundaries: inside/outside, subject/object, etc. This occurs through discourse in which
there are no dogmas, no promised lands, paradises or utopias. Again, the theme of
wandering is touched on, and in this place, it is wandering as "dis-course." The
etymological roots of discourse have to do with "running to and fro," a "meandering"
which may not have a final resting place, but ends up in an "adventure of uncertain
outcome." Wlad Godrich ably describes this wilderness setting in a discussion of the
thought of Emmanuel Levinas:
Levinas argues that there is a form of truth that is totally alien to me, that I do not 
discover within myself, but that calls from beyond me, and it requires me to leave 
the realms of the known and of the same in order to settle in a land that is under 
its rule. Here tlie knower sets out on an adventure of uncertain outcome, and the 
instruments that he or she brings may well be inappropriate to the tasks that will
43anse.
This is a journey of faith. Inappropriate to a contemporary analysis of the subject are 
linguistically-oriented "instruments." The writing i am undertaking here is to consider the
historical critics and a dozen hermeneuticists. Even so, ttiere is still little critique of the 
subject with any of these more radical thinkers.
Within theology, Tracy is much more "popular" than the poststiuctural-influenced 
religious thinkers but is, at tlie same time, treated witli skepticism when he focuses on 
plurality and openness. In spite of his openness, in the end Tracy gives a guar antee of 
a self who can read words. So when he states, "Some have recognized that, on the other 
side of our enjoyment of the enrichment of each by the pluralism present to all, lies the 
fascinans et tremendum reality of each one's seeming inability to become a single self any 
longer," the very next paragraph brings it all together, "As a single one, each theologian 
finally must decide on her or his own" (The Analogical Imagination, 30).
"Foreword," xvi.
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construction of the subject tluough a non-logocentric aesthetics which resides on the
thresholds of language.
The concept of the subject needs to be briefly unpacked here before going any
further. The "modem (enlightenment) subject" i am writing of has its roots in Descartes
cogito. As Godzich puts it,
The great revolution of modem science is not to value lived experience over the 
authority of acquired experience, but to have referred knowledge and experience 
to a single subject, which is nothing more than the point in which they coincide 
in an abstract Archemidean point: the Cartesian ego cogito, consciousness. . . . 
This single subject is universal and impassive, just like its predecessor, the 
nous, ['*'*] but it is not divine; it is an ego that unites within itself all tlie properties 
of the separate intellect and of the subject of experience.'**
It was for Descartes' skeptical questioning finally a search for certainty, an "Archemidean 
point" providing an origin and fundamental ground for all knowledge. And here is seen 
most clearly how the logos may be said to rest in the stable certain subject in ways that 
a consideration of historical theology may help illuminate (see footnote 17 above). Logos 
assures that the splits in the creation of the subject will be filled; 
presence/salvation/knowledge is about filling/bridging the gaps.
The fundamental enlightenment subjectivity particularly continues in the thought 
of Kant and Husserl, but it is Freud's ego which will constitute the construction of the 
subject as i am working with it here. Lacan links Descartes and Freud precisely in this 
search for certainty: "Freud's method is Cartesian—in the sense that he sets out from the 
basis of the subject of certainty."'*® The "subject of certainty" relies on language (logos) 
to give knowledge, leading to wholeness and slavation. While Freud posits tliat the ego
"For Aristotle and his medieval successors, knowledge does not have a subject 
as such, certainly not in the sense of the modem ego; the nous as intellectus agens, as 
agential intellect, actualizes knowledge in the person who submits to it, that is in the 
person who makes of his or her self tlie subjectum, the subject of tliis nous, wliich is 
unique, separate, and divine" (Godzich, "From the Inquisition to Descartes: The Origins 
of the Modem Subject," 10).
45 "From the Inquisition to Descartes," 16.
"Of the Subject of Certainty," 35.
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is not a 'point,' as with most foundational thought, but is fundamentally divided, language
used in analysis provides the teleological opportunity for the subject to be whole again.
This essay moves beyond Freudian ego-theoiy to consider also the aesthetic, and
specifically images, in the construction of subjectivity, hinting at tlie difficulty of
"certainty" when language is destabilized.
A "deconstruction of the subject" is not motivated by looking around for
sometliing new to deconstruct, rather, it is motivated by ideas such as Barbara Johnson's
in her introduction to the 1992 Oxford Amnesty lectures;
If  the 'deconstruction of humanity' is an interpretation of what humanist writings 
already make available to be read, if  the 'contemporary' critique of the subject is 
a rereading of the texts in which that subject has been fomiulated, it is not tliat 
there was once something that is now being taken away, but that a new way of 
encountering the challenges that those texts were written to meet (or to avoid) 
should be undeitaken. Could it not be that governments imprison dissidents for 
the same reasons that tlie rational, contiolling ego attempts to banish unwanted 
impulses from itself? That is, could it not be that the rigidity involved in tlie 
casting out or denial of anxiety-inducing otliemess both from the polis and from 
the self would arise out of a similar attempt to become selfsame, unified, without 
internal difference? In that case, a study of the ways in wliich the ego attempts 
to achieve masteiy by projection and repression might be of the greatest interest 
for defenders of prisoners of conscience.'*^
The concerns given here—as with tliose pointed out above concerning 'theoiy'—would also 
function as a border-crossing in the typically conceived theory/practice opposition. As 
this prescript's epigraphs of Foucault and de Certeau make clear, subjectivity and thinking 
are not separable, and socio-political concerns cannot remain bound to outdated modes of 
thinking no matter how liberating they may seem.
from  language to writing
And here i am faced witli an impossible project which cannot be answered but 
only approached. The task is to write an academic essay which ends up outside of
47 "Introduction," Freedom and Interpretation, 8-9.
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academic writing. Academic writing is logocentric. It relies on verbal language and is 
based on the clear presentation o f ideas from author to audience. Within Kierkegaard’s 
stages, academic writing and logocentricity would exist in the ethical stage, with the 
aesthetic and religious falling on the edges of this stage. I am writing not only on the 
ethical stage, but on the aesthetic as well. Kierkegaard confronted the same difficulty and 
developed a rigorous system of pseudonymous authorship, creating multiple layers of 
editors, letters, "found" diaries, and poets. In this way, Kierkegaard's literaiy talents 
become as groundbreaking as the ideas he communicated indirectly through these other 
voices.
For me to write about the edges of the logos and about images means i must 
paradoxically begin (and somehow end) with logocentric language. I must write verbally 
and in a way oriented toward the direct communication of ideas. This is an academic 
enterprise. So, how do i get around these rhetorical problems? My attempt is to write 
in a manner diat is 'doubly-refiective,' what Kierkegaard, as will be shown, calls a 
'repetition.' My writing will necessitate the need to move in and out of the academic 
discourse i am engaged in, to reassess where i-as-writing-subject am in regards to the 
discussion of subjectivity.'*^ In the (un)concluding final chapter i must assess where i-as- 
writing-subject have reached a stage of dissolution. I will point to the places where 
language must end, but to be true to the aesthetic stage means i cannot finally explain it. 
Paradoxically, the most communicative way of relating these ideas is to move away from 
them, to write, as will be seen with Kierkegaard's pseudonyms, indirectly and ironically.
This essay is not precisely a-historical but at times it may be de-historical in an 
attempt to "defamiliarize" that which has become too familiar, to e-strange the family as
At this point i should perhaps supply some thoughts on the use of the lower­
case i.' This usage is motivated by fact that no other pronouns in english are capitalized, 
and, further, that the personal pronoun in other languages {moi, ich) is also left in lower­
case. One must wonder about the importance given to the english 'i' by putting it in 
upper-case. By keeping it in lower-case, i am ironically drawing more attention to it then 
there would be in normal usage (i.e., in upper-case) while at the same time de­
emphasizing it. It is a simple gesture, and perhaps not terribly meaningful, but it does 
coincide with the subject of this essay.
Prescript 27
typically conceived (the "family o f knowledge"). The historical context i-as-writing- 
subject am writing from is the current context o f theology, the visual arts, and theoiy as 
they appear in certain circles in North America and Western Europe. While certainly i 
can state my socialized race, gender and social status it inevitably becomes clear that i 
cannot provide a total context out o f which I am writing. ContextuaUzing one's self is 
undoubtedly important, but the compulsion to state one's social status seems to edge 
towards a politics of identity, and something i am hoping to aigue against in the end, 
This in no way negates self-reflexive writing, rather it radicalizes such writing by showing 
contexts to be continually moving: nomadic.
At die same time, i am writing in a context of wliich i have been greatly 
influenced by the concerns o f marginalization. The critiques out of the two-thirds world 
and the voices of the multiplicity of persons who have not been heard due to political, 
religious and other oppressions influences tliis present work. They have become part of 
who i-as-writing-subject am. I hope that many voices will come through in these 
writings, and there can be heard an unheard conversation between the cries of the unheard 
and the silence and disappearance that marks the thresholds of language: the site of the 
aesthetic. My hope is to open up holes at the margins of discourse whereby mediated 
communications^ from other places can be heard and seen, but also to realize where the 
other cannot be heard, for too quick an assimilation of the other negates its otherness.
This essay, then, is about language and media of communication, about the limits 
of language and media- of communication, and about the connection of language and 
media of communication with living, breathing, speaking, material bodies; with the subject 
in process. The approach here to subjectivity is not unrelated to Denida's approach to 
grammatology and i end this beginning of a writing with a quote from liis writing:
O f Grammatology is the title of a question: a question about the necessity of a 
science of writing, about the conditions that would make it possible, about the 
critical work that would have to open its field and resolve the epistemological 
obstacles; but it is also a question about the limits of this science. And these 
limits . . .  are fundamentally and systematically tied to metaphysics.**^
Positions, 13.
IRcinhraiult van Rijn. The Sh,u);l„ered Ox (1643?) Panel 73,3x31.8 cm. Kclvingrovc A n  (iaiicrv. ( ilasc .w
A rtem isia G cntileschi,/«rfir/; Slaytnjj Holofirucs, 1612—i]i. Naples, M useo di C apod im onte
Wassily Kandinsky, Swinging (1925) Oil on canvas 70.5x50.2 cm. The Tate Gallery
#
Wassily Kandinsky, In the Black Square (1923) Oil on canvas 97.5x93 cm. Guggenheim Museum
ï
Salvador Dali, The Metamorphosis o f Narcissus (1937) Oil on canvas 51.1x78.1 cm. The Tate Gallery
t;s
Rene Magritte, Le séducteur, (1951) Oil on canvas 50x60 cm.
The Aesthetic
-Z j t j  d  1.1 G  tz jL c y jT J i
Draw: "1 pull or cause to move towards or after one. 4 take 
(a person) aside. 5 attract; bring; take in {drew  a deep  
b rea th ; fe l t  draw n to h er; d rew  m y attention)*  9a (also absol.) 
make (a line or mark), b produce (a picture) thus, c represent 
(something) thus. 18 (of tea) infuse. 21 write out or compose 
(a cheque, document, etc.). 22 formulate or perceive (a 
comparison or distinction). 23 disembowel."^
The drawing of Rembrandt’s The S la u g h te re d  Ox* Big and startling in the 
gallery, contrasting sharply with the Mackintosh style.^ The fascination 
of the sight of the drawn ox draws one towards. Drawn to that which is 
drawn, i feel drawn. Who drew the ox that now draws the viewer? Did 
the painter draw the ox? Or was it the butcher? Or, am i drawing the ox?
There are four draws of the ox: 1) the butcher draws the ox, leaving 
a disemboweled beast; 2) Rembrandt draws the ox, re-producing the animal 
that can no longer reproduce; 3) the viewer of the painting is drawn to 
the ox, fascinated; 4) i am drawing the ox here, now, as i write out and 
formulate commentary on the painting of the butchered animal.
Working from these above four theses, i consider that the form—and 
the move into formlessness—of the painting draws the viewer first. The 
slaughtered ox hangs on a crossbar with the arms tied up and spread, the 
crossbar perpendicular to the background wall. Recently slaughtered, the 
hide and head of the animal lie in the bottom right corner, the woman with 
bucket and rag cleans up. Bloody hues pervade and light illuminates the 
opening of the flayed animal. The body cavity is enormous and the viewer 
is brought to face a vast open space; a void which was once filled with life 
is now the emptiness of death. The presence of the trace of the internal 
organs forces the viewer to acknowledge that this is/was an animal.
But once the immediate form is noticed, the viewer realizes the 
blindness to a crucial element: the ox is upside-down. When, on first sight, 
the crossbar is considered, one is tempted to see arms with legs going out 
below—as in a crucifixion. Also, the tail-bone is in(ad)vertedly seen as a
 ^ O xford D ictionary  o f  C u rre n t Usage.
 ^ Dated 1643 and in the Kelvingrove Art Gallery, Glasgow.
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head and continues the appearance of rightside-up. But upon seeing the 
"lower part" (lower in the painting) of the ox, it is revealed that the head 
is the lower part and those arras on the crossbar are the hind legs. The 
"head" (or what would be the head if it still existed) is turned away from 
the viewer making clear that what is illuminated at the top of the painting 
are the "lower" parts of the animal, the locus of intestines and genitalia 
(or lack thereof, considering it is an "ox"). The inversion disrupts the 
first reading of the painting and multiplies the fascination.
Further, this lower part of the ox (the upper part of the painting) 
becomes a significant point of ambiguity. The marks of inside and outside 
are clear at the point of the chest of the ox, but moving downward 
(upward) the lines disappear. Reaching the place of sexuality and digested 
food (shit, and the stench of death) the inside can no longer be 
differentiated from the outside. This is also the most illuminated place, 
light pouring in from somewhere right of the scene of the painting. The 
unclear marks of inside and outside, the opened and illuminated hind 
quarters, and the spread legs, come together at the point where in a 
crucifixion scene the "head" would be. Not only is the head missing where 
the viewer looks for it (at the "top" of the painting), but the head is not 
where it should be either at the "bottom." Here, the viewer is left to 
wonder, to stare, to gaze at the undifferentiated mass of flesh.
The drawing of the ox is finally a headless drawing—like Acephale, 
Holofernes, Goliath—a castrated death. According to Freud, "To 
decapitate=to castrate,"^ but this animal has suffered both. Headless and 
de-gendered, the body remains.
The sexuality theme is doubled as one considers the decapitated ox 
and its relation to the woman. The head of the ox is gone, but the woman 
stands in its place. Had there been a head, the woman would have been 
mostly covered up by it; in its absence the woman—bent and working— 
comes into view. In this undifferentiated realm, gendered readings become 
mixed up, distinctions difficult to draw. It could be read—though i am not 
drawing this reading here—that the woman is a medusa figure, she has
 ^ "Medusa’s Head," 212,
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taken the place of the head. As Freud says, "The hair upon Medusa’s 
head is frequently represented in works of art in the form of snakes, and 
these once again are derived from the castration complex. It is a 
remarkable fact that, however frightening they may be in themselves, they 
nevertheless serve actually as a mitigation of the horror, for they replace 
the penis. But contrarily, the viewer may be drawn in to the interstices 
of the painting (between ox and woman) and function as Hélène Cixous 
claims, upsetting the Freudian view: "They riveted us between two
horrifying myths: between the Medusa and the Abyss. That would be 
enough to set half the world laughing, except that it’s still going on. For 
the phallogocentric sublation is with us, and it’s militant, regenerating the 
old patterns, anchored in the dogma of castration. . . . You only have to 
look at the Medusa straight on to see her. And she’s not deadly. She’s 
beautiful and she’s laughing."^ Prom a entirely different "masculine" point 
of view on castration/beheading: "I could not help envying the heathen 
Holofernes who came to such a bloody end, beheaded by a regal lady."® 
Is the castration/beheading of the ox a display of engendered power 
as in Artemisia Gentileschi’s J u d ith  a n d  H oloferenes?  Only now the scene 
is after the fact? Or is it a weakness of the ox, castrated, beheaded, 
stripped naked and put on display? The "engendered woman" reading is 
problematized by the fact that the woman herself is drawn into an 
ambiguous place. Is she looking inward (contemplating) while she works 
outwardly (cleaning)? She stoops in a doorway, an opening, the 
intersection of inside and outside. The ambiguity of the doorway and the 
insideness and outsideness of the woman is exacerbated by the realization 
that it is not entirely clear what is inside and what is outside in the space 
of the painting. Does the ox hang "outside"? But one catches a glimpse 
of a roof above the hanging beast. Is the woman’s bottom "outside" and 
she is facing "inside"? The darkness behind her in the doorway suggests 
there is still more inside.
 ^ "Medusa’s Head," 212.
 ^ "The Laugh of the Medusa," 885.
® Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, Venus in  Furs.
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Perhaps it is all inside and there is no outside. The viewer may be 
trapped, claustrophobically so, in the internal regions with a decaying, 
once living beast. The viewer too is inside the cavernous body: "Instead 
of being inside a butcher shop, we are within a body,"^ The dark body— 
which in the painting is the only light part—is the inside from which we 
cannot escape (besides the doorway is blocked). Is this the heart of 
darkness? But the heart of the beast is absent.
Drawn "in" (perhaps involitionally, perhaps not, and this is the 
point, the viewer does not know if they really are against their will) the 
viewer faces the unknowing mass of un differentiation. This is the 
confrontation: "What we have to deal with—what the work does not spare
us from—is the effect of the putrifying smell of paint. The medium of 
overcoming death , . . becomes here the medium of overcoming the 
nonrepresentability of death."® There are ways of seeing whereby we 
become blind, for good sometimes, not always so. Can we make distinctions 
as to how to see clearly and thoughtfully and avoid the times we cannot?
K i e r k e g a a r d A e s th e t ic  
In the beginning was/is to h u  bohu,^
A person, a world, does not begin with nothing, but with everything. 
It is not every th ing , but a flux of undifferentiation. It is a void that is 
not hollow but chaos, not an empty "hole" or "shell," but a labyrinth that 
cannot be defined or brought into coherence. This is the beginning which 
is not really an origin, but a place to begin. We start with something,
Soren Kierkegaard began his pseudonymous authorship by writing 
of a stage along life’s way he termed the "aesthetic stage." As mentioned 
in the Prescript, the stages do not necessarily progress with one replacing
 ^ Bal, R eading  "R em brand t,"  387,
® Ibid., 386.
® Of, the first verses of the Hebrew Bible: "In the beginning God 
created the heavens and the earth. The earth was a vast waste {tohu), 
darkness covered the deep {hohu) . . . "  (Genesis 1.1-2, R e v ise d  E ng lish  
Bible),
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the previous, rather it may be more fitting to think of them as overlapping
spheres in su p p le m e n ta ry  relationship, the previous always just below the
current stage, adding to and replacing. This "beginning" stage begins not
at biological birth so much as the birth of the subject. Here at the
beginning of the aesthetic, the individual is not really a subject yet and
cannot be a subject until it moves into the later spaces of the aesthetic
(the ’reflective aesthetic’) and the spheres of the ethical and the religious.
The beginning of the aesthetic is the place of pre-self,
’Aesthetic’ as it is used in Kierkegaard’s writings and as i will be
using it here, is related to, but not equivalent to, the aesthetic tradition
in philosophy. This tradition—which began with A.G. Baumgarten’s first
use of the term ’aesthetic’ in his 1735 thesis. R e flec tio n s  on P o e try , a n d
extended through the Romantics and Kant to Hegel—seeks to make
aesthetics a separate discipline of philosophical study. While Kierkegaard
understands this tradition, his radical use of aesthetics comes, not in a
new advance for the science, but in the "existentializing" of aesthetics. As
Eric Ziolkowski argues, "Kierkegaard’s innovative transformation of
aesthetics as science into the aesthetic as existential stage furnishes a
supreme example of one of the hallmarks of his philosophical thinking: his
tendency to move from the speculative to the existential and concrete.
The aesthetic is a way of life, a mode of existence. As Kierkegaard himself
says: "personal life does not find its fulfillment in thought alone but in a
totality of kinds of existence and modes of expression. This philosophy
is an embodied philosophy, one lived out, pursued and described in the
twentieth-century by Michel Foucault:
I believe that . . . someone who is a writer is not simply doing his
work in his books, but that his major work is, in the end, himself
in the process of writing his books. The private life of an
Certainly, aesthetics in some senses extends throughout western 
thought, but Baumgarten is often considered the originator because of his 
push to make the philosophical study of the arts a discipline separate from 
other sciences such as religion and philosophy.
"Kierkegaard’s Concept of the Aesthetic," 43.
Jo u rn a ls  a n d  Papers, 2:215, #1593 (III C 33). Quoted in Ziolkowski, 
"Kierkegeiard’s Concept of the Aesthetic," 39.
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individual, his sexual preference, and his works are interrelated, not 
because his work translates his sexual life, but because the work 
includes the whole life as well as the text.
Foucault and Kierkegaard would agree that life cannot be lived in "thought 
alone," that there are a plethora of possibilities in which one can express 
life and pursue differing "modes of existence."
Within Kierkegaard’s aesthetic life there are two dimensions and a 
movement from one to the other: immediacy to reflection. Even though 
there are two sides, each belongs within the sphere of the aesthetic for 
one key reason: the absence of decision, the inability to function in a 
symbolic/ethical existence as a speaking subject through the use of 
language. Roughly speaking, the "immediate aesthetic" is a portrayal of 
the Romantic tradition in aesthetics, while the "reflective aesthetic" is a 
portrayal of Hegelianism. Kierkegaard rhetorically creates an argument 
against both modes of thinking in his "existentialized" description of the 
aesthetic life. He embodies the philosopher’s thoughts to show their limits 
in concrete, lived life. While borrowing many ideas from previous 
philosophers, the concern is for the use of these ideas in historical time 
and place Now, without delay, i turn to the immediate.
So, into the tohu  hohu  we dive to find the character of the
immediate aesthete, living a life of indeterminacy. This character is played 
out most fully in part one of "Kierkegaard’s" E ith er/O r, where the editor, 
Victor Eremita,^^ has collected a series of essays and letters from a "young
man" (the immediate aesthete). The reader is invited to share in the
reading of these "found" notes and letters, a scattered assortment of 
thoughts and ideas on life, love, music, the erotic, and one’s relation to the
"An Interview with Michel Foucault," Death and  th e  L a b yr in th , 
Trans. Charles Ruas. (New York, 1986) 184. Quoted in Miller, The Passion  
o f  M ichel Foucault, 19.
One of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms. Kierkegaard published many 
books under pseudonyms such as Hilarius Bookbinder, Johannes de Silentio, 
Constantine Constantius, Johannes Climacus and Anti-Climacus. The strong 
rhetorical element to his pseudonymous authorship will be played out 
throughout this essay. For now it will be noted that i will refer to the 
authors of particular quotes by their pseudonym rather than attribute it 
to Kierkegaard.
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world.
At the beginning of the sphere of the aesthetic lives the immediate 
person (as portrayed by the "young man"), the person who lives the 
etymological definition of a isth e tiko s: "pertaining to sense perception." The 
senses are functions of the body and therefore im-mediate, and, therefore 
also, what is most abstract. Abstraction and immediacy at first might be 
seen as radically differing concepts, but are part of the same in the sense 
that they are each removed from history and language (mediating and 
symbolic factors). As the young man states, "[t]he most abstract idea 
conceivable is the sensuous in its elemental originality."^® The aesthete 
lives abstractly with no divisions, a life in and for the senses. To live 
concretely would be to live with language and history which would 
necessarily create divisions. Without language and history the aesthete 
floats through life without roots and without direction.
The abstract life of the aesthetic is described in fragments (for no
one within this stage could present a coherent view of their self, and no
one outside would understand) scattered throughout Kierkegaard’s works 
(especially in E ith er /O r I  and S ta g e s  on L ifers Way, both published 
pseudonymously), but it is the section, "The Immediate Erotic Stages or 
The Musical Erotic" in E ith er /O r  I, which provides a good overview of the 
immediate aesthetic. In the title of this section are given several important 
terms for a description of the life of the aesthete: immediate, erotic and 
musical. These terms are intertwined and have one common thread, that
of a ’sensuous’ life in all the connotations of the word.
Music, according to Kierkegaard’s young man, is the very 
consummation of the immediate life. It is the medium which is fm-mediate, 
without medium. In music, communication is stripped bare and presence 
exudes throughout life: "sensuousness in its elemental originality is the 
absolute theme of music, Without mediation and without history, music 
is non-language; "[t]he immediate is the indeterminate, and therefore
E ith e r /O r  I, 56.
Ibid., 71.
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language cannot grasp it.*'^  ^ Without distinction there is no language. 
Without language there is no subject and no action. As Mark C. Taylor 
remarks, "When sunk in sensual immediacy, selfhood is dissipated in the 
transient moods and multiple pleasures of the effervescent moment."^®
T aking  a p u lse
Before going in to further description of the immediate aesthetic life, 
i want to foreground Julia Kristeva’s category of the sem iotic  in order to 
draw parallels between the aesthetic and the semiotic. These realms exist 
at the beginnings of Kierkegaard’s and Kristeva’s views of the subject and 
are marked by immediacy, undifferentiation and bodily drives. Kristeva’s 
work will continue to be key in a rereading of Kierkegaard, As her 
semiotic is tied here to the aesthetic, her "symbolic" realm may also be 
related to Kierkegaard’s ethical stage, and her notions of poetic language 
and abjection will be read along with further readings of the aesthetic 
stage.
There is a beginning before the word, before language, this is the 
semiotic:
In that anteriority to language, the outside is elaborated by means 
of a projection from within, of which the only experience we have is 
one of pleasure and pain. An outside in the image of the inside, 
made of pleasure and pain. The non-distinctiveness of inside and 
outside would thus be unnameable, a border passable in both 
directions by pleasure and pain. Naming the latter, hence 
differentiating them, amounts to introducing language, which, just as 
it distinguishes pleasure from pain as^it does all other oppositions, 
founds the separation inside/outside.
The semiotic is p re-lingual, and separations of inside/outside,
Ibid., 70. Here, of course, the analogy to music breaks down, for 
music cannot be produced without distinction; tone, timbre and tempo all 
rely on difference. Even so, the Romantic (and naïve) urge to posit the 
"basic" elements of music continue (e.g., in George Steiner’s Real 
P resences),
J o u rn e y s  to  Selfhood , 235.
Pow ers o f  Horror, 61.
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subject/object have yet to be made.
The drives of the semiotic, according to Kristeva, are linked to the
psychoanalytic notions of primary processes: Freud’s displacement and
condensation, the anal and oral drives, those elements—pre-verbal and,
hence, pre-subject—where the in-fant ("without speech") is enmeshed with
the mother and, more specifically, the mother’s body. Let me begin with
a dense quote from Kristeva, and then try to unpack it.
We understand the term "semiotic" in its Greek sense: 
distinctive mark, trace, index, precursory sign, proof, engraved or 
written sign, imprint, trace, figuration. . . . Discrete quantities of 
energy move through the body of the subject who is not yet 
constituted as such and, in the course of his development, they are 
arranged according to the various constraints imposed on this body- 
-always already involved in a semiotic process—by family and social 
structures. In this way the drives, which are "energy" charges as 
well as "psychical" marks, articulate what we call a chorax a 
nonexpressive totality formed by the drives and their stases in a 
motility that is as full of movement as it is regulated.^®
The chora  (a term borrowed from Plato’s Timaeus) is somewhat of a 
"receptacle" for the drives of the infant. At the same time, the receptacle
is without form, amorphous, it is infinitely divisible and separable, and
"can never be definitively p o s i t e d . T h e  chora  is nourishing and
maternal, a wet nurse, according to P l a t o . S u c h  a description may
provide a metaphor of fluidity which would not be altogether inappropriate 
here, for this "receptacle" is se mi-permeable and the drives and pulsions
20 R evo lu tion  in  Poetic Language, 25. The etymological definition of 
"semiotic" is similar to Derrida’s function of writing [écriture]  in Of 
Grammatology and , indeed, Kristeva points this out later (R evolu tion  40-41). 
She keeps the word "semiotic" because it is linked to "symbolic" and 
"signifiance" which come together to create the signifying process. The 
signifying process is too complex for her to simply condense it into one 
term (i.e., écr itu re ). It could be understood, through Kristeva, that 
Derrida’s gram m atology  is concerned wholly (as with the psychoanalysts) 
with the "semiotic" side of language. On the other hand, linguistics has 
been concerned almost wholly with the "symbolic" side of signification. 
These are the two main types of analysis Kristeva attempts to bring 
together in her R evo lu tion  in  Poetic Language,
Ibid., 26.
Ibid., 26, 240 n.l4.
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constantly flow in and out of the body of the infant. Entirely dependent
as it is on the mother at this point, the infant nonetheless is full of
energies and rhythms which "precede evidence, verisimilitude, spatiality,
and temporality."^®
Like Thor, it sucks through a horn, the tip of which rests in the 
ocean; but the reason that it cannot suck its object to itself is not 
that the object is infinite, but that this infinity cannot become an 
object for it. Thus the sucking does not indicate a relation to the object but is identical with its sighing, and this is infinitely deep.
In other words, the infant has no self-conception, no way of seeing itself 
as separate or unified unto itself, it is caught in the flow with the mother, 
"Neither model nor copy, the chora  precedes and underlies figuration and 
thus specularization, and is analogous only to vocal or kinetic rhythm."^® 
Because there are as yet no separations—infant from mother—there 
is no linguistic sign to serve as representation of a split, a lost object. 
Kristeva’s theory, like Lacan’s (discussed later in this essay), establishes 
movements and constructions of subjectivity that are pre-Oedipal, and 
hence, pre-lingual and pre-gender construction. Regardless, any 
"signifying process" (made up in connection with the "symbolic," and 
articulated through a "speaking subject") must have the semiotic "as a 
psychosomatic modality of the signifying process; in other words, not a 
symbolic modality but one articulating a continuum."^® Such a theory gives 
language a fundamental materiality.
What is more, Kristeva’s theory gives primary positioning in the 
construction of subjectivity to the mother’s body’s relation to the infant’s 
body. As the concrete operations and primary processes of the infant’s 
body are connected to the mother, "the mother’s body is therefore what 
mediates the symbolic law organizing social relations and becomes the
Ibid., 26.
Kierkegaard’s young aesthete in E ith er /O r  /, 77.
25 R evo lu tion  in P oetic L anguage, 26.
Ibid., 28.
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ordering principle of the semiotic chorau"^^ Judith Butler adds, "The chora  
is that site where materiality and femininity appear to merge to form a 
materiality prior to and formative of any notion of the empirical."^® At the 
same time, the drives are ambiguous: both destructive—battling stases—and 
assimilating—connecting to the mother. This leaves the conclusion that, 
"the semiotic chora  is no more than the place where the subject is both 
generated and negated, the place where his unity succumbs before the 
process of charges and stases that produce him."^ ®
As mentioned above in the discussion of the role of music in the 
immediate aesthetic and as will be seen in the next section on Kandinsky’s 
painting, the analogy to "vocal rhythm" is worth highlighting. It is here, 
in the voice, in "the mother’s tongue," that analogy may help in the 
understanding of the semiotic. Sounds (and stemming from this, ’speech’) 
are thought to be the most "im-mediate" ("without medium") of expressions. 
The sound of music, Kristeva considers echoing Kierkegaard, is 
"constructed entirely on the basis of the semiotic."®® While it is true that 
the semiotic "precedes spatiality and temporality," the use of rhythm seems 
to lend weight to time, albeit not historical time.
On the other side of the signifying process is the sym bolic. Strictly 
speaking, the symbolic does not come about until after the aesthetic and 
semiotic—until the entry into the Law of the Father (Lacan)—, but a brief 
description here will be of use. The symbolic is the structuring of 
language into forms by which meaning comes into being. This is the realm 
of signification. It is a matter of positions and of judging®^; it is 
syntactical and creates, ultimately, a speaking subject. "Meaning" 
according to Husserl via Kristeva, "is thus nothing other than a projection
”  Ibid., 27.
Bodies th a t M atter, 17.
R evolu tion , 28,
Ibid., 24.
®^ Cf. de Certeau’s description of ’strategy’ in the Prescript, p,6.
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of signification (Bedeutung) as it is presented by judgment."®^ This
judging ability can come only with the development of subjectivity, and
subjectivity only through the separation from the Mother, when objects
become identifiable. "Sym bo lic  would seem an appropriate term for this
always split unification [of the signifier and signified] that is produced by
a rupture and is impossible without it." It is "a sign of recognition: an
’object' split in two and the parts separated, but . . . brings together the
two edges of that fissure. As a result, the ’symbol’ is any joining, any
bringing together that is a contract . . . and, finally, any exchange."®® By
’exchange,* a symbol is a socially agreed upon means of communication, and,
far from being natural or inherent, the symbolic realm shows the
constructed nature of language. Though unnatural, the symbolic is
nonetheless necessary for communication. Mark C. Taylor gives an
historical context for symbols:
In ancient Greece, the symbol was the means by which communication 
was secured. When a messenger departed, he was given one half of 
a broken staff that was called a symbol. The message he bore upon 
his return was deemed trustworthy only if the messenger brought 
back with him the other half of the staff. When the two halves of 
the symbol were ’thrown together,’ the circuit of communication was 
completed and the message transmitted.
Between these two—the semiotic and symbolic—is the th e tic  phase. 
The thetic comes after the semiotic and links the semiotic to the symbolic, 
becoming "the threshold of language"®® and the basis for all signification. 
Though it resides primarily on the side of the symbolic, it is also a
connecting point between the semiotic and symbolic. The place of the
thetic would be a "safety zone" where the pulsating and disruptive drives 
of the semiotic meet the social constructs of the symbolic. Yet, the thetic 
keeps the symbolic from obliteration. Kristeva stresses the need for the
thetic over and over again. The thetic is what is at stake in the
Ibid., 34.
Ibid., 49.
"The Eventuality of Texts," 227-228. 
R evo lu tion , 45.
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unsettling elements of poetry that do not leave us with complete loss of
identity, "for us, this is precisely what distinguishes a text as s ig n ify in g
p ra c tic e  from the 'drifting-into-non-sense' that characterizes neurotic
d i s c o u r s e . I n  the presence of the poetic, the subject is shaken, the
semiotic bursts through the symbolic, yet the subject does not disappear,
meaning continues in a different form.
[Tjhe seralotic, which also precedes it [the symbolic], constantly 
tears it open, and this transgression brings about all the various 
transformations of the signifying practice that are called ’creation.' 
Whether in the realm of metalanguage or literature, what remodels 
the symbolic order is always the influx of the semiotic. This is 
particularly evident in poetic language since, for there to be a 
transgression of the symbolic, there must be an irruption of the 
drives in the universal signifying order, that of ’natural* language 
which binds together the social unit. That the subject does not 
vanish into psychosis when this transgression takes place poses a 
problem for metaphysics, both the kind that sets up the signifier as 
an untransgressable law and the kind for which there exists no 
thetic and therefore no subject.
The symbolic and the semiotic work together and against each other to 
produce signification. According to Kristeva, neither side can be neglected 
for personal or political analysis. More than this, if one remains interested 
in the idea of "revolution," one must pay attention to the functionings of 
poetic language, a language that disrupts and puts into process the 
"given" symbolic language of a society.
Though this is all getting ahead of the present essay and 
signification not formally possible in the stage of the immediate aesthetic, 
a brief discussion of the signifying process in Kristeva may serve as a 
check on just what sort of writing is taking place here. Tinged with the 
semiotic, the symbolic writing which posits thesis after thesis continues to 
provide a place for a coherence, a place where subjectivity can be viewed. 
Without the symbolic, such an essay would be impossible.
Ibid., 51. 
Ibid., 62.
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K andinsky*s m usical p a in tin g
While the young aesthete and Kristeva’s "in-fant" consider music as 
the most abstract medium (i.e., dissociated from history, language and 
bound up with bodily sensuality), twentieth-century developments in 
painting may provide another (im)medium of expressing the aesthetic. Most 
notably, the work of Wassily Kandinsky parallels many of Kierkegaard’s 
views on the notion of the abstract, and Kandinsky goes so far as to make 
strong ties between music and the colors of painting.^® So, while 
Kierkegaard’s young man states, "The ear . . .  is the most spiritually 
qualified s e n s e , Ka n d i n s k y  names an album of poems and woodcuts, 
SoundSi and translates an article of Viennese composer Schoenberg into 
Russian.
The effort raised by Kandinsky to associate painting with music, and 
therefore with sound, is part of a long tradition in the west that insists 
on orality/aurality as the most immediately present means of communication. 
Through the close association of his painting to sound, Kandinsky could 
claim a place of privilege for the immediate perception of his paintings. 
If his paintings are like sounds, they are therefore like speech, and if like 
speech they are therefore somehow "primary," striking the viewer on a 
fundamental level with a minimum of mediation.^^
Enough of a parallel was made to cause celebrated modern art 
critic, Clement Greenberg, to comment, "His chief mistake was to draw too 
close an analogy between painting and music" {The Nation^ 7 April 1945. In 
C ollected E ssa ys  a n d  Criticism , vol.II p. 16).
E ith er /O r  I, 68.
S o u n d s  (1912) and Kandinsky’s own footnotes to Schoenberg’s "On 
Parallel Octaves and Fifths" (1911) are reprinted in K and insky: Complete 
W ritings on A rt, vol.l, pp. 291-339 and 91-95 respectively.
While there are a plethora of people who could be quoted to 
illustrate the tendency to privilege speech over other media such as 
writing, i supply a quote here from one who was not so philosophically 
sophisticated as Plato, Derrida, Don Ihde or Walter Ong. The quote is that 
of Helen Keller’s: "I am just as deaf as I am blind. The problems of 
deafness are deeper and more complex, if not more important, than those 
of blindness. Deafness is a much worse misfortune. For it means the loss
The Aesthetic 42
Around the same time that Ferdinand de Saussure was delivering his
famed, "Course in General Linguistics," Kandinsky was putting together his
most famous of writings, Ü ber das G eistige in  d er  K u n s t [On th e  S p ir itu a l
in  Art], Within this work Kandinsky discusses the nature of linguistics in
a way similar to Saussure’s linguistics. Kandinsky’s linguistics especially
parallel Saussure’s examination of the "sign" ("signifier" and "signified"
as well as having "phonocentric" similarities.
Words are inner sounds. This inner sound arises partly—perhaps 
principally—from the object for which the word serves as a name. 
But when the object itself is not seen, but only its name is heard, 
an abstract conception arises in the mind of the listener, a 
dematerialized object that at once conjures up a vibration in the 
"heart.". , , Eventually, manifold repetition of a word (a favorite 
childhood game, later forgotten) makes it lose its external sense as 
a name. In this way, even the sense of the word as an abstract 
indication of the object is forgotten, and only the pure sound of the 
word remains.
Words as sounds are quickly joined to painting when Kandinsky considers 
"[w]e may also, perhaps unconsciously, hear this ’pure’ sound at the same 
time as we perceive the real, or subsequently, the abstract o b j e c t , I n  
such a conception one is "dissolved into the ceremony of communication."^^ 
Mediation is eliminated and im-mediate perception is possible; the subject-
of the most vital stimulus—the sound of the voice that brings language, 
sets thoughts astir and keeps us in the intellectual company of humans." 
(From a letter to Dr. J. Kerr Love, March 31, 1910, from the souvenir 
program commemorating Helen Keller’s visit to Queensland Adult Deaf and 
Dumb Mission in 1948. Quoted in Ackerman, A N atural H is to ry  o f  th e  
S en se s , 191-192.)
There are many references in contemporary theory to Saussure’s 
work, complete with outlines of his two-part sign structure, the "signified" 
and the "signifier." I use Kaja Silverman’s, The S u b je c t  o f  Sem iotics for 
a brief definition here, "Within the linguistic system the signifier would be 
what Saussure calls a ’sound-image,’ that is, the image of one of those 
sounds which we shape within our minds when we think, whereas the 
signified would be the meaning which that sound-image generates" (6).
In K a n d in sky: Com plete W ritings, Vol.l, 147.
Ibid., 147.
45 Claude Lefort. The Political Forms o f  M odern Socie ty:  
B u rea u cra cy , Democracy, Totalitarianism , (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986) 226.
The Aesthetic 4 3
object distinction is broken down in the "pure sound."
P resen ce  in communication, it has often been considered, comes 
through speech, through transient and evanescent sounds that are tied to 
the immediacy of chronological life. Obviously speech is language {parole  
is within langue^^), and the aesthete, it will be remembered, is pre-lingual. 
But the aesthete is not pre-aural, and the connection i am drawing here 
leaves aside constitutive questions of verbal language for the time being 
and focuses on media, i.e., sound and aurality. The young aesthete of 
E ith er /O r I  makes the distinction that "Language [i.e., speech] has its 
element in time; all other media have space as their element. Only music 
occurs in time."^^ Music, like speech, exists in time and therefore becomes 
more primary to human communication. Writing or images, on the other 
hand, are commonly held to be parasitic on speech—they "re-present" what 
speech "presents"—and are highly mediated and secondary. Kandinsky, 
in a sense, tries to subvert the parasitic relationship in his attempt to 
paint abstractly, but in the end must rely on an analogy of his painting 
to sound for his justification. Voice, sound and speech are thought to be 
the most im-mediate communication, and the pursuit of a "musical" writing 
for Kierkegaard’s aesthete and a "musical" painting for Kandinsky is 
ultimately a search for presence.
But Kandinsky’s art is an inversion of Kierkegaard—if we understand 
the aesthetic stage as but one "mode of existence" and not as a telos. As 
the "first abstract artist," Kandinsky tries to move tow ards  the aesthetic 
sphere as it is laid out in Kierkegaard’s writings. Harmony is the key. 
Distinctions are to be broken down to where they no longer exist. The
Another element of Saussure’s linguistics is langue  ("language") 
and parole  ("speech"). Again, Silverman provides a working definition of 
these concepts: "language finds its locus only in memory—not so much in 
any single memory as in the memory of a culture. As Saussure points out, 
’language is not complete in any speaker; it exists perfectly only within a 
collectivity’ ([Course in  General L ingu istics]  14). Speech, on the other 
hand, has an individual and localized existence. It is characterized by 
certain ’accidental’ features, like personal intonation or style, which have 
no place within the more stable and normative language system" ( The  
S u b je c t  o f  Sem iotics, 11).
E ith er /O r  I, 68.
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medium is to disappear into immediacy. Whereas Kierkegaard presents the 
aesthetic as one stage, with distinctions a necessary part of development 
(to be shown later), Kandinsky sees his harmonious "abstract" or 
"n o n o b jec tiv ep a in tin g  as the culmination of a new age in the arts. The
harmony attempted is, in this sense, post-linguistic or post-subjective, it 
is a "return" to primary immediacy.
Kandinsky began writing and painting in an optimistic age (or, so it 
was to him), an age before the World Wars in Europe, This optimism 
created a profound a-political and a-mate rial stance in the thought of 
Kandinsky and he believed the time of the spiritual was dawning. 
Convinced, as he was, of the importance of theosophy, and especially the 
writings of Rudolf Steiner and Madame Blavatsky, the time had come to 
shed the material biases of the nineteenth-century and begin to emphasize 
"the spirit. To coincide with this new age a new kind of composition 
had to be developed, a composition he believed that, "[o]nce found and 
crystallized, it will provide the expression of the Epoch of the Great 
S p i r i t u a l . F o r  Kandinsky, the "spiritual" and the aesthetic came 
together at this time, and harmony, the end of distinction, was the goal. 
Several decades later, one of Kandinsky’s critics, Clement Greenberg, was
In the "Introduction" to volume one of K and insky: Complete 
W ritings on A rt, editors Lindsay and Verge explain that Kandinsky had 
used both "abstract" and "nonobjective" to describe his art, but "[i]n 
letters to Hilia Re bay in 1936 and 1937 he explained the misunderstandings 
inherent in the term a b s tra c t ("abstracted from some object"), and said he 
preferred n o n o b jec tiv e  (that which "creates its own elements")" (21). 
"Abstract" seems to be the term which has stuck, and i use it here for 
convenience.
Mark C. Taylor’s chapter, "Iconoclasm," (D isfiguring) sketches the 
relation of theosophy (ala Madam Blavatsky and Steiner) to the "new age" 
of the beginning of the twentieth-century, but also shows the impact early 
theosophy (in sixteenth-century figure, Jakob Bohme) had on the German 
Romantics and specifically Hegel. Taylor considers: "The threefold rhythm 
articulated in Hegel’s philosophy—unity, loss/fragmentation, and return to 
unity—constitutes the s tr u c tu r a l  foundation of all Theosophical systems. . 
, . Moreover, philosophical idealism and Theosophical spirituality agree that 
the te los  of the psychocosmic process is the discovery of the implicit 
Identity of the human and divine" (D isfiguring , 54),
"Content and Form," 90.
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to admit to a similar impulse which mimes Kandinsky well and reiterates
precisely where we are along Kierkegaard’s stages:
We are through with the big words and what they advertise; their 
aesthetic credit, at least, is exhausted. But in the name of 
’profundity* we still long to dissolve our art and ourselves in some 
ultimate vagueness or confusion. And what promises this better 
than religion'^^ Yet the aspiration is an aesthetic, not a moral or religious one.
"Dissolving" ourselves in some vagueness is the undifferentiated, unified 
aesthetic realm of Kandinsky’s abstract art.
In an essay dated 1910-1911, Kandinsky laid out a search for the 
perfect correspondence of form and content: "The most beautiful work is 
that whose external form corresponds entirely to its internal content 
(which is, so to speak, an eternally unrealizable ideal). For
Kierkegaard’s young man, this "most beautiful work" has already occurred:
From "Religion and the Intellectuals: a Symposium," P artisan  
Review . May-June 1950. Greenberg’s article is in vol.3 of The Collected  
E ssa y s  a n d  Criticism , pp. 39-42. Quote from p. 42.
"Content and Form," 87.
E ither/O r, 57.
In, among other places, "Content and Form."
::A:"In Mozart’s Don Giovanni, we have the perfect unity of this idea and its 
corresponding form."^^ Kierkegaard’s aesthete and Kandinsky would agree 
that unity of form and content, the lust for perfect communication, becomes 
available only through media outside, beyond, or before language—even, 
finally, beyond speech itself. The beyond of language is outside of history, 
outside of concrete action, it is the spiritual quest for presence*
The spiritual quest for immediate presence, to modernists such as 
Kandinsky, meant a striving for an internal consistency of form and 
content (what Kandinsky called, "internal necessity"^^) which led to 
autonomous art. Autonomy meant the artwork had to be outside of history 
and material constraints. It would be a mistake, however, to consider this 
spiritual painting as "art for a r t’s sake," for the te los  was always that of 
stirring the soul, "Art for a rt’s sake" existed in the materialistic age of 
which Kandinsky now considers to be giving way to the new spiritual age
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at the turn of the century. He considers the soul to be "deadened and
neglected by materialistic views" giving way to the opinion that "’pure’ art
is not given to man for a special reason, but is purposeless; that art exists
only for a rt’s sake. Here the bond between art and soul becomes half
anaesthetized."^^ Kandinsky’s art has a purpose. Greenberg describes
Kandinsky’s freedom of art:
Like Mondrian he spoke of ’liberation’—from the past, from nature— and was optimistic, anticipating a future of inner certainty and the 
’growing realization of the spiritual. ’ (As far as I can make out, 
Kandinsky’s ’spiritual’ means simply intensity and seriousness and 
has no religious connotations.)
Harmony, presence and the "spiritual" then, are caught up together
within the aesthetic. Borders between form and content, presence and
absence, and ultimately, subject and object disappear and a seamless realm
of undifferentiation is born into the new spirituality of the aesthetic.
Kandinsky boldly states that "[a]rt must march at the head of spiritual
evolution, adapting its forms to this greater refinement, its prophetic
role."^^ In a similarly unifying vein, Mark C. Taylor explains Kant’s
analysis of the work of art in The C ritique o f  J u d g e m e n t
Kant attempts to discern the original unity of theoretical [the first 
Critique] and practical reason [the second Critique] through which 
the identity of nature and reason can be secured and thus truth 
and freedom established. The demonstration of this primal oneness 
establishes the p o s s ib il i ty  o f overcoming fragmentation and alienation 
by recovering the unity of experience that has long been lost or 
hidden. The work of art opens the way to this original accord.
"Unity," as it is used here, is close to harmony, to the elimination 
of boundaries and distinctions and should not be confused with "unitary." 
Taylor’s phrase above, "primal oneness" points back to the discussion of 
the semiotic in Kristeva, it is a flow without boundaries—though it should
On th e  S p ir itu a l in  A r t, 212.
Clement Greenberg, from The Nation 7 April, 1945. In Collected
W orks IL  p. 16.
"Content and Form," 89. 
D isfiguring , 27.
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be quickly pointed out, Kristeva’s semiotic is not a pure and innocent 
origin, and is not attainable. The desire for the unity of a beginning is 
a romantic nostalgia and "The origin and end of [the Romantics] action is 
the ego,"^^ This unified nostalgia is seen throughout western thought, and 
here the logos is the guarantor of redemption; if only the unity of inner 
necessity can be painted, im-mediacy achieved, then we will be saved, made 
whole again. The goal of much of modern art, was to get back to this 
imagined unity of things, to "recover" what had been lost. In many ways 
this has remained the te lo s  of Freudian psychoanalysis.
But there is also another side of the modern—brought out in the 
term used above, ’unitary’—and that is the issue of autonomy and purity. 
Paradoxically, the quest for presence and harmony—a return to "primal 
origins"—is met with the individual unitary subject and autonomous art 
work. In this sense, unity and unitary are related but also contradictory, 
for unity would entail the end of borders and therefore the end of what 
is individual and unitary, or, to put it in another jargon, ’alienated.’ The 
immediate aesthete knows no alienation for she/he has no separations. 
Here in the middle (in  m édias), of im-mediacy we find an aporia which may 
unravel all artistic attempts at unity,
Peter Bürger recasts this aporia in relation to Hegel’s aesthetics, and
states.
Modernity is the epoch of the great division between subject and 
object. Their reconciliation is only possible when mediated by the 
imagination (in religion) or the concept (in philosophy), ^^rt, on the 
other hand, is characterized by a moment of immediacy.
In this Hegelian aesthetic, "the artist, not yet released from his n a tu ra l  
side is united d ire c tly  with the subject-matter, believes in it, and is 
identical with it in accordance with his very own self."^^ The mimetic 
relationship entailed here and which Kandinsky has attempted to live "is 
out of step with modernity because it wants to go back to a time before
Bürger, "Aporias of Modern Aesthetics," 11.
"Aporias of Modern Aesthetics," 7.
G.W.F. Hegel, A e sth e tic s:  L e c tu re s  on Fine A r t  Trans. T.M. Knox. 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 1975), 1:604. Quoted in Bürger, "Aporias," 7.
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division instead of trying to overcome it by means of the imagination or 
the concept. The imagination or the concept would be that which is 
transcendent, assuring a reunified wholeness, it is iogocentric. This is the 
"disappearance of art," a unity of form and content which fades away upon 
viewing, leaving the viewer in a primordial state. When the medium 
disappears—-im-mediacy occurs—presence, and therefore salvation, can 
happen.
Nonetheless, for Freud, as for Bürger, there is no original point 
which can be apprehended; the subject is split and attempts at 
mediatization are all that are available to us. Freud and Bürger also 
concur that there is a te los or utopia which is strived for, albeit 
impossibly. The problem with much of modern art, according to Bürger, 
is the Hegelianism and Romanticism which would neglect the medium itself, 
pretending it could disappear in pure communication.
As these issues will continue to crop up in this essay, i will leave 
these ideas and return to Kierkegaard. Suffice it for now that in the 
early stages of the immediate aesthetic what is of concern is "unity." Here 
the ethical/symbolic realm is swallowed up into the aesthetic, the very 
place Kierkegaard seems intent to place alongside the ethical/symbolic, A 
side-by-side, or su p p lem en ta ry , view provides a place where subjectivity, 
language and distinction are possible and interactive with the aesthetic. 
Again, the aesthetic will not disappear at other stages, but remains 
constitutive of all these "later" stages. Entering again into the flow of life 
developed in E ith er /O r  I, the young aesthete has a ways to go before 
making the move to the ethical/symbolic stage.
The con tinuum  o f  th e  im m ediate a e s th e tic
Immediacy is not just a (non)place, it is a (non)time. This is another 
reason for the choice of music as the quintessence of this early stage, and 
why we can also consider the "abstract art" of Kandinsky as an expression 
of immediacy. In E ith er/O r, the young aesthete considers the most
Bürger, "Aporias," 7.
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abstract medium to be music, from another angle, since ”[i]t cannot express 
the historical within time."^^ In the immediate there is no history, 
everything occurs "immediately." Past and Future are not comprehended, 
all is now, a now which cannot see itself as now. This ’now’ is echoed in 
a twentieth-century musically-oriented poem, T.S. Eliot’s Four Q uartets:
Time past and time future 
Allow but a little consciousness.
To be conscious is not to be in time
But only in time can the moment in the rose-garden,
The moment in the arbour where the rain beat.
The moment in the draughty church at smokefall 
Be remembered; involved with past and future.
Only through time time is conquered.^^
Mozart is invoked as the key player for the immediate aesthete and 
here it is realized how close to the tohu  bohu  we are; "if [Mozart] were 
taken away, if his name were blotted out, that would demolish the one 
pillar that until now has prevented everything from collapsing for me into 
a boundless chaos, into a dreadful n o t h i n g . B u t  luckily, to the aesthete,
Mozart is immortal and death has no power; for if death were real and did
have power it seems the aesthete would commit suicide, Mozart is immortal 
precisely because death has no power. Not that there is an overcoming of 
death, but what is death if life is "empty and meaningless"?^® Lacking 
"the courage to possess, to own, anything,"®^ even his own life, the 
aesthete lives on. Even death and life at this point have no distinction 
between them.
The aesthete lives "Either/Or" not as a choice to be made—and
thereby a commitment—but in an undifferentiated realm of both:
Hang yourself, and you will regret it. Do not hang yourself, and you 
will also regret it. Hang yourself or do not hang yourself, you will
®^ E ith er /O r  I, 57.
"Burnt Norton," 11.83-93. 
E ith e r /O r  I, 49.
Ibid., 29.
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regret it either way.®®
There are no divisions to be made, everything flows together as in a 
confluence; all of life is "a single color."®® This confluent place is a place 
of non-action, but not in any Buddhist or mystical sense, for this is the 
place of the beginning, whereas a contemplative sense of non-action comes 
later (and so we will come to it later), it comes a f te r  the subject. This 
non-action is abstraction at a base level, a level before there is even an 
individual subject which could (not) act.
Recalling the three terras of the section in E ith er /O r  I—immediate, 
musical, erotic—there is still the question of the erotic. How does 
eroticism function if there are no divisions or distinctions? Here too, a 
different twist is taken in the connotation and the element of ’desire’ 
comes to the fore. The aesthete as immediate aesthete is not an individual 
subject, but a flux of sensation. Subject and object are not separated 
because desire itself is not yet awake. Rather, "that which is desired is 
continually present in the desire."^® Desire has no object but turns within 
itself as the aesthete flows through the sensuous life, the life felt, but not 
felt deeply.
Desire here is asexual, unable to make gender distinctions: "The 
desire and the desired are joined in this unity, that they both are 
n e u tr iu s  g e n e r is  [of neuter g e n d e r ] . A l t h o u g h  it is certainly implied by 
Kierkegaard, this does not entail a compulsory heterosexual reading of 
desire, but a "neutered" reading. Sexuality cannot exist in a realm of 
undifferentiated sex, no matter what the orientation. Sex must be 
constructed along the "stages" of subjectivity.
With relation to desire and the erotic, there are three stages (though 
"I could perhaps more appropriately use the word ’metamorphosis’"^ )^
Ibid., 38. 
Ibid., 28. 
Ibid., 75. 
”  Ibid., 77. 
Ibid., 74.
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which make up the immediate aesthetic, each one a clearer separation of 
desire and object. The first stage of the immediate aesthete is marked, as 
stated and described above, by asexual desire "in which the object is 
stirring and is so close to the desire that it is within it."^® Desire is 
present, but "devoid of motion, devoid of unrest.
In the second stage desire awakens and separation begins. This is 
a crucial point in the development of the individual subject and one which 
will have continual resonances throughout the rest of this study. In spite 
of the fact that there is not a great deal of space devoted to this stage 
in Kierkegaard’s writings, there are reasons for this lack of space which 
i hope to draw out and emphasize.
In this second stage of the immediate aesthetic "desire awakens" and 
it is this "awakening . . . this jolt [which] separates desire and its object, 
gives desire an object. . . . The desire and object are twins, neither of 
which comes into the world one split second before the o t h e r . C r e a t i o n  
occurs through separation; the object is created out of the chaos of 
undifferentiation, not ex  nihilo. Newness and birth always require a 
splitting whether it is the mitosis of the cells of an embryo or the cutting 
of the umbilical cord. Yet, the split is never a final movement but only a 
catalyst for more moving; once desire awakens it is hard to stop:
this movement of the sensuous, this earthquake, splits the desire 
from its object infinitely for a moment; but just as the moving
principle shows itself for a moment as disuniting, so it manifests itself in turn as wanting to unite the separated. The result of the
separation is that desire is torn out of its substantial repose in itself, and as a consequence of this, the object no longer falls^^nder the rubric of substantiality but splits up into a multiplicity.
This multiplicity has the desirous aesthete searching in vain for its object. 
It seeks, but does not know what it is looking for.
This originary splitting constitutes a fundamental separation within
"  Ibid., 76. 
Ibid., 78. 
Ibid., 79-80. 
Ibid., 80.
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the development of the subject, and here we touch again on the impossible
"unity" which was left off in the discussion of Kandinsky’s aesthetics.
Derrida considers this split/break [ie coup] to be crucial (crux) in any
consideration of subjectivity, aesthetics or concept:
The exit out of the ’primitive* mythical unity (which is always 
reconstituted retrospectively in the aftermath of the break [dans  
P a p rès-co u p u re]), the scission, the decision—which is both deciding and decided—, the shot/throw/blow [ie coup] parts the seed as it 
projects it. It inscribes difference in the heart of life.
Here is the locus of Augustine’s restless h e a r t , o f  Petrarch’s wandering,^® 
and of ’desire’ as a fundamental basis of psychoanalysis.
Again, i feel this second stage in Kierkegaard’s immediate aesthetic 
is a crucial stage and one easily overlooked. The resonances with 
twentieth-century psychoanalysis are astounding and it is here worth 
highlighting some more contemporary approaches to this original splitting. 
It is Freud who is, of course, of importance here, but it is Lacan’s and 
Kristeva’s interpretations of Freud which occupy our interest.
In te rm e d ia ry  s ta g e s
Indeed, it is a section in Kristeva’s Pow ers o f  H orror which sparked
an idea in my own mind about the second stage of the immediate erotic as
a transitional and crucial stage. She sees in Freud’s Totem a n d  Taboo an
inserted third stage which holds her attention in consideration of the
"beginnings of childhood." The passage quoted from Freud is as follows;
In this intermediary stage [. . .] the sexual impulses which formerly 
were separate have already formed into a unit and have also found
D issem ination, 304.
See C onfessions, I.l.
79 See, among other places, Francesco Petrarca, L e tte r s  on Familiar 
M atters, Vol. 2. Trans. Aldo S. Bernardo (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 
1982), Fam, XV, 4: pp.258-261; "I do not know whence its origin, but I do 
know that innate desire to see new places and to change domiciles. . . . 
[Tjhere is something truly pleasant, though demanding, about this curiosity 
for wandering through different regions, whereas those who remain in one 
place always experience a peculiar boredom in their repose" (260).
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an object; but this object is not external and foreign to theindividual, but is his own ego, which is formed at this period.
For Kristeva, reading Freud, primary narcissism exists at the in- 
between stage between the undifferentiated pre-verbal world (the semiotic) 
and the linguistically constructed world of the subject and the object (the 
symbolic). The ’split’ between these two elements (semiotic and symbolic) 
is not a one-time event, rather, it is a process occurring over a period of 
time. The initial splitting is what will be considered here, with further 
splits leading into the symbolic. Once the subject is established in the 
symbolic realm, the unstable split between these two orders continually 
propels the subject onward, Kristeva labels this movement, "subject in 
process."
Primary narcissism is the "correlation between an entity (the ego) 
and its converse (the object), which is nevertheless not yet constituted; 
with an ’ego’ in relation to a non-object."®^ This is a place of "imprecise 
boundaries," and "inside and outside are not precisely differentiated here, 
nor is language an active practice or the subject separated from the 
other."®^ It is at this crux, this narcissistic, ambiguous, undifferentiated 
realm which "renders unstable the ego’s identity."®® Between, but not 
reduced to either the subject or the object, this crux is the site of the 
a b je c t
The abject is something which cannot be simply defined or 
assimilated, but only, as in the first section of Pow ers o f  Horror, 
"approached," and that approach through difference, "The nothing that 
approaches without being present can be approached only indirectly. In 
this uncanny domain, communication inevitably is ’indirect
®® Totem a n d  Taboo, 115-116, vol. 13 Complete Works. Quoted in 
P ow ers o f  Horror, 62.
®^ Powei's o f  H orror 62.
Ibid., 60.
Ibid., 62.
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communication.’"®^ As we approach abjection we discover a trail of 
oppositions which the abject comes between and foils. The abject is not 
opposed to these, but moves around the boundaries and at the slash which 
separates the oppositions.
The first opposition played with abjection is that between subject 
and object. Kristeva states, "When I am beset by abjection, the twisted 
braid of affects and thoughts I call by such a name does not have, 
properly speaking, a definable object* The abject is not an ob-ject facing 
me, which I name or imagine. . . . The abject has only one quality of the 
object—that of being opposed to J."®® Yet, it is also related to the 
subject for, "from its place of banishment, the abject does not cease 
challenging its master."®® By touching elements of the heterogenous 
semiotic which become repressed, the abject remains intimately tied to the 
subject and is indeed inseparable. Not being object, nor subject, the 
abject both attracts the subject and causes repulsion. This uncanny 
phenomenon is seen throughout history in the spectator sports of public 
executions, the "rubber-necking" drivers on the roadways scanning the 
accident for the blood and dead bodies, or the attraction to "horror" films. 
When we do come upon the truly horrible, we respond by gagging, by a 
certain queasiness that leaves us weak in the knees. It is an encounter 
with an other which produces something in us that is not other, that 
triggers something in our se lf, whereby we respond by projecting out of 
our self* And yet, we remain enthralled by the very thing which produces 
this queasiness.
The connection of the abject to the subject and object is seen 
through that which is unclean or impure, like certain foods or, at the 
other end, waste products and death—the corpse. Each of these are 
threshold objects, existing at the point between inside and outside, subject 
and object, death and life. Bodily orifices, the seat of the Freudian 
primary processes, are the erotogenic zones, the rim  (in Lacan’s terms)
R4 Mark C. Taylor, A lta r ity , 160. 
®® Pow ers o f  Horror, 1.
Ib id ., 2.
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between inside and outside, and therefore the site of bodily identification. 
The subject—properly constructed in a symbolic realm—seeks a ’clean and 
proper body* (c o rp s  p ro p re ) , and therefore waste products repulse, they 
bring one to the point of vomiting which is an expulsion of one’s se lf, 
spitting one’s s e l f  out, as a method of protection. "I abject m y se lf within 
the same motion through which ’I* claim to establish m y se lf
This motion is an ’abreaction,’ which according to Freud is an 
"emotional discharge through which the subject liberates himself from the 
affect connected to the memory of a traumatic event, thus permitting it to 
not become or remain pathogenic."®® Cixous and Clément note that this 
entails that something must "come out": "[i]t will come out, this act, in 
words or in tears, in devil’s voice, in excrement, in laughter; but it will 
come out."®® Again, there is an effort to "objectivize," to push out and 
away that which is disagreeable, but also there is a pulling, something 
working from within. Kristeva argues that it is finally "not lack of 
cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disrupts identity, 
system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in- 
between, the ambiguous, the composite."®®
We come here to a key element in the understanding of abjection: the 
notion of identity. Identity is about borders and is established by the 
split between subject and object. The abject, then, figures at this border. 
The abject "simultaneously beseeches and pulverizes the subject"®^ and, 
weary from this, the subject struggles to understand its identity, its 
borders. Eventually the subject "finds that the impossible constitutes its 
very being, that it is  none other than the abject. The abjection of self 
would be the culminating form of that experience of the subject to which
Ibid., 3.
Freud, S tu d ie s  in  H ysteria , Quoted in Cixous and Clément, The
N ew ly Born Woman, 15-16.
®® The N ew ly Born Woman, 16.
90 P o w e rs  o f  H o r r o r ,  4 
I b i d . ,  5.
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it is revealed that all its objects are based merely on the inaugural lo ss  
that laid the foundation of its own b e i n g . T h e  "inaugural loss" is the 
splitting, the jolt in Kierkegaard which separates for an instant while the 
"moving principle"®® forges an identity, eternally fragile.
The abject then, is not a "thing," an object—and this point must be 
stressed—but it is related to affect* Affect is what Kierkegaard is dealing 
with in the term, "moving principle," and what i am suggesting as a new 
way to approach ’faith.’ The affect goes between, it is produced when a 
particular subject meets a particular object and, once the meeting occurs, 
the subject-object distinction is messed up and one enters a "land of 
oblivion."®^ The borders of identity are found to be less than stable, the 
primary splittings which begin to separate subject and object continue to 
rupture identity structures, propelling the subject onward.
This border crossing is paralleled elsewhere in Kristeva’s writing 
when she considers the foreigner/exile to be one invoking something like 
the abject; "Confronting the foreigner whom I reject and with whom at the 
same time I identify, I lose my boundaries, I no longer have a container, 
the memory of experiences when I had been abandoned overwhelm me, I 
lose my composure. I feel ’lost,’ ’indistinct,* ’hazy,’"®® Here the foreigner 
disrupts the life of the staid community, challenging, like a prophet, the 
norms and symbols. Identity is remade.
Such instability is seen in "borderline patients," especially phobics, 
where "phobia bears the marks of the frailty of the subject’s signifying 
system."®® The phobic has fear, but fear of no object; the "object" is 
merely a "sign." It is because of "the intermediary of a rep resen ta tio n , 
hence a see ing , that [the sign] holds together."®^ The phobic has visual
Ibid., 5.
E ith er /O r  I, 80.
®^ Pow ers o f  Horror, 8.
S tra n g e r  to O urselves, 187. 
Pow ers o f  Horror, 35.
®^ Ibid., 46. Italics in original.
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hallucinations which are a desire for a sign, for symbolic language, a 
wholeness. For the rest of us who are non-phobic (in a clinical sense), 
"What is it that insures the existence of the sign, that is, of the rela tion  
that is a condensa tion  between sound image and word image? Condensation 
is indeed what we are dealing with."®® Kristeva argues that this primary 
process, condensation, is fundamentally constitutive of subjectivity—-as was 
also seen in the discussion of the semiotic. Before the Oedipal complex and 
the entry into symbolic language—the final establishment of the ego— 
condensation is a drive which holds together an image-as-sign for the not- 
yet-subject.
It is an image, working with the drives of the body, which 
establishes a primary locus for the subject, though again, not a singular 
point of origin, but a crucial relation. Symbolic language will complete the 
formation of subjectivity, but here the basis for such language is visual 
and material. Primary narcissism exists within the mother-child dyad, 
before the Oedipal triad with the Father which eventually allows for the 
construction of subject and object differentiation, Kristeva is arguing for 
this in-between stage at which there is a passive use of the signifier as 
opposed to the active use of the signifier, "Passive" because it is related 
to a h a llu c in a to ry  sign, a non-object. This non-object is impossibly labelled 
the abject, the moving principle, faith. Faith not in  a n y th in g , but faith as 
it is related to desire, affect and process; a faith of a fragile nature in the 
interstices of a severed relationship. And this is again a reminder of the 
frailty of the language used here by myself, and by Kristeva to describe 
this realm.
More E a rly  R e -flec tio n s
For Lacan, there are two separate separations in the formation of the 
(ego). The first separation is that of the mirror stage and depends on 
the vision of the infant, while the second separation is the Oedipal stage 
with the child’s entry into language. In an early essay, "The Mirror
Ib id ., 52.
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Stage" (1936), Lacan searches for a primary positing of the ego apart from 
the Oedipal stage laid out by Freud. When he finally revised the essay 
and delivered it in 1949, he had come to consider vision as a constituting 
experience, and, as the new title suggested, the mirror stage was 
"formative of the function of the Z"®® While Lacan and Freud were both 
interested in ’identification,’ and ’ego-theory’ was based on the search for 
primary identificatory loci, Lacan critiques Freud’s consideration of the 
Oedipal phase as primary (in the early Freud) and posits his own pre- 
Oedipal locus, "the mirror stage," Based as it is on rivalry with an other, 
the Oedipal phase is already secondary to the self-rivalry in the primary 
narcissism of the mirror stage: "It is in this erotic relation, in which the 
human individual fixes upon himself an image that alienates him from 
himself, that are to be found the energy and the form on which this 
organization of the passions that he will call his ego are b a s e d . L i k e  
Kierkegaard’s desire "in which the object is stirring and is so close to the 
desire that it is within it,"^ ®^  Lacan’s desire begins within, and the 
primary drama of life is one with one’s self.
Besides the internal ego-formation, the effects are external as well, 
and the mirror stage constitutes a fundamental positioning for the 
separation of the infant’s self from the world around. Whether the 
behavior of the child is seen reflected in an actual mirror or whether its 
actions are mimed by someone else, it is s ig h t  which constitutes the 
original individuality of the infant. The child in the in - fa n s  (without 
speech) stage before the mirror cannot walk or stand up, and must be 
supported, but she or he "nevertheless overcomes, in a flutter of jubilant 
activity, the obstructions of his support and, fixing his attitude in a 
slightly leaning-forward position, in order to hold it in his gaze, brings 
back an instantaneous aspect of the image,
®® The full title is, "The mirror stage as formative of the function of 
the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience," in É crits,
"Aggressivity in psychoanalysis," 19.
E ith er /O r  I, 76.
"The mirror stage," 1-2.
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The mirror stage (stade) is also a stage (stade; as in, "all the 
world’s a stage") within which the motions of "jubilant activity" are acted 
out; the "stage" is spatial and temporal. Pre-linguistic and still in 
primordial undifferentiation, this stage performance becomes a "panto­
mime": "dramatic entertainment by gestures to a musical accompaniment; 
performance of a dramatized tale followed by a transformation scene and 
clowning."^®® Musical immediacy (recall Kandinsky, Kierkegaard and 
Kristeva’s "semiotic") and gesticulation are the components of this young 
life, and the "transformation scene" comes when Lacan assumes the "mirror 
stage as an id en tifica tio n , in the full sense that analysis gives to the term; 
namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes 
an i m a g e . S t r i c t l y  speaking in psychoanalytic parlance, the infant is— 
and will remain for some time—a pre-subject, but, significantly for Lacan, 
"the X is precipitated in a primordial form."^ ®® As Malcom Bowie puts it in 
his work on Lacan, the mirror stage gives "an early moment in the life­
cycle when the individual’s humanity is already fully at stake," and 
"Lacan’s account of the ’specular’ moment provides the ego with its 
creation myth and its Fall,"^ ®® ’Creation,* as mentioned before, comes from 
separation and splitting, a fall from unity, and finally the infant must 
separate from its immediate surroundings in order to create an identity.
Correlatively, the infant must see  its image reflected for separation 
to occur, and this original sight provides what Lacan labels an imago. The 
wholeness and autonomy of the infant body comes into view through a 
g e s ta lt  (necessary because the infant is not independent, but still entirely 
dependent on adults), leaving a whole image, the ’imago.’ Consider Teresa 
de Lauretis’ relating of the physiologist Colin Blakemore’s work on vision:
Our apparently unified view of the outside world is in fact produced
by the interconnected operations of diverse neural processes. . . .
In other words, these interacting processes do not merely record a
®^® Concise O xford D ic tionary  o f  E nglish  E tym ology. 
"The mirror stage," 2.
Ibid., 2.
Lacan, 21.
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unified or preconstituted visual space, but actually constitute a 
discontinuous map of the external world. . . , The perceptual
apparatus, then, does not copy reality but symbolizes it. . . . The 
perceptual apparatus, moreover, is subject to adaptation or 
calibration, for expectations are readjusted on the basis of new 
stimuli or occurrences. . . .  To perceive is to make a continuous 
series of educated guesses, on the basis of prior knowledges and expectations, however unconscious.
Already, in the perceptual apparatus of the infant, forces are at work 
synthesizing and symbolizing; the infant becomes educated to see a unified 
whole.
Etymologically, imago is "a mental object, an unconscious prototype
based upon the infant’s earliest experiences,"^®® but entomologically it is
the "final stage of an insect."^®® While one imago is of "the infant’s
earliest experience," the other is a "final stage." Lacan’s duplicitous
intention here places the imago at a crucial place and time, not only is it
the "earliest," it is also "final." "[Tjhe important point is that this form
situates the agency of the ego, before its social determination [i.e., before
the entry into symbolic language], in a fictional direction, which will always
remain irreducible for the individual alone."^^®
The original sight is captivating for the infant and the fascination
with the image allows an initial construction of a whole and unitary L The
imago postulates an original narrative for the self, a play to be acted out
on stage through the rest of its history. In a similar way, although quite
different context, cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett considers the self to
be the "center of narrative gravity" and states.
This minimal proclivity to distinguish self from other in order to 
protect o n e s e l f  is the biological self, and even such a simple self is 
not a concrete thing but just an abstraction, a principle of 
organization. Moreover the boundaries of a biological self are 
porous and indefinite—another instance of Mother Nature tolerating 
’error’ if the cost is right. . . . Our fundamental tactic of self-
®^^ Alice D oesn 't, 53-54.
®^® Bowie, Lacan, 29.
Concise O xford D ictionary  o f  E nglish  Etym ology, 
^^® "The mirror stage," 2.
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protection, self-control, and self-definition is not spinning webs or 
building dams [as with spiders or beavers], but telling stories, and 
more particularly concocting and controlling the story we tell 
others—and ourselves—about who we are/^^
What Dennet here describes are the constructed stories which stem from 
that original imago. It is the infant’s conservative vision which acts 
against the recurrence of dreams of the "fragmented body" (co rp s  morcelé) 
and keeps things together for the I, giving an "armour of an alienating 
identity.
Meanwhile, the fragmented phantasies of the human body relentlessly 
haunt the I  as visions—like those of Hieronymous Bosch^ ^®—reveal the 
"lines of ’fragilization’"^ ^^  inherent in the anatomical self. As the subject 
goes through various separations in its evolution, these separations and 
"lines of fragilization" are immediately met with a unification in which the 
split is kept together. With the inkling of ’desire’ in Kierkegaard’s 
aesthete, there occurs an "earthquake" that "splits the desire from its 
object infinitely for a moment; but just as the moving principle shows 
itself for a moment as disuniting, so it manifests itself in turn as wanting 
to unite the s e p a r a t e d , H e r e  the "moving principle" is Dennet’s story­
telling and Lacan’s imago; unifying forces resealing the gaps and splits in 
the formation of the subject. At the same time, these forces are not simply 
unifying, for, like Kristeva’s abject and Kierkegaard’s moving principle, the 
separation continuously reveals "lines of fragilisation," simultaneously 
beseeching and pulverizing the subject.
At the end of the mirror stage it is realized that a fundamental split 
has occurred which shapes the rest of the development of the individual 
subject, "It is this moment that decisively tips the whole of human
C onsciousness E xplained, 414, 418.
112 mirror stage," 4,
113 Lacan saw the fifteenth-century paintings of Bosch as well 
representing the visions of fragmentation occurring in the individual.
"The mirror stage," 5.
E ith er /O r  I, 80.
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knowledge into m edia tiza tion  through the desire of the other" (emphasis 
mine)/^® The im-media-cy that marks the beginnings of the life of the 
infant begin to be shaken and a lack exists which must now be filled in 
by some media. Without lack there is nothing to be mediated, no spaces 
between; with lack, something must fill it to allow unity to continue. 
"Mediatization" involves making connections between what is split.
It is important to realize here that while Lacan is content to consider 
this splitting as creating a "gap" or "lack" and hence, in need of 
mediatization and filling—a phallocentric view though perhaps not quite 
logocentric because it lacks the guarantee of filling—i should like to 
emphasize notions (metaphors? images?) of difference and splits. In this 
sense subject and object are separated (subject/object), but separated by 
the slash, the scission which is not necessarily an empty space to be filled, 
but a passable boundary-marker. This is also the (non)place of Kristeva’s 
abject which is not a thing, but an affect refiguring the split. It is, to 
use the language of a poet, "the still point of the turning world" (Eliot). 
Hence, ’media,’ as i am suggesting, does not fill a gap, but confounds 
existing relationships (inside/outside, content/form, male/female). Rather 
than a faith of logos (and promise of filling) this faith continually defers 
and reorders the splits.
N a rc issu s  lea rn s  to  swim
As Lacan was finishing his doctoral dissertation in 1932 {On 
Paranoiac P sych o s is  in i t s  R ela tions w ith  th e  P ersona lity ), Salvador Dali was 
formulating similar concepts on paranoia. Indeed, Dali eventually read 
Lacan’s thesis and came to see it as a justification of his own thinking 
even though his ideas arose independently of Lacan’s . D a l i ’s ideas came
"The mirror stage," 5.
117 See Dawn Ades, Dali, 122-124. Ades quotes Dali commenting on 
Lacan: "’Lacan’s [thesis] perfectly gives an account of the objective and 
"communicable" hyperacuity of the phenomenon [paranoia], thanks to which 
the delirium takes on this tangible character, which is impossible to 
contradict, and which place it at the very anitpodes of the stereotypes of 
automatism and the dream’" (124).
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together in a method of interpretation and painting which he termed
"paranoiac-critical activity":
Paranoia: delirium of interpretive association bearing a systematic 
structure. P arano iac-critica l a c tiv ity :  sp o n ta n eo u s  m ethod  o f
irra tio n a l kn o w led g e  b a sed  upon th e  in te rp r e tiv e -c r it ic a l  associa tion  
o f  d e lirio u s phenomena* . . , Paranoiac-critical activity no longer 
considers surrealist phenomena and images by themselves but, on 
the contrary, as a coherent whole of systematic and significant relations.
Within such an activity associations become central, but these 
associations are not understood within the external language of a society. 
Rather, these associations stem from the unconscious and, according to Dali, 
are "irrational."
My whole ambition in the pictorial domain is to materialize the images 
of concrete irrationality with the most imperialist fury of precision. 
— In order that the world of imagination and of concrete 
irrationality may be as objectively evident . . .  as that of the 
exterior world of phenomenal reality. The images of concrete 
irrationality are thus authentically unknown images.
In this sense, Dali remains a "representationalist" although what he 
represents is internal (unconscious) rather than external phenomena. The 
internal turns itself outward in Dali’s paintings, establishing delirious 
connections between otherwise familiar objects. External and internal thus 
come together and the split between them is broken down; subjectivity is 
swallowed by objectivity.
Ironically enough, paranoia as described by Dali is analogous to 
Kandinsky’s conception of the "spiritual." Dali states, "I believe my 
paranoia is an expression of the absolute structure, the proof of its 
immanence. My genius consists of being in direct contact with the cosmic 
soul."^^® Kandinsky has more of a concern (and less of an egotistical 
attitude) for responsibility on the part of the artist—the responsibility to 
be true to the "inner necessity" that links form and content. But
Dali, "The Conquest of the Irrational," 418. Italics in original. 
Ib id ., 417.
120 The U nspeakable C on fessions o f  Sa lvador Dali, 143. Quoted in 
Bowie, Lacan, 39-40.
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Kandinsky also seems to believe—similar to Dali—in a final immanence and 
the possibility of direct communication with a "cosmic soul." This is seen 
most dramatically in his consideration of the "supersensible" abstract 
object or sound which has a "direct influence on the soul."^^^ Both 
Kandinsky and Dali consider the artist’s painting of objects, the 
relationship between the objects painted, and the relationship between the 
viewer and the paintings to be relationships in which barriers are broken 
down. The viewer is drawn in and categories obliterated between 
image/reality, form/content and subject/object. As the splitting which 
occurs in the infant—according to Lacan—creates a lack and a need for 
"mediatization," perhaps it is the medium of painting such as Dali’s
surrealism and Kandinsky’s abstraction in which the medium disappears 
into immediacy, a direct communication between viewer and object. What 
is a con-fusion of image and reality becomes, to the subject—not yet a 
differentiating subject—an in-fusion ("drawn," see beginning of this 
chapter), an impossible place from which to escape.
In light of the study under way here, and as a way to continue 
emphasizing the second movement within Kierkegaard’s stages of the 
immediate aesthetic, Dali’s "associations and interpretations" of the
paranoiac-critical method can be expressed by way of a painting, The 
M etam orphosis o f  N a rc issu s  (1937). Narcissus is, of course, an important 
character in the psychoanalytic tradition and one drawn upon by Freud, 
Lacan and Kristeva. The figure of Narcissus is important here for a
number of reasons. For one. Narcissus (and the concept of "primary
1 2 1 On th e  S p ir itu a l in A rt, 147.
122 However, it must be pointed out that there were plenty of 
differences in their ways of thinking and painting. Dali rails against 
abstract and non-figurative art for its optimism and the assertion that 
forms and colors have aesthetic value in themselves apart from 
representation ("The Conquest of the Irrational"). He was a 
representationalist after all, but what he represented were objects of 
delirium brought into material reality. Contrarily, Kandinsky separates 
abstract art from Surrealism "by reason of the fact that [abstract art] 
does not set out from nature or from an object, but itself ’invents’ its 
forms of expression in very different ways" ("Letter to Irmgard Bur chard," 
K a n d in sky: Complete W ritings on A rt, 11:830).
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narcissism’*) exemplifies the theories of Kristeva and Lacan and each of 
their reconceptualizations of Freud’s original essay. Second, the myth of 
Narcissus, and the psychoanalytic reading of it, shows a constitutive link 
between vision and the construction of subjectivity. Finally, Narcissus is 
an interesting character because he confuses image and reality. This 
confusion leads to his death, a literal "infusion" into his own reflection, or, 
as Claire Nouvet considers in her reading of Ovid’s Narcissus, "Narcissus 
does not properly ’die,’ he l i q u e f i e s , " This confusion has implications 
later in this chapter when the theme of "seduction" will be considered.
Within a paranoiac-critical painting, associations occur which create 
a transference from one object into the next "without any of them 
undergoing the least figurative deformation." These paintings literally 
meld one object into the next (see, for example. A pparition  o f  Face a n d  
F ru it Dish on a Beach), N a rc issu s  is different than many other paranoiac- 
critical paintings because N a rc issu s  repeats a particular form, creating a 
"metamorphosis," but in a way which keeps each image separate from the 
others. Still, The M etam orphosis o f  N a rc issu s  was considered by Dali in 
the accompanying poem ("Metamorphosis of Narcissus") to be the perfect 
illustration of paranoiac-critical activity.
In The M etam orphosis o f  N arcissusj associations are drawn by way 
of repetition, or, "similitude"; "The similar develops in series that have 
neither beginning nor end, that can be followed in one direction as easily 
as another, that obey no hierarchy, but propagate themselves from small 
differences among small differences. What is repeated is a form, the 
form of Narcissus kneeling and staring into the water, (This painting 
cannot simply be read left to right (or vice versa) and it is therefore 
impossible to consider which form is "primary"—and therefore which form 
could be considered authentic and which forms imitations. My choice in 
considering the figure of the person of Narcissus as the primary form is 
therefore arbitrary, and yet part of the necessity of using verbal language
"An Impossible Response," 125.
Ades, Dalft 126.
Michel Foucault, T his I s  Not a Pipe^ 44,
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to discuss a medium such as a surrealist p a i n t i n g . O n e  must begin.)
That said, there are several repeated instances of a form; the first
under consideration is the figure of Narcissus staring at his reflection in
the water. Soft gold tones and a play of light and shadow cause a muted
figure to come into view. The right edge of Narcissus’ shoulder and the
torso fade away while there are sharp lines drawn on his left arm. As the
viewer stands reflecting on this reflecting figure, the figure begins to
disappear, to melt into the world around him, much in the same way that
Ovid’s Narcissus "melted" into the water after gazing at his reflected
image. As Dali considers in the accompanying poem: "Narcissus, in his
immobility, absorbed by his reflection with the digestive slowness of
carnivorous plants, becomes i n v i s i b l e . T h e  invitation is given to the
viewer to gaze at the figure in this painting until they disappear.
Such a conception of gazing to the point of disappearance is
particularly germane in the western twentieth-century where the milieu is
one of thousands of images vying for attention. As a response to the
image-saturation of western culture Andy Warhol has taken up the
problems associated with too much looking and created films which last for
several hours with themes as riveting as a man sleeping or people eating.
As Warhol reflects (an oxymoron, Warhol never reflects), the gaze
eventually erases the object stared at and "the more you look at the same
exact thing the more the meaning goes away, and the better and the
emptier you feel."^^® Warhol’s gaze is a gaze without break, a gaze that
exhausts rather than stirs to action.
Warhol could enter, in phantasy, a world of pure seriality and 
standardisation, in which, at one and the same time, the ’Otherness’ 
of the image of the ’other’ was effaced and the identity of the self 
obliterated through the agency of an impersonal machine-like
126 The choice too, is precipitated by the title of the painting, but 
this still does not give reason for the figure of Narcissus to be the 
"originary" form.
127 M étam orphose de Narcisse^ 1937 [English trans., 1937]. Quoted in 
Ades, Dalit 133.
Andy Warhol as quoted in Peter Wollen, "Raiding the Icebox," 23.
The Aesthetic 67
’Other.
For Dali, the gaze which makes disappearance happen is met with a 
repetition (a "metamorphosis"), a return of the form albeit with different 
content. Once the figure of Narcissus disappears and the viewer loses 
interest and/or meaning, the hand holding the egg and narcissus flower 
comes into perspective. The "head" of the figure of Narcissus in the first 
form is that of a bulb,^^° while in the second figure the bulb comes into 
bloom. Spring has sprung as the egg cracks open with new life; a rebirth 
of the "liquefied" Narcissus. The third repetition of the form is the snow 
god, evident over the mountains in the upper right hand corner of the 
painting. As the snow god melts, the spring theme is repeated, as is the 
theme of reflection. Dali’s poem tells about the snow god’s "dazzling head 
leaning over the dizzy space of reflection. The fourth repetition of the 
form lies directly below the snow god: a human figure looking statuesque 
on a pedestal. Here the figure is reversed and the backside of the other 
forms is seen. The description at the Tate Gallery suggests, "Narcissus as  
h e  was is seen posing in the background" (emphasis mine), (While the form 
is the same but reversed, it appears to lack the knee of Narcissus or the 
thumb of the hand.)
Spring is, of course, the season of desire, a time of new birth and 
re-birth. It is the season in which desire awakens—the season of the 
"earthquake" of Kierkegaard’s aesthete. Narcissus, fascinated with his 
reflection, is here reborn within the repeated form of desire breaking 
through the crack in the egg. The painter saves Narcissus by repeating 
and metamorphosizing him just as he is getting ready to disappear from 
view. Death (seen in the melting of Narcissus and the fossilized hand) is
Peter Wollen, "Raiding the Icebox," 21.
Dali’s idea for this painting is said to have come from the 
overhearing of a conversation by two Port Lligat fisherman:
"First fisherman: ’What does that boy want to look at himself all day 
in the mirror for?
Second fisherman: ’If you really want me to tell you: he has an 
onion [bulb] in the head.’" (Quoted in Ades, Dalit 133.)
"Metamorphosis of Narcissus." Quoted in Ades, D a lly  133.
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brought into relation with the life of the flower and the activity in the 
background of the 'heterosexual group,' Yet, death holds life and supports 
it. Perhaps it is not so much rebirth as a baptism into death, "death 
living a human life."^^^ In Narcissus' vanity is pure positivity and 
reflection, negativity is nowhere seen.
The "heterosexual group" to the viewer's right of Narcissus may also 
be read upon the dissolution of the first form of the kneeling youth. 
Indeed, the figures pose as does the Narcissus on a pedestal "as he was." 
None seem to take notice of each other and they all are standing on a 
shimmery watery surface. Though backgrounded, this group, "in attitudes 
of 'preliminary e x p e c t a t i o n , m a y  be the pre-scene of the myth; the 
purely positive vanity of reflection. In this way, a narrative may be 
tempting to trace out of the metamorphosis, with that-from-which- 
Narcissus-came, and that-to-which-Narcissus-has-gone displayed in the 
forms. But the repetition of forms allows no particular direction to read 
the story, and the continual interplay of immersion/reflection, 
depth/surface, pulls any reading in more directions than are possible for 
a linear narrative.
As spring creates a thaw, the "melting" Narcissus (as well as the 
snow god) still appears as a whole in contrast to the "fragment" of a 
body—the hand-next to him. The fragment and the whole are set next to 
each other and the fragment is repeated in the figure of the scavenging 
dog gnawing on a hand to the right of the fossilized hand. Like Lacan’s 
imagOy it is the whole image which protects against dreams of bodily 
f ragmentat ion,whi l e remaining haunted by the loss of limbs. Likewise, 
Nouvet points out that Narcissus’s "crime" was that of "pride," of not 
allowing others to touch him and not answering others, in other words, of 
maintaining a unitary and autonomous self.
Pride describes the peculiar predicament of a subject who can
Alexander Kojeve, In tro d u c tio n  to th e  R ead ing  o f  Hegel (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1947) 548. Quoted in Bataille, "Hegel, Death, Sacrifice," 10,
Dali makes this reference in the poem. Quoted in Ades, Daily 133. 
134 mirror stage," 4-5.
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neither experience desire nor respond to desire because he 
undertakes to constitute himself as absolutely impervious to the 
other, , . . [Pjride can thus be said to define the position of any 
’self’ which b e lie fs  in the possibility of remaining uncontaminated 
by an otherness.
For Narcissus, the moment desire awakens otherness is confronted (though, 
recalling Kierkegaard and Kristeva, it is not the point of a complete 
subject-object differentiation), and simultaneously it is the moment of his 
"infusion" into the water. Yet in Dali’s painting, desire is reborn through 
the crack of the egg; a fragmented piece of a whole, petrified, with new 
birth and the continuation of the form held together. The repetition of 
form urges the viewer on, just as the subject of the painting is put in 
process.
Relations and associations within the paranoid irrational unconscious 
are here objectified, allowing a new perspective through juxtaposition. 
Wholeness and fragmentation, death and rebirth, solidity and liquefaction, 
are some of the paranoid contrasts Dali plays with in this painting. While 
some borders have been liquidated, others appear in a continually shifting 
identity-structure. Each contrast compels more readings—narratives, 
linearizations—in the search to find a way below the surface texture of the 
paint. And so, this essay moves along in its own connections, providing 
scenes of interrelations in its attempt to account for reflection and 
subjectivity.
The th ir d  s ta g e: th e  e ro tic
Returning to Kierkegaard after a digression taken off from this 
second (and, i have argued, crucial) stage of the immediate aesthetic, the 
third stage of the immediate aesthetic is where desire is finally qualified 
as desire, where "desire has its absolute object; it desires the particular 
a b s o l u t e l y . T h e  character chosen to "represent" this stage is Don
"An Impossible Response," 113. 
E ith e r /O r  J, 85.
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Juan, "the incarnation of the flesh. With Don Juan and his 1,003
seductions we note a shift in what is called the erotic; "the erotic is here 
qualified by another predicate: here the erotic is sed u c tio n , " A s  an 
immediate aesthete, Don Juan lives the moment outside of history. The 
particular is desired, but he searches for a representation, the universal 
embodied in the particular, "he desires total femininity in every woman. 
Without history and still lacking an individual volitional self, he can only 
go on by "continually finishing and continually being able to begin all over 
a g a i n . T h e  particularities (i.e., the seductions) are wholly without 
relation to each other. Don Juan lives as one full of desire and split in a 
primitive way from the object of desire, but "[t]he self is not yet an 
autonomous individual who stands in relation to the particular object but 
is a restless embodiment of purely natural force.
Due to the fact that Don Juan is not yet an individual with 
consciousness and lacks the ability to use language (in a historical and 
self-conscious manner), he cannot properly be called "a seducer." "He 
desires, and this desire acts s e d u c t i v e l y , b u t  it is d es ire  itself that is 
the agent of action, In the same way, he does not use language, but is 
used b y  language. Don Juan is pushed and pulled about life in the waves 
of a force stronger than himself, since he really is no subject. He is 
musical, the immediate, the a-historical, the seductive erotic, the 
embodiment of sensuousness, but he is no subject. "He dissolves, as it 
were, in music for us; he unfurls in a world of sounds.
An illuminating example of the immediate aesthetic in the erotic realm
Ibid., 88.
Ibid., 93.
Ibid., 100.
Ibid., 96.
Taylor, J o u rn e y s  to Selfhood , 234. 
E ith e r /O r  I, 99.
Ibid., 134.
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may be seen in the young couple who comprise the main characters in 
Georges Bataille's S to r y  o f  th e  Eye, Within this story most of the 
communication exists on an entirely non-linguistic level; the connections 
seemingly happen as if Simone and the narrator (who remains nameless) 
had no differentiation between them. Throughout the story are elements 
of inexpressibility ("I found it difficult to have things out"^^^; "her mute 
and absolute spasm"^^®; "almost wor d l e s s l y" " unab l e  to explain"^^^) with 
the characters acting in harmony, not needing to speak but knowing each 
other’s minds. Without language, without a connection to concrete 
existence, this young couple lives abstractly, driven by desire. Like Don 
Juan, Simone’s desire for eyes, eggs and testicles are representative 
desires for totality within the particular.
The pursuit of desire leads the young couple (and note: it is desire 
which moves them, for as immediate aesthetes they are not yet in control 
of desire) through a series of events where undifferentiation and sensuous 
existence are fully lived out. Smells, sights, sounds, tastes, and touch 
mingle, but Bataille takes the physicality of the body a step further than 
Kierkegaard ever did and includes tears, blood, vomit, shit, and semen in 
the sensuous world. The heterogeneous and undifferentiating elements of 
the story are perhaps best brought together in the description of the end 
of an orgy:
Upon seeing me, [Marcelle] displayed a sickly but violent terror. 
After all, I was pale, smeared with blood, my clothes askew. Behind 
me, in unspeakable disorder, brazenly stripped bodies were sprawled 
about. During the orgy, splinters of glass had left deep bleeding 
cuts in two of us. A young girl was throwing up, and all of us had 
exploded in such wild fits of laughter at some point or other that we 
had wet our clothes, an armchair, or the floor. The resulting stench 
of blood, sperm, urine, and vomit made me almost recoil in horror, 
but the inhuman shriek from Marcelle *s throat was far more 
terrifying. I must say, however, that Simone was deeply tranquil by
144 S to r y  o f  th e  Eyoy 10.
145 Ibid., 11.
146 Ibid., 20.
147 Ibid., 56.
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now . . . her pacified face almost smiling.
Here all flows into all, boundaries and separations all but non-existent, 
inside and outside move together, human and inhuman—realized in 
Marcelle’s "inhuman shriek"—are barely distinguished, and even terror is 
quickly met with tranquility. Elsewhere the lack of differentiation brings 
another similarity to Kierkegaard’s aesthetic, the indifference to death and 
life:
it struck me that [if] death was the sole outcome of my erection, and 
if Simone and I were killed, then the universe of our unbearable 
personal vision was certain to be replaced by the pure stars, fully 
unrelated to any external gazes and realizing in a cold state, without 
human delays or detours, something that strikes me as the goal of 
my sexual licentiousness: a geometric incandescence (among other 
things, the coinciding point of life and death, being and 
nothingness), perfectly fulgurating.^ ^
This sort of pure presence, this absolutely immanent flow through
bodies and stars and divisions may be a desirous aspect of the erotic, but
this is to claim a paradox. And yet the paradox as described in S to r y  o f
th e  E ye  is one of which Bataille was aware. The paradox is between the
unity and universality involved with the erotic orgy and the particularity
of desire for an object. Bataille states, "The final aim of eroticism is
fusion, all barriers gone, but its first stirrings are characterized by the
presence of a desirable o b j e c t . T h e  aporia involved here must be
understood. The seamless unity of the life of the young man in E ith er /O r
I  and of the young couple in S to r y  o f  th e  Eye can only be talked about
(i.e., language used, distinction made) from outside that realm. In other
words, total fusion is impossible; desire is the moving force which must be
awake and, if it is, then there must be a split (however primitive) between
subject and object. I quote Bataille at length here.
In the orgy continuity cannot be laid hold of; individuals lose 
themselves at the climax, but in mingled confusion. The orgy is 
necessaiTly disappointing. Theoretically it is the complete negation
Ib id ., 17.
Ib id ., 30. 
Erotism, 129-30.
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of the individual quality. . . . Not only is individuality itself 
submerged in the tumult of the orgy, but each participant denies 
the individuality of the others. All limits are completely done away 
with, or so it seems, but it is impossible for nothing to remain of 
the differences between individuals and the sexual attraction 
connected with those differences.
If eroticism in its pure form (total fusion, continuity, nakedness) were 
actualized, desire would not be possible. "The object of desire is different 
from eroticism itself; it is not eroticism in its completeness, but eroticism 
working through it."^^^ Desire involves splitting and fragmentation. 
Eroticism involves the absence of splits. This is the aporia that works 
itself out in the aesthetic realm of Kierkegaard and, in varying ways, in 
Bataille.
And so, desire has awakened and we come to a place where the 
contradictions involved with erotic unity, harmony and undifferentiation 
reach a point of dissolution. The contradictions, having become more and 
more intense, push the subject onward. The mediatizations disrupt the 
borders, forcing the splits to a heightened level of instability. Then 
another break occurs...
Ibid., 129. 
Ibid., 130.
The Aesthetic 74
iz io ir j .
There is another side to the aesthetic life, apart from the immediate. 
This side of the aesthetic consists of an individual (who can now be called 
a "seducer" even though she or he is not a fully acting subject in 
Kierkegaard’s schema) separated from the world, but faced with the world 
as infinite possibility. The split caused by desire turns the individual to 
face the infinity she or he recently moved away from. That which she or 
he was a part of is now other. Distanced from that from which she or he 
came, the aesthete still lacks concrete action in the world, but stands 
across from the world in the realm of re flec tion .
The development of a "subject," in the view of Kierkegaard and 
others, is a gradual coming into use of concrete historical language (which, 
as will be seen, is to be distinguished from the entry into symbolic 
language for many of the psychoanalysts), with each step bringing a 
greater separation from the immediate and consequent greater use of 
language. The individual subject must make up for the absence that 
occurs upon the awakening of desire. In the confluent life of the 
immediate aesthetic, reflection is unknown, for "reflection is fatal to the 
i m m e d i a t e , b u t  now language must make up for the split caused by the 
death of the immediate. The individual must prove mastery of the 
separation and it does this through mastery of language. In 
psychoanalytic lore, the final entry into subjectivity takes place as the 
individual I works through the Oedipal triangle. This will be discussed 
further in the chapter on the ethical.
The reason the entry into symbolic language is mentioned here is 
that the "reflective" side of the aesthetic may be seen as another step in
the process on the way to the ethical, but it may also be seen as a
digression. As i hope to show, the reflective side of the aesthetic life is
a place where language is used fully, and therefore subjectivity is
accomplished, yet it is used in ways which can ultimately not break out of 
infinite reflection on past and future. It will only be in the move to the
E ith er /O r  I, 70.
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ethical sphere where the individual becomes a concrete user (i.e., out of 
the abstract reflection on past and future into the present) and agent of 
language. It must be added again that these stages are not necessarily 
linear in their development, but that an individual subject can move in and 
out of these various "modes of existence."
D iary o f  a S ed u c e r
Venturing into the reflective part of the aesthetic life according to 
S0ren Kierkegaard we find a bundle of letters and diary entries under the 
provocative heading "The Seducer’s Diary." This group of writings is 
found among the original collection of notes and papers of the "young 
man" as found by Victor Eremita. Briefly peeling apart the textual layers 
at this point it can be seen that the "seducer’s diary" is written by a 
person named Johannes, found by the young man and included with his 
own writings which are then found and collected by Eremita. Over all of 
this is Soren Kierkegaard himself. These layerings may be seen as ways 
of writing out the various possibilities of the subject of Kierkegaard, 
contradiction and paradox all working within the same pen. The 
pseudonymity allows an experiment in writing which has rarely been 
equalled in western writing.
As presented within Either/O ry  the reader is invited into a labyrinth 
of multiple authors and multiple genres. When the levels build up, and the 
maze wandered through, the reader loses orientation; there is an invitation 
to take a peek at another’s personal diary, a "seducer’s diary." As Victor 
Eremita makes an initial consideration as to "whether I might not become 
guilty of an indiscretion toward the unknown a u t h o r s , t h e  young man 
ponders similar thoughts when he comes upon the "diary." Eremita, 
ethically of course, decides he can publish these "unknown authors" 
papers because "they yielded no information" and "are s i l e n t . T h e  
young man seems to struggle with the implicit voyeurism a bit more and,
Ibid., 12. 
Ibid., 12.
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while he goes ahead and collects the loose papers of the diary off of a 
friend’s desk, reflects on the implications.
The young man is, after all, an aesthete—and therefore caught up 
in the abstraction of the poetic life—but he is also reflective and knows 
his own movements within the poetic. He seems to have a sense as to what 
is right and wrong (i.e., ethical), but is unable to act concretely in an 
ethical manner. (Besides, as Johannes says, "The ethical is just as boring 
in scholarship as in life."^^®) And yet, what the reader learns from his 
reflective poetic musings on the found papers of the diary could not be 
learned from someone in the ethical realm. The young aesthete is all too 
aware of his complicity in the voyeuristic aspects of reading someone else’s 
despicable writings. He is all too aware of watching a seduction take place 
and doing nothing about it. He reads on and is filled with anxiety over 
the affair,
I, too, am carried along into that kingdom of mist, into that 
dreamland where one is frightened by one’s own shadow at every 
moment. Often I futilely try  to tear myself away from it; I follow 
along like an ominous shape, like an accuser who cannot speak. How 
strange! He has spread the deepest secrecy over everything, and 
yet there is an even deeper secrecy, that I myself am in on the 
secret and that I came to know it in an unlawful way. . . . There is 
nothing t^at involves so much seduction and so much malediction as a secret.
The poetic is seductive. It continually takes over the actual. 
Concrete historical living is poetically reflected on so much that lives are 
"bent into t h e ms e l v e s " a n d  decision becomes impossible. Life for the 
poet exists wholly within the poet’s own head and, it would seem, an 
author of a book is continually at risk of confusing fiction and life, 
possibility with actuality. As an author, there is the risk of seducing the 
reader as well, but perhaps this is the point . . ,
Johannes is the poetic author out to seduce Cordelia, to disrupt her.
Ibid., 367. 
Ibid., 310. 
Ibid., 307.
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"to confuse poetry and actuality, tru th  and fiction, to frolic in infinity, 
Johannes may be said to use the paranoiac-critical method outlined by Dali 
where "through a process of thought of a paranoiac and active character, 
it will be possible to systematize confusion and contribute to the total 
discrediting of the world of reality, This not to make her fall in love
with Johannes necessarily—though he seems to say this at times—but for 
the sake of seduction itself, for his own pathetic poetic life. While he 
thinks he is being an educator in his speech and writing, and leading her 
out to face the world of infinite possibility, he is finally only looking for 
his own reflection. Like Narcissus, Johannes is staring at the deep waters 
and finally takes the plunge and cannot swim; the seducer himself is faced 
with the impossibility of an infinity of possibility. This is the point of 
anxiety as "the dizziness of freedom.
S e d u c tiv e  T h eo ry
The theme of seduction has been used by a contemporary theorist,
Jean Baudrillard, to describe the simulacra of our mass culture. His
beginning work in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s as a Marxian-oriented
critic was abandoned because of its inability to analyze the current mass
media culture. As Mark Poster comments,
Baudrillard found that the product!vist metaphor in Marxism was 
inappropriate for comprehending the status of commodities in the 
post-war era. Only a semiological model, he argues, can decipher 
the meaning structure of the modern commodity. But the commodity 
embodies a communicational structure that is a departure from the 
traditional understanding of the sign. In a commodity the relation of 
word, image or meaning and referent is broken and restructured so 
that its force is directed, not to the referent of use value or utility, 
but to desire/
Ibid., 392.
From "L’Ane Pourri," [The Rotten Donkey] Le Surréa lism e au 
S e rv ic e  de la R évolution, (1930) no.l. Quoted in Ades, Dali, 121.
The C oncept o f  A n x ie ty , 61.
"Introduction," Jean B,^udrillard: S e lec ted  W ritings, 1.
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So enter seduction.
When Baudrillard points to Kierkegaard’s "Diary of a Seducer" in his 
own work S ed u c tio n  he picks up on the notion of the secret. "The young 
girl [Cordelia] is an enigma, and in order to seduce her one must become 
an enigma for her; it is an enigm atic duel, and seduction resolves it 
w ith o u t d isc lo s in g  th e  s e c r e t " Beneath the secret, of course, is 
nothing. The secret itself is the secret, it is the surface appearance of 
having a secret that seduces. When Kierkegaard’s young aesthete finds 
the "diary" he states, "He has spread the deepest secrecy over everything, 
and yet there is an even deeper secrecy, that I myself am in on the secret 
and that I came to know it in an unlawful way."^^  ^ What the deeper secret 
is is that there is no secret. If there is a depth, it is merely a depth 
spread over surface. "[T]he intensity between the two is simply the secret 
of the secret. Life in this schema is a masquerade in which the same
face exists beneath the masks, but it is still a masquerade.
Against interpretation and all "masters of suspicion," (as Paul 
Ricoeur has called them; Marx and Freud espec i a l lyBaudr i l l a rd  gives 
attention to the "surface texture" of discourse. No one is finally interested 
in the interpretation of texts, he considers, it is the method involved, the 
"rhetoric" we may say, that is interesting and that catches our attention 
and seduces. As U2’s Bono echoes, "We’re all sliding on the surface of 
things. Sometimes its kind of nice."^^^ And maybe this is the secret, the
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"On Seduction," 159. Italics in original. 
E ith er /O r  I, 310.
"On Seduction," 159.
See F reud  a n d  Philosophy,
"Behind the Fly: Bono, the Rolling Stone Interview," Interviewed 
by Alan Light. Bono seems to have read Baudrillard in some of his 
comments in this interview: "We used to have this thing about our image: 
’What image? We don’t have an image. We’re playing with images, like the 
desert or whatever, and we dress in a way that is sympathetic with the 
music, but it’s not an image,’ And finally, I just said, ’Fuck it, maybe it 
is,’ In fact, if it is, let’s play with it, and let’s distort it and manipulate 
it and lose ourselves in the process of it. But let’s write about losing 
ourselves in the process of it, cause that’s what’s happening to everybody
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secret that secrets are not wanted, that interpreting for depth is a drag 
and the surface has a certain glimmer to it. The narcissistic subject here 
liquifies as "the age of simulation thus begins with a liquidation of 
ref erentials. "
Without ref erentials, there are only signs; signs referring to one 
another in endless play with nothing to point to save more signs. To put 
it in light of the study underway here, subjectivity dissolves, leaving only
objects. At the end of the modern subject which relied on the split
between subject and object, the subject has been overtaken by the object, 
the subject is now one more object in the transparent society. "Nothing 
(not even God) now disappears by coming to an end, by dying. Instead 
things disappear through proliferation or contamination, by becoming 
saturated or transparent.
The secret sign that has no secret in this present age is the image:
These would be the successive phases of the image:
1) It is the reflection of a basic reality.
2) It masks and perverts a basic reality,
3) It masks an absence of a basic reality.
4) It bears no relation to any reality whatever: it isits own pure simulacrum.^ ^
While images used to represent the "real," they have now imploded reality 
and become reality. There is nothing below, behind or beyond them.
In the study on seduction, Baudrillard considers trom pe-V oeil 
painting to show how images "represent" the limits of the representation 
of reality, and thereby, the limits of reality itself. These paintings are 
"[p]ure appearances, the irony is their excess of reality. By "tricking 
the eye" in their referring to real objects, trom pe-V oeil paintings subvert 
the perspective of the viewer, showing that what is seen is other than it
else on a smaller scale anyway."
"Simulacra and Simulations," 167.
169 The T ra n sp a re n cy  o f  Evil, 4. 
"Simulacra and Simulations," 170. 
"On Seduction," 155.
The Aesthetic 80
first appeared. In what must be a nod toward Lacan, Baudrillard states, 
"[T]he objects of the trom pe-V oeil have the same remarkable vivacity as 
when the child discovers his or her own image, like an instant 
hallucination prior to perception.
Making a comparison of trom pe-V oeil to surrealism in the twentieth- 
century Baudrillard considers of both that "[t]hey disrupt at the very 
point of impact with reality or functionality, and therefore with 
consciousness. . , . They undermine the world’s c e r t a i n t y . P e r h a p s  
then, it should be no secret that René Magritte’s Le S é d u c te u r  may be a 
pertinent illustration here.
Le S é d u c te u r  is the painting of a ship in the water. Quite literally 
this is so. The water is  the ship, or r/? ‘ er, the water rises from the sea 
in the form of a ship. What the viewer "sees" are the sails of the ship, 
which are water, above the water. The hull of the ship is the sea itself, 
melted, in a sense, into the sea.
And yet, the water is not the ship, the water is the water. And the 
ship is not water, the ship is the ship. What the viewer produces 
(interprets) for her or his self is a ship, and water. Because the viewer 
has seen drawings of ships in the water or seen "real" ships and "real" 
water, they remember the shape of a ship with its sails and when 
confronted with this painting of water in the outline of a ship, a ship is 
what is seen. The water "resembles" a ship. But the ship "resembles" 
water.
The hierarchy of resemblance—whereby one image "represents"
another—is negated. By upsetting "resemblance," the painting becomes
concerned with "similitudes." Michel Foucault points out the differences:
Resemblance serves representation, which rules over it; similitude 
serves repetition, which ranges across it. Resemblance predicates 
itself upon a model it must return to and reveal; similitude circulates 
the simulacrum as an indefinite and reversible relation of the similar
Ibid., 156. 
Ibid., 157.
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to the similar.
While Kandinsky upsets the notion of representation in painting by 
painting abstractly, Magritte hyperrealizes resemblance to the point where 
the resemblances become absurd and finally deconstructive of the viewer’s 
typical image/reality structuring. As Foucault states, "Kandinsky’s is a 
naked affirmation clutching at no resemblance, and which, when asked 
’what it is,’ can reply only by referring itself to the gesture that formed 
it: an ’improvisation,’ a ’compos i t i on.Magr i t t e ,  contrarily, paints "exact 
resemblances, to the point where they willfully multiply as if to assert 
themselves.
It will also be recalled that, like Magritte, Dali’s paintings can be 
described using the term ’similitude.’ Indeed The M etam orphosis o f  
N a rc issu s  similarly lacks a hierarchical structure of resemblance, i.e., there 
is no "first cause" of the metamorphosis. The result is an endless play of 
readings, each one pushing the viewer to go back and think again from a 
new perspective. Similitude works within a painting, circulating "the 
simulacrum as an indefinite and reversible relation of the similar to the 
similar," but also may function between paintings, opening the readings 
still further.
We may see this especially in a comparison of Dali’s N a rcissu s  and 
Magritte’s S é d u c te u r  which could compel a re-reading from the perspective 
of liquefaction. As Narcissus liquefies he is transformed into a hand, 
flower, snow god, etc., and yet we only know of his watery experience 
through the mythological language which has been passed on to us. 
Likewise, Magritte’s ship is liquefied, literally figuring the ship as water, 
but here, apart from Narcissus, the entire scene occurs on the surface in 
front of the viewer. Or, in another comparative rereading, we may take
174 This I s  Not a Pipe, 44. The use of these two terms has been 
debated and Silvano Levy argues that Foucault gets them wrong, or, they 
are not used in a way Magritte would agree with. The terms seem to me 
to be adequately clarified by Foucault and i do not push the debate any 
further. See Levy, "Foucault on Magritte on Resemblance."
This I s  Not a Pipe, 34.
Ib id ., 35.
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the view of ’petrification’ with the ship being what David Sylvester calls 
a "variant to petrification because it not only involves an analogous 
metamorphosis but because it results in g r i s a i l l e . T h e  grey petrified 
form of the ship is met with the rhythmic flowing of the sea whereas 
Narcissus is petrified into a hand holding the color and rebirth of the 
flower and egg.
These brief suggestions are given to show the necessarily ’inter- 
textual’ readings of a painting. When similitude moves between paintings, 
it may be thus considered inter-textual. More than a simple "borrowing" 
or "study of sources," Kristeva’s notion of inter-textuality is a 
"transposition of one (or several) sign system(s) into another . . .
[demanding] a new articulation of the thetic."^^® The first position of the 
thetic is disrupted upon the im-position from another sign-system which 
"pluralizes the thetic doxy,^ ^® opening the way for more readings. Within 
the brief re-readings of Dali’s N a rc issu s  and Magritte’s Le S éd u c teu r , it 
is seen how one painting im-poses upon another, how mythological language 
im-poses upon a painting and, finally, how an image such as a painting 
may disrupt a language-based "reading," breaking down the signifying 
process and halting it in its tracks. Inter-textuality provides us with yet 
another perspective—another tactic—from which to see the word/image 
relationship, but ultimately shows the shortcomings of inter-textuality 
composed with word and image as two separate but transgressable "sign- 
systems." The viewer skims the surface of paintings like Magritte’s trying 
to establish theirself in the depths and finding only surface. Readings may 
still proliferate and "new articulations of the thetic" forever possible, yet 
the image challenges the thetic ability from within an inter-textual 
economy. That is, the "demand" for a "new articulation" may be frustrated 
as soon as it begins, and the viewer may be left floating, seduced into the 
pulsions of the semiotic.
Each painter (Magritte and Dali, as well as Kandinsky) is
M agritte, 284.
R evo lu tion  in  Poetic Language, 59-60. 
Ibid., 60.
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uninterested in the automatism of other surrealists like Miro, but a key 
difference between Dali and Magritte seems to be that Magritte is a 
"conscious painter" and undermining of symbolism while Dali finally is 
dealing with representation by painting the paranoiac associations of the 
unconscious. Magritte paints by inspiration, "the moment when one knows 
what is h a p p e n i n g , w i t h  "the images obtained through voluntary and 
conscious research based on some object that has been taken as a 
’q u e s t i o n . M a g r i t t e  may believe in an unconscious, but the relationship 
of his painting to it is tenuous. He states, "I am not trying to express 
ideas or feelings in paintings, even if they strike me as outstanding (nor 
anything emanating from some so-called unconscious)."^®^
The difference between Magritte’s "conscious" painting (if i may be 
allowed such a description) and the paranoiac unconscious painting of Dali 
is especially interesting here because i think it shows one of the crucial 
divides between the immediate aesthetic and the reflective aesthetic and 
moves back into the discussion of seduction. At the level of seduction 
(and of the reflective aesthetic) language and reflection are available and 
used. As Suzi Gablik argues about Magritte’s method, "Problems are solved, 
in the manner of philosophy, not by giving new information, but by 
rearranging what we have always k n o w n . A l o n g  these lines Magritte 
says that "Le S é d u c te u r  was the response found to the ’question of water,’ 
the research consisted of a kind of ’frenzied contemplation’ . . .  of the 
question,
La S é d u c te u r  is seductive. Its secret is that it is a painting (which 
is no secret after all). It is not a ship. It is not the sea. It is a
Quoted in Suzi Gablik, M agritte, 15.
Letter from Magritte to G, Fuel, November 13, 1953. Quoted in 
Harry Torczyner, M agritte, 200.
182 In an address upon accepting membership in the Academic Picard, 
April 5 1957. Quoted in Torczyner, M agritte, 200.
M agritte, 10.
In a letter to G. Duel, November 13, 1953. Quoted in Torczyner, 
M agritte, 200.
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painting. Seductively, it challenges the viewer’s conceptions. The viewer,
thinking there is something there below the sea, within the ship, is
brought into the space of the simulation. Magritte does not paint
symbolically, but people
hunt around for a meaning to get themselves out of the quandary, 
and because they don’t understand what they are supposed to think 
when they confront the painting, . . . They want something to lean 
on, so they can be comfortable. They want something secure to 
hang on to, so they can save themselves from the void. People who 
look for symbolic meanings fail to grasp the inherent poetry and 
mystery of the image. No doubt they sense this mystery, but they 
wish to get rid of it. They are afraid. By asking ’what does this 
mean?’ they express a wish that everything be understandable. But 
if one does not reject the mystery, one has quite a different 
response. One asks other things.
The secret mystery spread over Magritte’s painting seduces, it leads away
from the depths to the surface. His painting is a simulation. Returning
to the breakdown mentioned above of word/image in an inter-textual
relationship, Magritte’s painting is, again in Foucault’s words, a heterop ia ,
H eteropias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine 
language, because they make it impossible to name this and  that, 
because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy 
syntax in advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct 
sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes words 
and things to "hang together," . . . [Hjeteropias (such as those to 
be found so often in Borges) desiccate speech, stop words in their 
tracks, contest the very possibility of language at its source; t^ey 
dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences.
While Borges may be a heteropic writer, Magri: may be a heteropic
painter. Indeed, images may function quite well as heteropia, standing 
beside verbal language and showing the frailty of it. The viewer is left 
speechless in trying to describe. Words approach it, but cannot 
comprehend, and the viewer knows it.
A similar seduction is seen through the writings of Baudrillard. 
Consciously, he faces the enigma of the tin  de millenium  culture and, like 
Johannes, "in order to seduce [Cordelia, or the culture] one must become
185
186
Magritto quoted in Gablik, M agritte, 11. 
The O rder o f  T h ings, xviii.
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an e n i g m a . T h e  anxiety of the "dizziness of freedom" has crept up on 
Baudrillard and the critical thinking of differentiation seems to have 
vanished. He has become, as a recent collection of essays on him says, 
"perplexing."^®® In other words, B audrillard  has become th e  enigm a in 
hopes of finding a way into the enigmatic culture of the simulacra. "We 
do in fact live among pure forms, in radical obscenity, which is to say 
visible and undifferentiated, among figures that were previously secret and 
distinct."^®® Certainly this is evident in his Fatal S tra te g ie s  where he 
thinks from the point of view of the object. The social has imploded and 
there is no longer a Kantian or Cartesian subject to look at the world, only 
objects remain, objects continually referring to each other and nothing 
outside this play. This is precisely what the seductive is, "the reign of 
the object over that of the subject,"^®® the infinite possibilities facing the 
subject who has now entered into the simulacra theirself and become a 
sign.
®^^ "On Seduction," 159.
®^® "Introduction," F o rg e t B audrillard?  ix.
®^® "On Seduction," 163.
L*Autre p a r  lu i-m êm e  (Paris, 1987), 53-54. Quoted in Arthur 
Kroker, "Panic Value," 183.
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Concluding the Aesthetic
With a variety of motivations, i have woven together several threads in this 
previous chapter. Generally speaking, i have tried to bring a new perspective to the 
movement through the aesthetic stage as conceived by Kierkegaard. Within ..uch a 
"progression" there are a series of breaks, or splits, which occur, propelling the individual 
into the next phase. Over and against certain other theories of primary ego formation 
(most notably the Oedipal stage of Freudian-influenced analysis), i have considered, along 
with Lacan and Kristeva, the reflective vision of primary narcissism to be a constitutive 
place of identity formation. I have also placed prin. .ry narcissism mid-point in the three 
stages of the immediate aesthetic life in the Kierkegaardian framework, a place often 
overlooked. Not only am i drawing connections between Kierkegaardian subjectivity and 
poststructural-psychoanalytic analysis, but i am u, seeing the dimension of "seeing," or 
vision, into Kierkegaard's stages.
While many theories of the subject have relied on language, i have suggested a 
shift toward media-oriented analysis in a consideration of subjectivity. At this point 
aesthetics—and especially the "existentialized" aesthetics of Kierkegaard—becomes a crucial 
locus for such a re-view. Within an aesthetically-informed view of the subject we are 
compelled to take various media into account in the construction of the subject, further 
realizing the impossibility of a totalizing structure of knowledge. As language can only 
opproach the semiotic or the aesthetic, perhaps it may be images which lend themselves 
to a new but non-final "theory" of the subject. Kristeva and Lacan have pointed out the 
element of visuality in early distinctions of subject and object, and i have put forward 
images as an aid to the "understanding" of the pre-subject. The shift from language to 
media gives weight to a disseminated subject, one . /îossessal;. : and finally unanalyzable. 
As stated in the Prescript through Kristeva and Johnson, such a re-viewed subjectivity has 
political implications and staves off the systematizing attempts inherent in much of 
western philosophical-theological thought.
Also, through a media-oric .led analysis we realize the impossibility of claiming 
one medium as more primary than another. As Derrida and others have continually 
stressed, the western philosophical tradition is full of phonocentric concepts which would
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privilege the voice or music as "present" while other media are secondary and parasitic. 
Contrarily, Deconstruction shows how all media is mediation, and speech and music are 
not beyond being media. Beginning from the view that communication is always already 
mediated, we may come to see the disruptive possibilities when one medium works 
against another, unsettling and putting the subject in process. One medium supplements 
another, opening meaning and deferring a final interpretation.
Putting this view in light of Kierkegaard's aesthetic, we may move further away 
from a linear, narrativized reading of the stages; at the same time remembering that this 
essay presents the stages in such a linear progression. As brought forward in the Prescript 
via Blanchot and Newmark, an existential movement "is already a kind of rhetorical 
device or figure in the narrative form of an allegory. But, as Kevin Hart points out, 
"classically understood, allegory is a trope of closure—it seeks to fix the meaning of a text. 
Irony, however, is always a trope of non-closure, forever indicating the difference between 
text and meaning and therefore calling allegorical closure into qu e s t i o n . I r o n y  (a trope 
almost exhausted by Kierkegaard himself) is a way to read the stages in a non-narrative 
way, as opposed to the allegorical trope which leads to fixed meanings and stable subjects.
Indeed, it is an ironic view which will be developed further in the next section, 
"(Un)concluding postscript." Suffice it for here that what is of interest is a view of 
subjectivity which is "in process/on trial" {sujet en procès)^ without promised lands. In 
other words, by making a parallel between "modes of existence" and media” of 
communication, i am suggesting that no one mode or medium may be final. Rather, each 
disrupts the others, deferring the final meaning of the text which, in this case, would be 
the subject. The subject becomes an ironic subject—ironized through modes and media— 
which is a subject in process. Various media and modes show the frailty of other sign- 
system s' abilities to signify as well as show the tentative nature of particular ways of 
being. In turn, the subject remains open to change and resistant to totalizing forms of 
analysis. The image and the aesthetic are but two of these media and modes, but two i
Newmark, "Taking Kierkegaard Apart," 9. 
The trespass o f the sign, 157.
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have attempted to foster in this essay showing relationships which put the subject on a 
journey.
Tied to these views is the import of the material. Within visual and aesthetic 
theories there must also be attention paid to the materiality of the body. The aesthetic is 
that which "pertains to sense perception" and this necessarily includes, but is not limited 
to, the physical processes of sensoiy experience. As Kristeva has pointed out, the 
materiality of the body and the early-subject's connection to the mother's body provide a 
feminine {mater-id\) basis of the construction of the subject that is pre-Oedipal and, hence, 
pre-patriarchal. Kristeva's (and others') feminist critique is directed most especially 
toward Freud, but also toward Lacan's continuing emphasis (in spite of the early "mirror 
stage") on the Law of the Father. Obviously, if Deconstruction is taken into account, as 
it has been in feminist theorists such as Kristeva, Butler or Cixous, there can be no 
particular "sexed" basis for subjectivity or language either. These theorists continue to 
subvert a view of origins.
At the beginning of the Prescript i stated that i was working with three general 
fields of study: theology, theory and the visual arts. The chief theological concept i have 
been alluding to (though certainly not developing in any systematic way) is that of faith. 
Throughout the aesthetic stage, faith has been played with and against the relentless 
critiques which exist in poststructural theory and in the unsettling visual images of 
Rembrandt, Dali, Kandinsky and Magritte. Visually it is an image—however 
hallucinatory—that holds together the unified (pre)subject and gives the "armour of an 
alienating i d e n t i t y . B u t  it is also an image (as i have suggested in the initial viewing 
of Rembrandt's Slaitghtered (9%) which may take the subject "back" to the point where 
identity is made and unmade, leaving the subject-as-viewer in an undifferentiated space.
Faith is the question residing at the split (inside/outside, subject/object). Faith is 
'desire,' in a chronological view, and founds the initial splitting. In a topographical view, 
faith is 'abject,' the disrupting elements of poetic language and images which provoke a 
resituation of the splits. Faith in this sense is the "moving principle" of Kierkegaard
Lacan, "The mirror stage," 4.
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which urges the subject to rework borders, and rework them continually so that the 
subject in process is a subject of faith. Such faith cannot be possessed by a subject, but 
the subject and faith enter into relationship. Faith is always excessive. It is not a faith 
in a final redemption, but includes the element of risk at every step ventured.
But i have left Johannes in the water, infusing into his reflection. The seducer uses 
language, but is caught up in the world of reflection and thus, cannot use parole in a 
concrete manner. And then the reader must take a step back, for when the seducer is 
himself seduced in the end of "Diaiy of the Seducer" (when he becomes the enigma), the 
reader must also reconsider her/his own subject in relation to seduction. The questions 
(the ironic questions of faith) at the end (which is also a beginning) are; "Have i too been 
seduced? Have . been drawn into the lure of another's privacy? Have i been captivated 
by an image? An image at once terrible and fascinating? Am i too a voyeur?" The 
answers to these questions, if one can give them, are part of the ethical stage.
Francis Bacon, Three Studies for a Crucifixion (1962) Oil on canvas; each panel 147.5x198 cm. Tale Gallery
Salvador Dah, y4M/Mmna/ Cannibalism (1936) Oil on canvas 65.1x65.1 cm. The Tate Gallery
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(Un)concluding Postscript 
Tremendous
Terrific, dreadful; immense, rel. to Tremor, "involuntary shaking of the 
body"; Gk. trémein, tremble.^
I've always been very moved by pictures about slaughterhouses and meat, 
and to me they belong very much to the whole thing of the Crucifixion. 
ThereVe been extraordinary photographs which have been done of animals 
just being taken up before they were slaughtered; and the smell of death.
I think these pictures \Three Studies for a Cnwifixion, 1962] were very 
much based on that kind of thing, which to me is very, very near this 
whole thing of the Crucifixion. I know, for religious people, for Christians, 
the Crucifixion has a totally different significance. But as a non-believer, 
it was just an act of man's behaviour, a way of behaviour to another.
-Francis Bacon"
. . .  or dissect
the recurrent image into preconscious terrors.
-T.S. Eliot"
It is November, Slachtmaand, "slaughtering month." The animal which was put into
production by a scission (castration) and used to draw a plow, is now again put into
production by yet more scissions and drawings. The life of this animal has been a
continual sacrifice, cut to produce, and cut again to produce. Dying to its presence in life,
the presence will now be disseminated and consumed. The end of the body and the
beginning of writing, a writing and reading that are continuous.
I remember at the age of twelve or thirteen, reading the following sentence: "The 
flesh is sad, alas, and I have read all the books." I was struck with astonishment 
mingled with scorn and disgust. As if a tomb had spoken. What a lie! And
’ Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology. 
 ^ Quoted in Ades, Francis Bacon, 19.
 ^ T.S. Eliot, "The Dry Salvages," V. 192-3.
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beyond, what truth: for the flesh is a book. A body "read," finished? A book—a 
decaying carcass? Stench and falsity. The flesh is writing, and writing is never 
read: it always remains to be read, studied, sought, invented.'*
To be productive now—to be read, studied and finally consumed and incorporated—
the ox, after having been drawn, will be quartered. The image of a whole animal is
marked with "lines of fragilization," lines which make production possible; for, creation
comes through splitting. Out of the undifferentiated tohu bohu divisions occur which
mark the beginning of relationships and the beginning of social structure. If subjects and
objects are not distinguished then there can be no interrelations, no otherness. Dividing
the ox allows for consumption, a necessity of society.
As drawings have already taken place, the woman removes the stain of the drawn
blood. The cuts take on a surgical quality: sterile, nothing defiling. By hiding the
drawing, a killing is transformed into civility. "Of course we must eat!" Of course. But
we eat right up to the boundaries—draining the drawn blood, severing the head, the
genitalia, removing any recourse to the stench of mortality; life and positivity must be
extolled and death (and any reminder of it) expunged and sponged from the floor. This
is the order of civility.^
Corporal politics—making manifest the body in all its vulnerable, disarticulated, 
morbid aspects, in its apertures, curves, protuberances where the boundaries 
between self and the world are porous—is somehow indecent. "It is in keeping as 
far as possible out of sight, not only actual pain, but all that can be offensive or 
disagreeable to the most sensitive person, that refinement exists," writes the great 
liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill. In fact, it is a sign of the "high state of 
civilization," of the "perfection of mechanical arrangements," that so much can be
kept hidden. . . . The infliction of pain, as Mill points out, is delegated "to the
judge, the soldier, the surgeon, the butcher, the executioner."®
Once clean, the oxflesh must be shared. The French, partager, gets at the
Ox.
Hélène Cixous, "Coming to Writing," 23.
® Thanks to J. Stephen Fountain for suggestions on this reading of The Slaughtered
® Thomas Laquer, "Clio Looks at Corporal Politics," 14. No reference is given for 
J.S. Mill quote.
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beginnings of production in its dual significations of'dividing' and 'uniting,' Production 
entails moving back across the splits which have occurred, sharing between others. As 
Edmond .labès pursues the question of sharing in The Book o f Shares, he claims, 
"Whatever exists has no existence unless shared. Possessions under seal are lost 
possessions. At first sight, giving, offering yourself in order to receive an equivalent gift 
in return, would seem to be ideal sharing."^ A reciprocality where all the divisions are 
smoothed out allows for a good society.
But what's that in the corner of the painting? The painter (and the woman) seem 
to have forgotten the excess of the hide and head. Tf hide and head could have been 
hidden then the sharing would have gone on neatly—everything divided into each person's 
share—, but there is no place to hide and the grotesque peripherals display themselves. 
Simply "meat" if the unedibles were covered and taken from view, the viewer is instead 
forced to see that meat is more than meat, that a certain otherness shows itself in the 
excess. A question of origins surfaces: At which point does subject, object, meat, animal, 
or human begin and end? When can consumption occur? What are the necessaiy 
preconditions for a splitting which is not violent? Or is it always violent?
The question itself is an excess. Without questions there would be pure exchange, 
"efficient" production. In Sergei Battleship Potemkin, the ship's doctor keeps
the tight production going by exclaiming of the maggot-infested carcass intended for 
consumption: "The meat is good. No questions." Production must keep moving and not 
leave anything dangling, no questions, no rethinking borders.
Despite the best efforts of repression (and cleansing), there is an excess. Exchange 
is never complete. "[I]f we cannot share all, what remains and will always remain outside 
sharing? What has never, at the heart of our possessions, been ours?"*^  What is not ours, 
what can never be ours, is the other. The call of the other invokes responsibility which
’ From the back cover of The Book o f Shares. 
Ibid.
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"carries within it, and must do so, an essential excessiveness.R em brandt's Slaughtered 
Ox carries with it such an excessiveness, an excessiveness which challenges the viewer's 
conceptions of subject/object, food/consumption, human/animal, death/life. The effect of 
the framed and painted surface is a reordering of boundaries, a reordering which is 
without end.
The flesh is writing, and writing is never read: it always remains to be 
read, studied, sought, invented.
Derrida, "Eating Well," 108.
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Writing after the writing
The South Sea King was Act-on-Your-Hunch.
The North Sea King was Act-in-a-Flash.
The King of the place between them was 
No-Form.
Now South Sea King 
And North Sea King 
Used to go together often 
To the land of No-Form:
He treated them well.
So they consulted together 
They thought up a good turn,
A pleasant surprise, for No-Form 
In token of appreciation.
'Men,' they said, 'have seven openings 
For seeing, hearing, eating, breathing.
And so on. But No-Form 
Has no openings. Let's make him 
A few holes.'
So after that 
They put holes in No-Form,
One a day, for seven days.
And when they finished the seventh opening.
Their friend lay dead.
Lao Tan said, 'To organize is to destroy i l O
As i write this. President Clinton is preparing to send troops to Bosnia [and as i 
edit this, preparation is underway for troops to go to Haiti], imagining this to be some 
solution to the crisis there, a crisis which is unapproachable, a crisis which shows the 
postmodern condition in all its sickness. Poison and cure are both part of the 
pharmakon,** leaving the entry into the postmodern era a mixed blessing. A new 
openness and plurivocal culture may certainly be called blessings, but the ambiguity which
Thomas Merton, The Way o f  Chuang Tzu, 95-96.
** See Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy," in Dissemination.
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comes along with the openness is dangerous with lives and war at stake. There is no
longer a simple opposition to take place in the European (or other) regional theater;
There is no longer an avant-garde, political, sexual or artistic, embodying a 
capacity for anticipation; hence the possibility of any radical critique—whether in 
the name of desire, or revolution, or of the liberation of forms—no longer exists. 
The days of that revolutionary movement are gone. The glorious march of 
modernity has not led to the transformation of all values, as we once dreamed it 
would, but instead to a dispersal and involution of value whose upshot for us is 
total confusion—the impossibility of apprehending any determining principle, 
whether of an aesthetic, a sexual or a political kind/^
Opposition is over, and we are left fumbling with the inadequacies of discourse to find 
an answer. Peace talks break down, the calls for cease-fire go unheeded. The signifier 
and the signified seem to have split for good.
And i remember a book of poems for Bosnia i purchased last year. And i 
remember the title was Klaonica, which is Croat-Serbian for "slaughterhouse, abattoir, 
butchery, shambles." The editors state, "Poetry may be only words. And politics too may 
be only words, words less truthful, less direct, less meaningful. War is another agenda."*^ 
This other agenda may have something to do with words, with the discrepancy between 
what is said and what is meant, and the discrepancy between what is said and what is 
acted on.
In a previous "civil" war, oppositions were more prominent and the good and 
sensitive artists and intellectuals could respond within reason in the name of emancipation 
and freedom. But as the Spanish civil war broke out in 1936, Dali responded with the 
painting, Cannibalism, and commented in his typical less-than-politically-oriented
way: "These Iberian beings, eating each other in autumn, express the pathos of the Civil 
War considered (by me) as a phenomenon of natural history as opposed to Picasso who 
considered it as a political phenomenon."*'* The movement of history is a movement of
Jean Baudrillard, The Transparency o f  Evil, 10. 
Klaonica: Poems fo r Bosnia.
14 Quoted in Ades, Dali, 112.
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consumption, production put into practice, which is a violent act. Perhaps what Dali saw 
was the inevitability of violence and consumption that many in a post-Liberal society are 
seeing in the 1990's. The evil demon is here to stay and we are at pains to make sense 
of (or acquaintances with) the demon; exorcism is over.
The cannibalistic consumption portrayed by Dali is not without its erotic and 
desirous connotations, for Dali elsewhere considers this same painting in relation to his 
future-spouse. Gala:
And this first kiss mixed with tears and saliva, punctuated by the audible contact 
of our teeth and furiously working tongues, touched only the fringe of the 
libidinous famine that made us bite and eat everything to the last!*^
The awakening of desire—and subsequent scission—creates the necessary subjectivity for 
living with others. The split becomes the basis for a society, a "libidinal economy" 
(Lyotard), in which an un resolvable paradox exists. The paradox has to do with the desire 
for bodies to meld into each other (as in Dali's painting), for eroticism in its pure form 
to manifest itself leaving no distinctions. The desire is to "get back" to a pure state of 
harmony and rhythm: the early aesthetic. But, as we have seen, such a feat would be the 
implosion of desire, the end of movement, and the end of society, something unlikely to 
occur.
So, while Baudri I lard's "transaesthetics," "transpolitics" and "transsexuality" (see 
quote above) are seductively simplistic and ring true to postmodern ears, the paradox is 
that borders have not gone away, we have not found the way back to our primordial 
undifferentiated origins. Baudrillard is more of a pessimist than the Romantics or 
Liberals, and the above quote points to a sense of regret for where we have come, or what 
we have "come back to." By contrast, the utopian dreams of modernity (which seem to 
include both temporal directions with the Romantics recovering something lost and the 
Liberals progressing toward an end) were overly optimistic in their telos. We have 
reached utopia, Baudrillard claims, and it ain't all that its cracked up to be; or, in his more
15 From The Secret lAfe o f Salvador Dali, quoted in Wilson, Salvador Dali, 19.
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famous quote, "What do we do now the orgy is over?"’® While one can empathize with
Baudrillard's strategies (that of "becoming the object," the enigma) there must (also) be
a continued desire to paradoxically keep thinking at the borders, to transform critical
theory into a "philosophy of the limit.
Thinkers such as Edith Wyschogrod in her Saints and Postmodernism see two
sides to postmodernism. One would seem to include the likes of Baudrillard (though she
does not deal with him much) where difference is eliminated. Her main targets here (for
she argues against such thinking) are Deleuze and Guattari and Kristeva. On the other
side are Blanchot, Derrida and Levinas who are thinkers of difference. Her arguments
against Deleuze, Guattari and Kristeva leave something to be desired,”* but statements like
the following provide a way into the ethical:
The singularity of the Other speaks from the non-place of difference between the 
saint's desire and the Other's own suffering so that the Other's singularity is always 
an excess, more than can be encompassed by saintly intention. What is absolutely 
Other gives itself to the saint as this excess.’^
Suffering inevitably entails that all borders are not so easily crossable and eliminated. 
People are killed, and death is a limit, Liminal thinking ("philosophy of the limit," 
difference) is bound up with eroticism, sacrifice and subjectivity. Each of these, i am 
arguing, must not be analyzed through (binary) oppositions or systematic structures, but 
reviewed by thinking at the limit, the threshold, the locus of the split which ruptures and
16 See, among other places, the introduction to The Transparency o f  Evil.
The title of a book by Drucilla Cornell, a phrase that is a rephrasing of 
Deconstruction
”* Tt would seem that Deleuze, Guattari and Kristeva are not so dismissive of 
difference and the reading of Kristeva's Powers o f  Horror seems to miss the mark. See 
Deleuze and Guattari's chief translator, Brian Massumi's User's Guide to Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia and Kristeva's own response to Wyschogrod in "The Speaking Subject is 
not Innocent," especially p 166. I am indebted to Pamela Anderson for making the 
connection between Wyschogrod's reading and Kristeva's response in a paper given at the 
1994 Women and Religion conference, LJniversity of Glasgow.
19 Saints and Postmodernism, 256.
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reorders and does so continually.
The practice of eroticism would then be not the end of distinction, but as Bataille 
defines it as the "assenting to life up to the point of d e a t h . E r o t i c i s m  (and, with it, 
desire) still has boundaries with life and death, subject and object distinguished.
The ethical becomes a re-viewing of the limits, with the questions existing at the 
thresholds of language and subjectivity. The ethical is the call for a response. It is the 
calling of an other that stirs in one, response-ability. Separations have taken place, 
borders established, crossed, identities are bom. Violent ripping away, tears, necessary 
positing of a subject. Language is bom as immediacy dies. And yet, it is so imperfect, 
as Bosnia perfectly shows.
So enter writing.
Writing the Ethical
This essay leaves little space for a full quety into the ethical stage of Kierkegaard 
and to do so would make it impossible not to touch on the religious stage as well. A full 
study on modes of existence (the stages) in Kierkegaard's thought would have to include 
all three stages and their interrelations, a complex and involved study. As my chief 
concern in this essay has been to read through the aesthetic stage, considering the role of 
images in the aesthetic constmction of the subject, i will here, by way of conclusion, give 
a brief foray into the ethical stage, reading for the role of writing in considerations of 
subjectivity. The following final section is then a reflective and doub 1 y-reflective (a 
'repetition') look back on the aesthetic stage and, consequently, my writing on the aesthetic 
stage.
As has been shown, the reflective aesthetic is a place where language is used, yet 
it is not used in an ethical and concrete manner; it remains "suspended above" existence 
"The seducer of Either/Or is preoccupied with his own erotic strategies, not with the
Erotism. 11
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hapless object of them; his reflectiveness, so to speak, has become his immediacy."^’ The 
language used does not take the Other into account. Similarly, in Lacan's reading of 
Freud's grandson's fort-da game,^^ Freud's account is taken one step further. As the 
mother leaves, the wooden reel does not become a "representation" of the mother, but "a 
small part of the subject that detaches itself from him [the child] while still remaining his, 
still r e t a i n e d . T h i s  is a reflective language which can finally only see the speaking 
subject her or his self. The child does not yet know the other, its language merely an 
extension of its self.
The accounting of the other in language requires the entry into the symbolic realm, 
a place where subjects and objects have split. Because of the split, a medium of 
communication becomes necessary to re-establish a relationship between self and other. 
Here we harken back to the discussion of Kristeva's symbolic which was prefigured 
alongside the description of the semiotic. The symbolic is "a sign of recognition: an 
'object' split in two and the parts separated, but . . . brings together the two edges of that 
fissure. As a result, the 'symbol' is any joining, any bringing together that is a contract." '^* 
The contract is social, and the entry into the symbolic is the place where the individual 
is given full status as a subject, one who enters into the symbolic exchange of language.
Against the Freudian psychoanalytic tradition's reliance on language as primary 
entry into subjectivity (the result of the final split from the mother due to the "third term" 
that is the father), i have previously pointed out where certain thinkers have suggested 
other primary splits, and i want to argue further with Kierkegaard that a more important
Terry Eagleton, "Absolute Ironies," 181.
See Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 13-17. In this game, Freud observed, the 
child would throw a wooden reel with a string tied to it over the side of his cot saying, 
"o-o-o-o" which the adults took for fort (gone). Then the child pulled the reel back, 
exclaiming "da" (there). This was done when the mother was absent, and Freud 
interpreted it as the child's mastery over the disappearance and appearance.
The Four Fttndamenial Concepts o f Psycho-Analysis, 62.
Revolution in Poetic Language, 49.
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shift is the individual's ability to use language in a historical (i.e., ethical, considering the 
Other) manner. This shift may be paralleled to the difference between langue and parole, 
from symbolic, culturally-constructed language to the individual's ability to use speech 
But more than this, which many of the psychoanalysts do not pick up on, the move for 
Kierkegaard is the responsibility (response-ability) which comes with speech. As William 
Blake puts it, "He who desires but acts not, breeds pestilence.""® That is, an individual's 
language has concrete consequences. Language and subject enter into a dialogic space for 
Kierkegaard, parole is ruptured by the Other and, of course, the other way around. While 
psychoanalysis may stress entry into subjectivity is an entry into language, Kierkegaard's 
conception stresses the two-way process of an entry into language, but a responsible use 
q/language.
Upon reaching the ethical stage, it is fairly quickly realized that this stage is not 
the paradigmatic "mode of existence," according to Kierkegaard, and his Judge Wilhelm 
who writes from an ethical standpoint in Either/Or / /  regarding the ethical validity of 
marriage is finally a bland and bourgeois character, Marriage, for Wilhem, becomes an 
ideal place of reconciliation and Hegelian synthesis of opposites, a place where 
individuality and inwardness are brought into harmonious relation with universals and 
outwardness. In such a conception, the ethical would be a return to the harmony of the 
beginnings of the immediate aesthetic stage, a place Kandinsky hoped his paintings would 
inhabit. In Kristevan terms, the semiotic and the symbolic would be brought together 
without the possibility of fissure, and therefore, without the possibility of signification. 
Ethical existence for Kierkegaard (and certainly for Kristeva as well) would be a place 
of stagnation, a place where growth, process and significance are not possible. Still, 
growth and process are not possible without the ethical stage, for without the ethical the 
"subject" would remain completely inward and abstracted from socio-political life.
"The Marriage of Heaven and Hell," "Proverbs of Hell," line 5. Interestingly 
enough, Bataille (mis)quotes (or is it mis-translated?) this line as, "To speak without 
acting is to breed pestilence" ("Letter to René Char on the Incompatibilities of the 
Writer," Yale French Studies 78 (1990): 33). "Speaking" and "desire" seem to be bound 
on an unconscious level for this p sy ch oan a I y ti cal 1 y -ori en ted writer
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From the standpoint of the ethical then, we must here go back and re-view the 
possibilities of writing ethically. But first we must review the possibilities of writing the 
aesthetic. In this place we stumble on irony.
Ironing out differences
The Hegelian definition of irony, following Socrates, is an "infinite absolute 
negativity."^® Kierkegaard, however, shows that Hegel contradicts himself by moving to 
resolve all the dilemmas involved; Hegel's negativity is only momentary The Socratic 
method of irony, argues Kierkegaard, is a place of peipetual questions with the result 
being to raise "the individual up and out of immediate e x i s t e n c e . I r o n y  is always 
already in existence, ready to surface at the slightest settlement of resolution or synthesis.
As literary trope, irony is that which forever indicates the difference between text 
and meaning This ironic deferral of a text's meaning establishes the need for more 
reading. The reader must go back and read again, producing a thesis (the ihetic), but only 
to be followed by a compulsion for more reading and writing.
Going back to Kevin Newmark's statement given in the Prescript, it will be 
recalled that within
a nonnarrative structure, the form of communication (which is partly, though not 
entirely, a question of aesthetics since it is concerned with the outward form or 
sensuous appearance of the communication) and the meaning of the 
communication (which would at some point become religious truth as inwardness) 
are maintained indissolubly in a relationship of nonadequation as the result of a 
philosophical X\\Qory of indirect communication or, better, as the result of a purely 
linguistic predicament (that the communication of truth is by necessity indirect).^
The indirect communication (the relationship between form and meaning of
®^ See Taylor, Journeys to Selfhood, 95-97. 
The Concept o f  Ironv. 48n.
28 Ibid.. 9.
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communication) is here that of i r o n y A s  i write from the ethical stage—the place of the 
symbolic, of academic writing—i formulate theory on irony.
Also, the context in which Newmark's above quote was given in the Prescript was 
that of logocentricity, T relate this context in order to pull irony in as a subverter of a 
logocentric view of the subject. The logos was considered to have a two-fold nature the 
medium of the word (language), and the guarantee of final fullness, wholeness and 
redemption. By relating irony to subjectivity and relating this relationship to media of 
communication and "modes of existence" (stages), i am suggesting that the logos breaks 
down in both its manifestations. The medium of language is ruptured and supplemented 
by the medium of the visual image, and the final resting point is continually deferred in 
the constant questioning provoked by irony. Thus, a subject in process.
What irony provokes is a questioning of all that has gone down in writing in the 
preceding essay (and all that is written in these and the following pages) To put it 
simply and directly, writing the immediate aesthetic is ironic. As i stated throughout the 
previous chapter, the immediate aesthetic is a place of rhythms, music, images, bodily 
pulsions, etc It is a place uninhabited by language. And yet Kristeva, Lacan, Bataille, 
Kierkegaard and myself have written on it. We have attempted theses on that which is 
pre-thetic. Does this mean everything i have written is simply wrong? No, it shows that 
it is ironic, that what is said is not fully congruent with the "reality" of the immediate 
aesthetic. To make such a recognition while at the same time proceeding to write has its 
uses, as we will see shortly. Here i turn to some comments Kristeva, Bataille and 
Kierkegaard have given for their acknowledgement of ironic writing.
I would have liked to include Lacan as well, as his discourse on the Imaginary 
would also fit here. But Lacan would seem less concerned about the impossibility of his
Irony is not the only method of indirect communication. Roger Poole argues 
that before 1846 indirect communication and irony for Kierkegaard are co-extensive, but 
not after. The argument in this book is that Kierkegaard's body became the element of 
his indirect communication after the famed Corsair affair. (See especially "The Text of 
the Body" and "The Body of the Text" in The Indirect Communication.)
For my purposes i am looking at irony itself and not directly the broader questions 
of indirect communication.
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writing and seems to choose images, algebraic charts and references to painting as 
supplements to language's inadequacy to describe events such as the mirror stage. Even 
if he is famed for the statement, "the unconscious is structured like a language,"^® he 
makes no haste in referring to Bosch or Dali in descriptions of the infant's psychological 
experience.^’ Such a rhetorical move would encourage my suggestion of various media 
showing themselves to be ironic elements. Images too indicate the distance between what 
is said and what is meant. Images surface in Lacan's language when the split between 
description and meaning is too great for linguistic mediation.
Kristeva, by contrast, realizes in writing that the articulation of the chora is 
contradictory. Academic writing and Kristeva's symbolic order exist in the ethical stage 
and to de-scribe the semiotic is ultimately an impossible task. "[0]nce it has been named, 
that functioning, even if it is pre-symbolic, is brought back into a symbolic po.sition. All 
discourse can do is differentiate, by means of a 'bastard r e a s o n i n g Ac c o r d i n g  to Plato, 
since "Reason" is divine and therefore unchanging and stable, any reasoning and naming 
about the unstable and innominable is "bastard reasoning," Yet, because the semiotic is 
indispensable for "signification" within Kristeva's structure, the impossible becomes 
necessary—"the chora is governed by a necessity that is not God's law."^’
Beyond necessity, Bataille opens language up to a wholly different possibility of 
expression. The erotic, of course, is unmentionable. How then pretend to write? One 
might further be compelled to ask: How are these two writers, Kierkegaard and Bataille, 
who each react so strongly to Hegel and the "identity of opposites" which are such a part 
of the Hegelian structure, to get away with the contradictions involved with writing the 
erotic? Understanding that they are writing a contradiction, can they be taken seriously?
Four Fundamental Concepts, 20.
Perhaps he would mean to include such images as part of language. This would 
be a further study.
^ 0 0  Revolution, 239-240 n.l3; cf. Plato, Timaeus, 52a-52b.
Ibid., 240 n.l3.
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Perhaps it is through language, through an understanding of the malleability of language
in ways radically precursory to the poststructuralists that both Kierkegaard and Bataille
are able to play with the opposites involved through use of fictional narratives and
pseudonyms.^'* Denis Hoi lier suggests of Bataille that there is a particular "practice of
writing" employed which, because it
is constituted by language, there is the double, contradictory possibility of both 
affirming and refusing the identity,of opposites. . . . Language is, simultaneously, 
as a code, theoretical space (dominated by the signified) that, to protect its 
homogeneity, implies the identity of opposites, and, as writing, the space of a 
practice that on the one hand valorizes themes of rupture and on the other itself 
unfurls according to a rhythm of rupture, of destruction of sublimating unity
This is the practice also employed by Kierkegaard and it is recalled that in the final 
description of Don Juan, "[h]e dissolves, as it were, in music for us; he unfurls in a world 
of sounds."^®
Writing—in certain practices—becomes an approach to the description of the 
immediate aesthetic erotic life. It allows for the impossible. The impossible within 
Kierkegaard would be the production of meaning at the level of the aesthetic, the level 
of the pre-symbolic. (As Victor Eremita says, "A coherent aesthetic view of life can 
hardly be presented."^^) The impossible is the use of historical language in the service 
of a-historical writing, a place in which it is described that music (or, as i have included, 
abstract art and the material drives and pulsions of the body), not language, is the 
immediate. Kierkegaard's young man paradoxically realizes this and is rhetorically self- 
reflective: "when I have brought the reader to the point of being so mu.si call y receptive 
that he seems to hear the music although he hears nothing, then I shall have finished my
‘^* Bataille's Histoire de l’oeil was originally published in 1928 under the name, 
Lord All ch.
Against Architecture 90.
"® Either/Or 1 134.
37 In his "Preface" (13) to the collection of writings which make up Either/Or.
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task, then 1 shall fall silent, then T shall say to the reader, as I say to myself: Listen."^** 
With language Kierkegaard (via the young man) writes to make language disappear.
In this current essay, "impossible writing" translates as my writing from the ethical 
sphere (the sphere where language and critical distance are possible, the sphere out of 
which academic writing comes) about the aesthetic. Again, language itself cannot re­
present this sphere, it can only suggest and lead away from itself. In this way, the use 
of painting as abstract as Kandinsky's may be justified. While commentaries on painting 
use words of judgement from the ethical sphere (the thetic), painting itself comments on 
the aesthetic from somewhere other than the place which necessarily po.sits a thesis 
Painting "comments" on the aesthetic from within the aesthetic. In other words, the 
painting of Dali, Rembrandt and Kandinsky, or the music of Mozart are as much a valid 
commentary in the present discussion of the aesthetic as are the writings of Lacan, 
Kristeva or Bataille.
But if we stay here, interested in the irony, we have gone no further than the
seduction. We remain in reflection. Kierkegaard warns:
just as there is something deterring about irony, it likewise has something 
extraordinarily seductive and fascinating. Its masquerading and mysteriousness, 
the telegraphic communication it prompts because an ironist always has to be 
understood at a distance . . . the fleeting but indescribable instant of understanding 
that is immediately superseded by the anxiety of misunderstanding—all this holds 
one prisoner in inextricable bonds.
'Reflection' lets us look back to Narcissus. We look again at the water's suiface and ask 
whether reflection is a "mirror-image," a perfect image of the thing itself. Does the 
mirror (the water's surface) give a true view of what we think it does? Here i am moving 
away from the material description of mirror—though it is entirely important that the 
example is that of a mirror, and hence, is visual—and into reflective philosophical 
endeavors which attempt to find one's self mirrored in an other, whether that other is a 
person, a system of thought, a painting, or what have you.
Either/Or I, 86.
39 The Concept o f Irony, 48-49,
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Here i turn to Paul Ricoeur's reading of Freud in his mammoth, Freud and 
Philosophy. In trying to place Freud, Ri coeur brings out the importance of reflection in 
philosophical enquiry, linking it to the psychoanalytic tradition spawned by Freud himself. 
By reading Freud as a philosopher concerned with reflection, Ri coeur states, "reflection 
is the effort to recapture the Ego of the Ego Cogito in the mirror of its objects, its works, 
its acts."'*® This leads to a definition of reflection as a whole; "Reflection is the 
appropriation of our effort to exist and of our desire to be, through the works which bear 
witness to that effort and desire."'*’ In this way, quite tnily, he moves away from a radical 
split between subject and object which leads to a detached objective scientific view of life, 
but also from a purely subjective view which gives the subjective agent the sole power 
of critique (whose far end would be solipsism). Ricoeur is interested in a relationship 
with the world ('world' in a general sense), a world allowing for intersubjectivity to occur, 
a world where the individual subject can be changed by her or his environment as well 
as change his or her environment.
What i want to call attention to though, is the use of the term 'appropriation* (a 
translation granted, but the english phrase brings out the sense given in this context). 
Reflection as appropriation brings the other into itself {fort-da). The subject sees itself 
in the other and takes the other, or part of the other, as a part of the subject's own 
existence (and existence does seem to be what Ricoeur is interested in). This is what is 
labeled 'interpretation,' it is a "recollection of meaning"'*^ which finally helps to establish 
the self.
It must also be shown that recollection of meaning not only takes place in a 
philosophical setting, but works theologically as well. When Ricoeur deals with the 
"recollection of meaning" he states, "The contrary of suspicion, I will say bluntly, is
'*’ Freud, 43 
'*’ Ibid., 46.
42 I)Interpretation as Recollection of Meaning," Freud, 28-32.
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faith. Ri coeur's faith is a "postcritical faith," one that "seeks, through interpretation, a 
second naïveté."'*'* There are two sides to this faith (which wind up constituting the 
"hermeneutic circle"): that of believing (i.e., interpreting) and that of understanding. 
"Understanding" becomes the end of faith, Tt is not a final place but the next stage of the 
circle which turns back into itself for more seeking.
There are many parallels here to the scattered mu sings of faith that i have alluded 
to throughout this essay, and the continual moving of faith that is the hermeneutic circle 
would seem to be a faith Kierkegaard may be "comfortable" with. All of this i would 
agree with save for one key element: the logos. Tn the interpretive philosophy (which is 
also ultimately a theology) of Ricoeur there is an overriding logocentricity, a belief in 
language, a belief "that men [sic] are born into language, into the light of the logos 'who 
enlightens every man who comes into the w o r l d . A s  long as faith has this resting point 
which finally guarantees understanding, the "suspicious" element of interpretation can 
continue because it is always assumed that understanding will eventually meet suspicion
But what happens when the comforts of the logos are taken away? What are the 
implications towards subjectivity when translation breaks down, when the other resists 
appropriation? An appropriation-resisting otherness is what i began this section on the 
ethical with (see especially the quote of Wyschogrod's), and what i have considered the 
aesthetic to be. Quite simply, if we allow for an aesthetic element in the construction of 
subjectivity, then we must allow for the inappropriable, the excess, to reside within the 
subject itself. Totality cannot be shared and the aesthetic is not equivocal with language. 
Description of the aesthetic via language is an ironic act; that is, there is a continual 
discrepancy between the medium and the meaning. The "recollection of meaning" of 
interpretation remains within language, indeed is bound by it. The aesthetic, contrarily, 
resists reflection.
"  Ibid., 28. 
^ Ibid.
45 Ibid., 29-30,
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This Hegelian urge to appropriate, to bring the world into a coherent system 
understandable by the subject, is the move Kierkegaard argues must be met with 
repetition. As with Kierkegaard's view of Hegel, reflection and recollection are not bad, 
but one cannot remain bound there. "[T]he fleeting but indescribable instant of 
understanding that is immediately superseded by the anxiety of misunderstanding—all this 
holds one prisoner in inextricable bonds."'*® There are limits to a -based view of 
subjectivity. The movement to be made is that of a repetition.
Repetition in Kierkegaard is to be distinguished from the Greek and Hegelian 
notion of'recollection' and its connected term, 'reflection.' Tn recollection is speculation, 
a "looking backwards," but, wains Kierkegaard's Prater Tacituiniis, "the spectator must 
not confuse theatre and actuality, or himself with a spectator who is nothing more than 
a spectator at a comedy."'*^ Though recollection is not wrong it cannot be an end in itself; 
it must move into concrete action. The possible must become actual: "If one does not 
have the category of recollection or of repetition, all life dissolves into an empty, 
meaningless noise."'*** Hegel never made the move to repetition, according to Kierkegaard, 
and the "seducer" whose diary was read earlier is the warning established against too 
much recollection.
Perhaps it would be possible to see the idea of repetition as a sort of unstable 
combination of the third immediate stage (the culmination of the immediate aesthetic) and 
the seducer (the reflective aesthetic). The third stage of the immediate aesthetic—as seen 
in Don Juan—is where, still stuck in im-mediacy, there are a series of actions which take 
place but there is no ability to pull out of the immediacy. Don Juan goes on by 
"continually finishing and continually being able to begin all over again,"'**' but has no 
ability to choose. On the other hand, the reflective aesthete—as seen in Baudrillard and
'*® The Concept of Irony, 48-49. 
'*^ Stages on Life's Way, 461.
'*** Repetition, 149.
'*" FAther/Or I, 96.
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the "seducer"—is able to see the possibilities available and therefore has unlimited 
freedom, but cannot act on any of them. The seducer winds up dizzy from the 
possibilities. Repetition then, occurs through "in-corporation" of the possibilities, the 
particularity of the immediate returns after reflection on the world of possibility. One 
acts, but now it is an action out of freedom. Repetition is a "double reflection." When 
faced with any number of possibilities—infinite or not—the reflective person must begin 
by reflecting, but then, through the free act of the will, attempt to exist and make actual 
what was only possible.
Tn this place it is important to recognize the diachronic element of repetition. 
"Repetition and recollection are the same movement, except in opposite directions, for 
what is recollected has been, is repeated backward, whereas genuine repetition is 
recollected forward."®® There is a. re-turn involved, but the return is not a going back (to 
an Ego Cogito), the re-turn is moving ahead to what is unknown. The return of repetition 
is a return with excess, an excess that cannot be assimilated. "Repetition is the return of 
absolute Difference."®’
As a forward recollecting movement, repetition brings out the function of the 
artist/writer This is especially tme in Lyotard's writing on the particularity of the 
postmodern artist
A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a philosopher: the text he writes, 
the work he produces are not in principle governed by preestablished rules, and 
they cannot be judged according to a deteimining judgment, by applying familiar 
categories to the text or to the work. Those rules and categories are what the 
work of art itself is looking for. The artist and the writer, then, are working 
without rules in order to formulate the rules of what will have been done. Hence 
the fact that work and text have the characters of an event, hence also, they always 
come too late for their author, or, what amounts to the same thing, their being put 
into work, their realization {mise en oeuvre) always begin too soon Post modern 
would have to be understood according to the paradox of the future {post) anterior 
{modd).^^
®® Repetition, 131.
®’ Taylor, Altarity, 351.
52 "Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?" 81.
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I am not interested in making an argument for the advancement of postmodern art (if 
there could be such a thing), but rather for the role of the artist/writer in the individual 
subject and, by extension, in the broader culture
The artist/writer is one who plays with possibilities. The poet, as the painter, dis­
plays possibility, allowing a viewing. As has been stated, Kierkegaard uses pseudonyms 
as part of his literary production, making it possible to experiment with possibilities 
(modes) of existence, Mark C, Taylor describes this literary device thus:
By insisting upon the disparity between his ideas and his life, the poet directs the 
reader away from his person and toward his poetic creation. Kierkegaard's 
pseudonym ity is the curtain separating him from the drama he stages. His 
multiple literary devices seek to focus the reader's attention on the play his 
personae enact rather than on the complex behind-the-scenes maneuvres necessary 
to mount the production.®^
The artist/writer is one who plays with possibility, who imag(in)es what-could-be, but the 
artist/writer's role is not necessarily to live out the possibilities. Rather, Kierkegaard urges 
the move beyond the first viewing towards a "re-viewing," a repetition It is the viewer 
who is responsible to confront the creation, to deal with it in her own life. The 
possibilities given by the artist-writer are not—and this is a crucial point in the whole of 
Kierkegaard's corpus—a prescriptive writing telling what-should-be, but rather an indirect 
means of giving the reader a number of choices by which she or he must then decide how 
to proceed on their own. "When in reflection upon the communication the receiver is 
reflected upon, then we have ethical communication. The mai eu tic The communicator 
disappears, as it were, makes himself serve only to help the other to become."®'* The task 
is that of a translator {trans-latns, "cany across").
Trans-lation occurs at the splits, the places of division and connection. The 
artist/writer as translator thus plays a crucial role as she or he stands at a point of 
(dis)solution of two othernesses. By using indirect communication (the maieutic; Gk
®^ Journeys to Selfhood, 102.
®'* Journals and Papers, 654; 8-2: B 89. Quoted in Taylor, Journeys to Selfhood,
101-2.
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maieuomai, act as midwife), the translator works at the birthing (splitting) and then 
disappears.
As translator, the artist/writer uses irony, but in a knowing way: "The poet
him[her]self must be master over the irony."®® Kierkegaard ends his Doctoral dissertation
with a six-page section entitled, "Irony as a Controlled Element, the Truth in Irony," in
which the writer-reader relationship is explored. Within this relationship, irony plays a
crucial role as "what could be called the absolute beginning of personal life."®® Yet, even
with a master ironist, irony maintains a sense of independence and continues to shake
itself free, remaining perpetually uncontrollable.
Irony as the negative is the way; it is not the tnith but the way Anyone who has 
a result as such does not possess it, since [s]he does not have the way. When 
irony now lends a hand, it brings the way, but not the way whereby someone 
fancying him[her]self to have the achievement comes to possess it, but the way 
along which the achievement deserts [her] him.®''
For Kierkegaard it is the Hegelian urge to contain, to cut out any excess, which prompts 
this quasi-apophatic view of irony. Irony is an excess, a repressed element surfacing 
when the waters are calm Pure reflection is rippled, recognition is misrecognition
A Final Re-view
We have seen the function of irony in the subject and the function of the 
artist/writer as a "master ironist," but we have still to get out of the seduction and allow 
repetition to occur. We have re-turned, but not recollected forward. To do this, and to 
put an end to this essay, we return via Lacan to Dali's Narcissus.
Repetition, unlike irony, cannot have a master in control. Repetition comes upon 
us, unsuspected. In Kristeva's approach to abjection she quotes from Dostoyevsky's The
®® The Concept o f Irony, 324. 
®® Ibid., 326.
Ibid., 326-327.
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Possessed, and here we come upon a repetition in the making;
There are seconds—they come five or six at a time—when you suddenly feel the 
presence of eternal harmony in all its fullness It is nothing earthly, I don't mean 
that it is heavenly, but a man in his earthly semblance can't endure it He has to 
undergo a physical change or die. . . . What is so terrifying about it is that it is so 
terribly clear and such gladness. Tf it went on for more than five seconds, the soul 
could not endure it and must perish. In those five seconds I live through a 
lifetime, and I am ready to give my life for them, for it's worth it.®**
In Lacan's economy, repetition {tuché) is "the encounter with the real,"®*' and "[w]hat is 
repeated, in fact, is always something that occurs . . .  as if  by chance."^ Repetition is an 
in-breaking of the real which is otherwise untouchable. Most of life is spent moving 
around within the symbolic realm from which there is no escape and no transgression 
Bringing the point home Lacan states, "the true formula of atheism is not God is dead ,
, , the true formula of atheism is God is tinconscious.''^^
This "chance" encounter in Lacan's scheme is self-admittedly informed by 
Kierkegaard who is closer to the correct view of repetition than is Freud. Freud's analysis 
deals with a return and recovery of some past while Kierkegaard's repetition "demands the 
new."®  ^ Freud was a Romantic and "[t]he romantic longing for something higher may 
well be genuine, but just as man must not separate what God has joined together, so man 
also must not join what God has separated, but a sickly longing such as this is simply a 
way of wanting to have the perfect prematurely."®^ Repetition is wiederholttng, and Lacan
®^ The Devils, Trans. David Magarshack. (London: Penguin Books, 1953) 586- 
587, Quoted in Powers o f Horror, 19.
Four Fundamental Concepts, 53.
®® Ibid., 54.
®’ Ibid., 59.
Ibid., 61.
63 The Concept o f Irony, 329.
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reminds us that holen means "to haul, to draw."®'* Repetition, therefore, is a re-drawing 
and drawings, we will recall, are separations.
Once Lacan has set up his notion of repetition, he begins to outline a structure of 
vision. Within his analysis (situated within the explanation of repetition®®), there is a split 
between the ’eye' and the 'gaze.'®® Just as there is no fixed and unitary subject in Lacan, 
neither can there be a fixed point for visual perspective. The eye and the gaze are related 
but split. The eye can never see reality (the Real); vision is always already mediated and 
in that mediation are blind spots {méconnaissance-, scotoma). As Martin Jay considers in 
his overview of Lacan, "the eye is that of the specular, Cartesian subject desiring specular 
plenitude and phallic wholeness, and believing it can find it in a mirror of itself, whereas 
the gaze is that of an objective other in a field of pure monstrance."®^
The gaze is part of a web that the subject is but one (but not One) piece of: "We 
are beings who are looked at, in the spectacle of the world. . . . [the] gaze circumscribes 
us."®** Confronted with a painting it may be said that the painting has eyes and looks back 
at the viewer. Within such a web of interconnectedness it becomes impossible to see 
one's self, there is no Cartesian cogito to apprehend one's own subjectivity "Seeing 
myself seeing m yself is an illusion. T look, but not without being looked at, and i cannot 
separate out an eye which sees.
This illusory aspect is not as fatalistic as it may at first seem. There is no getting 
away from the mediated nature of all seeing, but one could see the split between eye and 
gaze as ironic and return to the elements of process in subjectivity which have been
®'* Four Fundamental Concepts, 67.
®® See Ibid., 79.
®® In the end Lacan remains a "critic of ocularcentrism" and is suspicious of the 
element of vision in the construction of subjectivity, but his work on vision has remained 
crucial for many theories of images. See Martin Jay, "The Specular Subject of Ideology," 
in Downcast Eyes, 329-380.
®^ Downcast Eyes, 363-4.
®* Four Fundamental Concepts, 75,
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strongly stated by Kierkegaard. Seeing can be ironic, for what one wishes to see is other 
than what is seen; "The subject is presented as other than [s]he is, and what one shows 
[her] him is not what [s]he wishes to see."^  ^ As with irony, the eye can also be a guide,^" 
moving the subject along by constantly revealing the split nature of relationships.
Here we come again to desire and its correlate, the Other. "Modifying the formula 
T have of desire as unconscious--[wo]/;/-3»'v desire is the desire o f the Oiher~A would say 
that it is a question of a sort of desire on the part q/the Other, at the end of which is the 
showing.^*^  ^ Jay comments on Lacan's relation of desire and vision: "the gaze can be 
thought of as brought about by the Other's desire to show itself, a desire that is matched 
only by the eye's desire to see."^  ^ A repealing occurs, however indecently or impure, and 
the subject, desire, and Other are caught into relationship. The desire is cannibalistic 
(Dali paints this desire) wanting to see in a pure way. Yet, "When, in love, Î solicit a 
look, what is profoundly unsatisfying and always missing is that—Tow never look at me 
from the place from which I see yoti.'''’^  Seeing is never perfect.
We are back to the paradox of desire and eroticism, the desire for pure 
correspondence and the inevitable splits which keep such communication mediated. 
Wanting to see the other in the subject's own terms and wanting to see one's self reflected 
in the other—to 'appropriate' the other—is finally an act of violence. Seen and seer do not 
correspond, never will. Boundaries are established and cannot be looked through without 
distortion, there is only a dim view. This is what maintains desire.
What Lacan seems to lament as the incongruity of self and other becomes, to 
repeat Wyschogrod, the place for the saint: "What is absolutely Other gives itself to the
® Ibid., 104.
™ See Ibid., 71. Lacan brings out Maurice Merleau-Ponty'sLe Visible et l'invisible 
as recognizing the eye as guide.
Ibid., 115.
DoM’ncast Eyes  ^ 366-7.
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saint as this excess." '^* Lacan is skeptical toward reflection, toward the full appropriation 
of otherness, yet his desire seems to be taken over by sorrow. To the contrary, a "vision 
of excess" is precisely what Bataille would see as the moment of ecstasy It is a way of 
seeing that takes faith, that accepts the horror and does not shy. Or, as Cixous would 
state;
Everything that is (looked at justly) is good. Is exciting. Is 'terrible'. Life is 
terrible. Terribly beautiful, terribly cruel. Everything is marvelously terrible, to 
whoever looks at things as they are.^^
Such is the faith of seeing, a faith that moves the subject in process, always 
unsettled and willing to move among modes of existence and various media Within these 
moves one encounters the excess of the Other, the inappropriable Other. Seeing is ironic, 
there is a perpetual split between what one wishes to see and what one sees In this way 
seeing is compelled to look again, to find another perspective, and to do so continually. 
And not only does the subject see, but she or he is also seen. The various views of the 
subject therefore enable the subject to exist in a variety of ways, in a diverse life
Re-turning at the Tate
I went back to The Tate Gallery to visit Dali's Metamorphosis o f Narcissus and 
to gaze again at Francis Bacon's Triptychs. Standing in front of Narcissus, wanting to 
look, to see, to see something new, another fragment to write down and capture about the 
painting. I know i did not come to find myself or to see myself reflected. I wanted 
something to say. I wanted to respond, to claim for myself the irony and therefore master 
it But irony is slippery and slides away, it will not be controlled for long
I looked, noting the interplay of surface and depth. 1 wondered, "Was this surface 
solid and did it allow no access to the deep waters? Or were there no deep waters'?" And 
as i pondered i was drawn in, and just as i was drawn in i noticed a reflection. There,
74
75
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just to my right of Narcissus, within the "heterosexual group," i saw the blond male, 
second from the left. This figure had the same pose i had when i approached the 
painting: left leg out front, hand to face, staring. I saw my pose, reflected.
All of the figures within this group, wandering on a reflective surface, are staring 
and seemingly not seeing anything, at least, nothing that would be an Other They do not 
seem to recognize each other At the same time, they are being looked at, they are on 
display, stripped naked and given poses.
Aha! i thought. They are naked and i am not. While the pose is the same, the 
clothes are different. And yet, perhaps i too had been caught, shown my reflection and 
thereby exposed by the painting. I had been uncovered and looked at as well The 
double reflection, seeing the other while the other saw me—however filled with blind 
spots—was a re-veal-ation. A revelation in an art gallery. The painting that has eyes 
looks back, resisting appropriation and objectification.
As i am drawn in, i am caught up in the metamorphosis, ossified, shown my 
nakedness and death. The painting sees my death and shows it to me What is revealed? 
The tenuous nature of my life and death, the frailly of the subject/object difference And 
if this is so frail, i wondered, do the others in the gallery see me looking? Do they know 
of my nakedness? My inescapable death?
And then the moment comes. The time, the very brief time, of living at the split, 
of having felt both sides, of seeing and being seen, of feeling a part of the interrelations 
around me, of understanding (not on any cerebral level). It all makes sense, if only for 
a moment . . . "What is so terrifying about it is that it is so terribly clear and such 
gladness. If it went on for more than five seconds, the soul could not endure it and must 
perish. In those five seconds I live through a lifetime, and I am ready to give my life for 
them, for it's worth it."^^
76 See footnote 58.
(Un)concluciing postscript 117
There is irony in those efforts one makes to alter one's way of looking at 
things, to change the boundaries of what one knows and to venture out a 
ways from there. Did mine actually result in a different way of thinking? 
Perhaps at most they made it possible to go back through what I had done 
from a new vantage point and in a clearer light. Sure of having traveled 
far, one finds that one is looking down on oneself from above. The journey 
rejuvenates things, and ages the relationship with oneself.
-Michel Foucault^*^
76 The Use o f Pleasure, 11
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